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ABSTRACT 
  
The study of technology is divided.  There are scholars, found especially in 
sociology and history, who emphasize interpretive flexibility, agency and historical 
contingency.  These I label ‘mild-constructivists.’  Other scholars, found especially in 
business, economics, military studies and macro-history, emphasize functional 
adaptation and “deterministic” trends.  These I label ‘sociotechnical adaptationists.’ A 
theory of sociotechnical evolution can unify the insights of these seemingly 
contradictory approaches to technology.  
Competitive processes constrain sociotechnical variation: the range of 
interpretations and choices available to an actor are constrained by the imperative to 
survive.  Economic and military competition, in particular and in the long run, 
constrain an actor’s decisions to those that promote, respectively, the profit or power 
of the encompassing ‘social organism,’ such as a firm or state.   
Thomas Misa has noted that scholarship with large-scales of analysis tends to 
be technologically deterministic.  At large scales of analysis, instances of economic 
and military competition are more common.  I argue that economic and military 
competition is the mechanism that gives rise to emergent deterministic patterns.  New 
technology “merely opens a door; it does not compel [us] to enter.”
1  It is economic 
and military competition that shoves us through.   
Military competition tends to operate over longer time scales and constrain 
economic and social competitive processes.  Economic competition operates over 
middle time scales and constrains social competitive processes.  These competitive 
forces “select” for economically and militarily functional sociotechnical 
                                                 
1 White, Lynn. 1962. Medieval Technology and Social Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 28. configurations.  Thus, at larger scales of analysis the competitive processes giving rise 
to functionalist adaptation are more apparent.    
A unified theory of sociotechnical evolution can reconcile the detailed micro-
narratives of mild constructivism with the functionalist insights of the adaptationists.  
Almost all theories of technology are appropriate in their proper analytical context, 
defined by the character of variation (in particular, the degree of path dependency) and 
the kinds of competitive processes present.   
There are, however, two approaches to technology which cannot be reconciled 
within a theory of sociotechnical evolution.  They are radical social constructivism and 
naïve technological determinism.  Scholars in the first group claim that there is 
unlimited interpretive flexibility, agency and contingency.  Scholars from the latter 
group naively attribute agency to technology, failing to acknowledge the absence of a 
micro-theory for their claims.   
 
The history of Japan’s use of firearms provides an illustration of the utility of 
the sociotechnical evolution framework.  The introduction of firearms into Japan, 
beginning in 1543, follows the adaptationist script: two firearms arrived with some 
Portuguese adventurers, were bought, reverse engineered, and soon produced and used 
in the hundreds and then thousands.   
From the 1600s to 1853, though, Japan’s use and development of firearms 
stagnated.  Constructivist scholars could productively explore the social reasons for 
this ‘reversion to the sword’.  Their findings are bounded, though, by the conditions 
that characterized this period, namely: the absence of internal and external military 
competition.   
In 1853 Commodore Perry’s ultimatum ended this 250 year ‘retrogression’ by 
imposing a painful imperialist challenge.  Japan could no longer maintain its isolation 
  without risking following the fate of China in the Opium Wars.  Japan’s ensuing 
industrialization and modernization poses a problem for both constructivist and 
adaptationist theories of technology.  Japan eventually adopted superior Western 
military technologies, but not in the simple functionalist way that an adaptationist 
would expect. A satisfying history requires an appreciation for both the cultural and 
military context, and the ways that they interact.   
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Tradition is not something constant but the product of a process of selection 
guided not by reason but by success. . . . 
 -Friedrich  Hayek
2
Introduction 
Who—if anyone—controls technological change?   
The most important, though often disguised, issue in the study of technology is 
the question of agency.  Can individuals or groups modify their tools, and thus 
necessarily their systems of production, social relations, political systems, and world-
view?   Or, are we trapped within the unintended consequences of momentous 
technological systems that were built by yesterday’s engineers?  Or, are the majority 
of people obliged to use the technologies designed by the powerful to reinforce their 
rule?  Or, does technology autonomously develop according to an “inner logic” that, 
for better or worse, determines society?     
Prior to the 1970s, the view that technological change was an autonomous, 
“out of control,” history-shaping process was, in many scholarly circles, well received.  
Since the 1980s, though, this view has been disparagingly labeled “technological 
determinism,” and has been increasingly caricatured to the point where no sociologist 
or historian today would allow themselves to be so labeled.  In the words of historian 
of technology Ronald Kline, “technological determinism” has become a “critics’ 
term.”
3   The pendulum of scholarly fashion has swung away from large-scale 
inferences about abstract technology-driven historical trends towards small-scale 
descriptive narratives that emphasize the agency of individuals and groups.  While in 
other fields of social science this intellectual tension is regularly confronted under the 
                                                 
2 Hayek, Friedrich. 1985. Law, Legislation, and Liberty, volume 3: The Political Order of a Free 
People. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,166.
3 Kline, Ronald R. 2001. Technological Determinism. In International Encyclopedia of the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences (3rd ed.), edited by N. J. Smelsa and P. B. Baltes. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
1  
rubric of “structure vs. agency,” or “determinism vs. voluntarism,” or “inevitability vs. 
contingency,” within the sociological and historical study of technology the debate has 
been won by the social constructivists and contextualists.  And yet, to this day, in the 
neighboring disciplines of economics, geography, archaeology, and computer science, 
and in the discourse of business strategists and military planners, technologically 
deterministic claims are rampant.   
Rather than dismiss the large body of scholarship—past and present—that 
finds technology to be a self-moving determinant of social change, this paper seeks to 
reconcile “deterministic” observations with the interpretivist insights and attention to 
micro-social action of constructivist approaches to technology.  I introduce a 
conceptual category, “sociotechnical adaptationism,” which encompasses those 
approaches to technology that explain change by appealing to the adaptiveness or 
functionality of technology.  I argue that all sociotechnical adaptationist work rests on 
the critical mechanism of competition; economic and military competition constrain 
choice, historical contingency, and give rise to deterministic trends.   I finally outline 
the beginnings of a theory of sociotechnical evolution which can reconcile the insights 
of constructivist and adaptationist scholarship by making explicit two key contextual 
parameters: 1) the path-dependency of variation in form, and 2) the character and 
intensity of selection processes (competition).  I then look at the history of firearms in 
Japan because it represents one of the most dramatic examples of the social 
construction of technology, and, following 1853, one of the most radical cultural 
reversions concerning - and induced by - technology.  
I propose that a theory of sociotechnical evolution, by emphasizing the 
processes of variation and selection, can reconcile interpretivist insights, micro-social 
action, and large scale technologically deterministic claims.  To briefly summarize 
what such a theory argues: 1) All knowledge is imperfect, and socially and cognitively 
2  
mediated; 2) large scale historical patterns emerge from the actions of individuals and 
do not exist independently of individual actors; 3) technological change enables new 
sociotechnical configurations; 4) military or economic competition has been 
ubiquitous throughout history; 5) by definition, some configurations will out-compete 
others, and will proliferate through either conquest or imitation; 6) in a large 
population of competing actors, each individual is constrained (and driven) by the 
imperatives of successful competition.   To summarize: in a competitive world, 
sources of sociotechnical variation (such as new technologies) will “drive history” by 
“opening the doors” that competing actors will be compelled to step through so as to 
survive.  Competition constrains a group’s feasible choice set to those few options that 
allow social survival, be it of the family, the tribe, the firm, or the state.  Those who 
choose to not adapt (or are unable to adapt) become incorporated or destroyed by the 
dominant sociotechnical systems.   
As the number of competing social entities approaches infinity, individual 
agency—the ability to shape the  future—vanishes to nothing.  Individual entities may 
only choose to innovate, imitate or be conquered; if they do not make the adaptive 
decision they will replaced by or incorporated into those entities that do make the 
adaptive decision.    Historical change is determined by two sets of analytically 
separable factors, those that affect: 1) the variation in social forms and 2) the nature of 
the competitive environment.  Technological change has been an important—though 
by no means the only—factor affecting the variation and selection of social forms.  
Other “social” factors have also been important, such as the creation of different 
ideologies and institutions.  What is unimportant, in this picture of a world of many 
competing entities, is individual choice.  
There are actually two debates about technological determinism: 1) whether 
technology is the most important (or only) factor determining historical change, and 2) 
3  
whether individual humans have agency: the ability to perturb historical trajectories.
4  
In both debates, attention to competitive (or selectionist) processes provide a plausible 
mechanism for technologically deterministic claims, while at the same time situating 
their limits.  First, whether technology is the “most important” factor is an empirical 
question, one that depends on the nature of variation and selection in different 
historical contexts (and scales of analysis).  Second, as will be explained in the section 
below on sociotechnical evolution, selectionism points out that historical contingency 
(and therefore individual agency) is inversely related to the scale and intensity of inter-
group competition.   
For these reasons, the position I put forward in this paper should be called 
“sociotechnical evolutionism,” with its more deterministic inferences properly called 
“sociotechnical adaptationism,” rather than the ambiguous—bordering on 
meaningless—“technological determinism.”  Adaptationism believes that the 
characteristics of replicating entities (including social organisms like firms or states) 
are functional (also called adaptive or optimal) because functional traits tend to 
proliferate within competitive systems.  Note that the terms ‘functional’, ‘adaptive’ 
and ‘optimal’ all imply a selection environment: functional for what, adaptive for 
what, optimal for what.   
The question of whether “technical” or “social” factors are more important to 
historical change is not central to adaptationism, nor to the theoretical and political 
debates about agency and historical inevitability.  Besides, most scholars of 
technology will allow a sufficiently expansive definition of technology, or 
technological systems, as to obviate the need for splitting hairs on whether the artifact, 
institution, or ideology is “more important.”  What matters to most 
                                                 
4 Elster, Jon. 1983. Explaining Technical Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 32. 
4  
determinists/adaptationists and constructivists is whether our systems are “out of 
control,” or whether we—humans—are in charge of our destiny, and how exactly that 
control is manifest.
5   To this question sociotechnical evolutionism offers an answer: 
we have the freedom to shape our destiny over those time horizons for which we are 
able to alter the relevant selection pressures; to the extent that we compete within a 
system over which we have no control, we are bound by “best practice.”   
Interestingly, this theoretical finding is more than academic.  Never in history 
has humanity been more able to consciously design our global system: the possibility 
of choosing our destiny is within reach.  Our world, however, remains divided into 
“self-help” states, or blocs, that acquire weapons and oil supplies in anticipation of 
future conflict.  Furthermore, economic competition is intense and broad, constraining 
many government policies with the threat of capital flight and lost “competitiveness.”  
Selectionist analyses point the way through confused political debates about effecting 
change: to guide social evolution one must, at the least, supervise military and 
economic competition.    
 
In the real world, of course, neither ideal-type of extreme sociotechnical 
adaptationism or radical social constructivism is accurate: the world does not consist 
only of a large population of intensively competing actors, nor is competition absent 
all together.
6  During times of weak competition and with few competing entities
7 
                                                 
5 Winner, Langdon. 1977. Autonomous Technology - Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political 
Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
6 I will explain in detail how competition constrains interpretive flexibility and agency in the section on 
Sociotechnical Evolution. 
 
7 In this paper I focus almost exclusively on competition as the selectionist process; I do this because 
competition is a concept more easily grasped by readers who are unfamiliar with selectionist theory.  To 
those who are familiar with selectionist theory, I acknowledge that selectionist processes need not be 
blatantly “competitive”, such as with ecological selection where entities may be “competing to survive” 
with “nature.”  “Competition” is a useful metaphor, though, with which to introduce selectionist theory 
5  
there will be weaker selection for functional traits, more historical contingency, and 
the interpretivist critique will be central to understanding historical change: socially 
constructivist narratives will be the most compelling.  In times of intense competition 
and many social entities, selection for adaptive traits will be strongest, historical 
contingency and agency will be constrained, the interpretivist critique will be only 
weakly relevant: sociotechnical adaptationist arguments will be the most compelling.  
Furthermore, since there will be more actors, more opportunities for 
competitive interaction, weaker social ties and higher costs of collective action over 
larger scales
8 of analysis, adaptationist explanations are more appropriate—and 
consequently more prevalent—in macro-scholarship.  Scholarship emphasizing 
interpretive flexibility and historical contingency are more prevalent and appropriate 
for studying processes over relatively smaller scales of analysis.  Misa’s observed 
correlation between macro-analysis and technological determinism can be explained 
by this relationship between the scale of analysis and the intensity and character of 
selection: as the scale of analysis increases, sociotechnical adaptationist explanations 
become more appropriate, the interpretivist critique less relevant, agency and 
contingency constrained, and sociotechnical variation induced through technological 
change becomes a central process in historical change.  Technology does not simply 
drive history through autonomous linear progress, as naïve interpretations of 
technological determinism would suggest.  Nuanced technologically deterministic 
claims can, however, be sustained through a sociotechnical adaptationist theory of 
history: technological change enables new sociotechnical possibilities, some of which 
                                                                                                                                              
since in most selectionist systems different entities compete for some resource, and especially in social 
systems, the selectionist environment consists largely of competition with other social organisms.   
8 Large temporal scales of analysis tend to involve large spatial scales of analysis because there are 
more opportunities for spatially distant factors to influence each other.  Likewise, large spatial scales of 
analysis tend to involve large temporal scales of analysis, since distant entities tend to interact over 
larger scales of time.   
6  
out-compete their rivals and proliferate regardless of the wishes and interpretations of 
the conquered. 
 
Theory 
This paper seeks to reconcile two seemingly antithetical perspectives on 
technological change: “technological determinism”
9 and social constructivism.  Both 
perspectives possess abundant supportive evidence, a large community of scholarly 
advocates, and a quickly appreciated prima facie plausibility.  While some scholars 
situated in the extremes choose to converse only with those in their own camps, 
accusing the other camp of “technological determinism” or “relativist post-
modernism,” many scholars situate themselves uncomfortably between.  Few scholars, 
however, have tried to unify these groups theoretically.  Motivated by the 
epistemological prior that the tensions between two seemingly contradictory, yet 
independently compelling, explanations for the same phenomena ought to be resolved, 
I hope to offer an outline for a unified theory (sociotechnical evolutionism), built on a 
theoretical mechanism (variation and selection) which can explain how deterministic 
macro-historical dynamics could emerge from a constructivist micro-dynamic.   
 
In the following sections I will survey, with particular reference to their 
theoretical implications and contradictions, first technological deterministic 
scholarship, and then social constructivist scholarship.  After a brief epistemological 
interlude, I will then introduce a new category for a set of slightly deterministic 
theories: sociotechnical adaptationism.  After laying out the theoretical landscape, I 
                                                 
9 Scare quotes to indicate that this nomenclature isn’t balanced, “technological determinism” being a 
critic’s term, social constructivism being the group’s own self-designation. 
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will discuss what an encompassing unified theory—sociotechnical evolutionism—
based on the analytical distinction of variation and selection, would look like.  Finally, 
I discuss the history of firearms use and development in Japan as an illustrative 
example.    
What is Technology? 
One premise of this theoretical enterprise, as well as that underlying most 
studies of technology, is that ‘technology’ is a coherent concept that can be studied, 
and that insights from the study of a particular technology can be usefully generalized 
to other technologies.  ‘Technology,’ though, may be an ill-founded concept, 
confusing more than clarifying, because of what it conflates and what it hides.  If this 
is the case, then perhaps the deep divisions in the study of technology are not a cause 
for concern, since each disciplinary approach may be studying different entities which 
are confusingly conflated under the term ‘technology’.  I don’t, however, believe this 
is the case, as I argue presently. 
 ‘Technology,’ as a concept, emerged during the late 19
th Century to fill a 
“semantic void, that is, a set of social circumstances for which no adequate concept 
was yet available.”
10  ‘Technology,’ defined in 1909 as “the science or systematic 
knowledge of the industrial arts”
 11 accomplished something which the terms 
‘mechanical,’ ‘practical’ and ‘industrial’ arts could not.  Firstly, ‘technology’ was able 
to transcend the “vulgarity” of the “idea of utility”
12, abstracting away from concrete 
connotations of dirty machines to the more refined and progressive pursuits of science 
                                                 
10 Marx, Leo. 1997. Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept. Social Research 64 (3). 
11 Harris, W. T., and F. Sturges Allen, eds. 1909. Webster's New International Dictionary of the 
English Language. Springfield, Mass: G. & C. Merriam Co. 
12 Kline. Technological Determinism;Knox, MacGregor, and Williamson Murray. 2001. The Dynamics 
of Military Revolution: 1300-2050. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;Marx. Technology: The 
Emergence of a Hazardous Concept.  
8  
and business.  Secondly, machines were increasingly embedded in large systems (such 
as the railroad) which involved extensive infrastructures and new forms of social 
interaction, training, financing, and legislation.  ‘Technology’ came to encompass 
entire technological systems.  And yet despite the word’s vastness, abstractness and 
vagueness, ‘technology’ also continues to imply specific artifacts, like an automobile 
or transistor.  ‘Technology,’ then, is a term referring to large systems composed of 
social, political, economic and mechanical elements, and yet at the same time the term 
focuses on specific mechanical elements: technical artifacts.   
Leo Marx sees this dual meaning of technology as a source of conceptual 
danger.  On the one hand, ‘technology’ in the abstract has grown so vague as to 
interpenetrate with almost all of ‘society,’ and yet we still speak about ‘technology’ as 
if it is a discrete thing.  Thus, to ask about the “‘impact’ of a major technology like the 
automobile upon society makes little more sense, by now, than to speak of the impact 
of the bone structure on the human body.”
13  ‘Technology,’ by putting our conceptual 
focus on the artifact and yet connoting the entire system, leads people to exaggerate 
the causal force of artifacts, rather than the social, political and economic relations that 
also constitute and shape these systems.  This semantic confusion has led many people 
to treat ‘technology’ as if it were the:  
. . . causative factor-if not the chief causal factor-in every conceivable 
development of modernity.… [‘Technology’] serves as a surrogate agent, as well 
as a mask, for the human actors actually responsible for the developments in 
question.… Because of its peculiar susceptibility to reification, to being endowed 
with the magical power of an autonomous entity, technology is a major 
contributant to that gathering sense, at the close of the millennium, of political 
impotence. By attributing autonomy and agency to technology, we make 
ourselves vulnerable to the feeling that our collective life in society is 
uncontrollable.
14  
 
                                                 
13 Marx. Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept.  
14 Ibid. 
9  
Leo Marx does not make specific recommendations concerning the use of 
‘technology.’  A possible alternative, of which it seems reasonable to infer that Marx 
would approve, would be to avoid using the word ‘technology’ and replace it with two 
words for the two meanings.  ‘Artifact’ can stand in the abstract for all useful material 
‘technologies’: machines, devices, tools.  ‘Technological system,’ or perhaps even 
better ‘sociotechnical system,’ can refer to the vast, hard-to-delineate systems.  I will 
adopt this usage, where possible, because it does clarify much discussion.  
However, even after the introduction of these two clarifying nouns, there 
remains a semantic need for ‘technology’.  We can see this in one present-day 
definition of technology as “a manner of accomplishing a task, especially using 
technical processes, methods, or knowledge.”
15  ‘Technology,’ in this definition, is a 
term which denotes the set of all artifacts, practices and institutions that serve (or once 
served) as an intended means to some human designated end.  For example, when we 
speak of the ‘technology of education,’ we mean something more than simply the 
artifacts used in education, and something different from the educational system itself.    
The technology of education refers to all the computers, books and 
blackboards (artifacts), lesson plans, seating arrangements, grading and salary 
incentive structures (techniques), and the knowledge base and research of educational 
psychology and the subject matter that is being taught (knowledge base and its 
production).  The expressions ‘the educational system’ or ‘the sociotechnical system 
for education’ refer to all of this and more.  The ‘technology of education,’ however, 
refers to all those things within the ‘educational system’ that are (intended to be) 
functional, as well as putting emphasis on their (intended) functionality.  The term 
‘technology’ is both a reference to (functional) artifacts, techniques, knowledge 
                                                 
15 “Technology.” Merriam-Webster Online.  2005 [accessed January 10th, 2005]. Available from 
www.m-w.com. 
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institutions and sociotechnical systems, but also an emphasis on their functionality, 
rather than their materiality.  ‘Technology,’ then, is all those things that are 
technological or functional, as well as an analytical lens (emphasizing functionality) 
through which to see those things. 
For this reason, I believe that though ‘technology’ as a category is 
indeterminate and does suffer from Leo Marx’s critique, as an analytical lens it allows 
us to focus on functional aspects of the sociotechnical world.  ‘Technology studies’ is 
the academic domain which studies (intended to be) functional artifacts, practices, 
knowledge and systems, as well as the meaning of functionality itself. 
Like the three metaphorical pillars for the social sciences, ‘economy,’ ‘society’ 
and ‘polity,’ ‘technology’ as an abstract concept is inseparable from the totality of 
social reality.  It is equally as impossible to point to some component of our social 
world that is not technological, as to something which is not social, economical or 
political.  These terms, at their most abstract, each refer to the entire social reality.   
Yet they are not synonyms.  Each term, or abstract lens, emphasizes different elements 
and relationships of this social reality.  A computer is a different entity when seen 
through a technological, social, economic or political lens.  ‘Technology,’ thus, is all 
those things that are  functional, as well as a concept that emphasizes the functional 
elements of various things.  The study of technology, then, is an analytical enterprise 
which focuses on the functional dimension of social reality.   
 
In this document, then, I will use the (referential) synonyms for ‘technology’ 
when appropriate (such as tool, artifact, machine, technique, institution, ideology, 
system, etc.).  I will, however, maintain the (conceptual) use of ‘technology’ to refer to 
and emphasize the functionality of  artifacts, practices, knowledge or systems.    
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Technological Determinism 
Merritt Roe Smith summarizes “hard technological determinism” as the belief 
that “technological development [is] an autonomous force, completely independent of 
social constraints”; human “agency (the power to effect change)”
16 is limited such that 
“changes in technology exert a greater influence on societies and their processes than 
any other factor.”
17    Ronald Kline shares Smith’s formulation of technological 
determinism: 1) technology develops according to an “inner logic independent of 
social influence”
18 and 2) “technological change determines social change in a 
prescribed manner.”
19  Bruce Bimber, in trying to bring clarity to the discussion, 
radically defines “nomological” technological determinism as the claim that “there is 
only one possible future course of social change [that] ‘would be the same no matter 
what people thought or desired’… History is predetermined by scientific laws that are 
sequentially discovered by people … which produce technology.”
20  Given this 
extreme interpretation, it is not surprising that Bimber finds “technological 
determinism [to be a] rather unlikely account”
21 of historical change.   The question of 
technological determinism is a multi-dimensional issue, concerning which the above 
critics have selected and conflated the most extreme positions on each intellectual axis 
for its definition.  It is thus unsurprising to find that no scholar of technology would or 
does self-identify as a technological determinist.  Ronald Kline has aptly identified 
this intellectual category as a “critics’ term”
 22 and suggested abandoning its use.
23  Its 
                                                 
16 Smith, Merritt Roe, ed. 1987. Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the 
American Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, xii. 
17 Smith, Merritt Roe, and Leo Marx, eds. 1994. Does Technology Drive History?  The Dilemma of 
Technological Determinism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2. 
18 Kline. Technological Determinism. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Miller, Richard. 1984. Analyzing Marx. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 183, quoted in 
Bimber, Bruce. 1994. Three Faces of Technological Determinism. In Does Technology Drive History? 
edited by M. R. Smith and L. Marx. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 84.   
21 Bimber. Three Faces of Technological Determinism, 99. 
22 Kline. Technological Determinism. 
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imprecise and dismissive meaning serves more to delimit the boundaries of 
“acceptable” scholarship than to foster productive intellectual exchange.     
If we understand “technological determinism” more charitably, though, as the 
claim that 1) there is some broad sequence and tempo of scientific and technical 
advance that 2) profoundly shapes historical change, and 3) is not entirely controlled 
by social choice,
24 then “technological determinism” has had a respectable scholarly 
history and present. In the absence of a more favorable label, throughout this paper I 
will use “technological determinism” to refer to those scholars who emphasize, to 
varying degrees, the above three related claims. If scholarly debate manages to avoid 
Bimber’s strawman caricature of “technological determinism” in the future and adopts 
a moderate version of Roe Smith or Kline’s definition, such as the one I outlined at the 
beginning of this paragraph, then a potent unified theoretical enterprise may be 
constructed, the first outlines of which I hope to develop in this paper in an integrated 
theory of sociotechnical evolution. 
  The above definitions of technological determinism collapse into two, often 
intertwining, intellectual questions: 1) Is technological change out of control, and 2) 
how important are “technical” factors in shaping historical change?  While the first 
question—the question of agency—is what motivated both the determinists and their 
constructivist critics, the issue of technological determinism is often misleadingly 
framed in terms of the second question.   
Following Thomas Hughes
25, I intend to distinguish these two overlapping 
meanings by referring to the claim that our sociotechnical system is largely out-of-
                                                                                                                                              
23 Dafoe, A. Personal Conversation with Ronald Kline, 2005.  
24 This formulation is borrowed from Robert Heilbroner, found in: Heilbroner, Robert. 1967. Do 
Machines Make History? Technology and Culture 8. 
25 Hughes uses “technical” to refer to physical artifacts and software, and “technology” to refer to 
sociotechnical systems.  Smith, and Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History?  The Dilemma of 
Technological Determinism., 102. 
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control as technological determinism, and the more ambitious claim that technical 
factors are the most important determinants of historical change as technical 
determinism.  Technical determinists are obviously also technological determinists, 
since if technical factors are the most important historical determinants then technical 
factors are more important than other factors, such as political systems, beliefs, or 
values, which might control historical change.   
While technological determinists do tend to see technical trends as underlying 
or embodying the out-of-control forces facing humanity, few are interested in arguing 
over whether technical, economic or social factors are more causally determinative 
(sometimes called, respectively, technical, economic or social determinism).  Most 
technological determinists would in fact argue that the process or trends that they 
describe also involve economic, political, social and psychological phenomena.  
Rather, the important point for technological determinists is that these processes are 
out-of-control, spreading a rationalizing logic that is largely, if not completely, 
independent of human will.   Lewis Mumford perhaps expressed best the irrelevance 
of the technical/social distinction through his characterization of the deterministic 
process: “The Machine, by which I mean all the agencies of order, regularity, and 
efficiency, whether social or technical….”
26    
The claims of technological determinists, thus, should be read in the light of 
the question of agency.  They argue, in short, that humans are forfeiting or losing 
control over their future, and that this loss of control has something to do with the 
spread of technological artifacts, systems, and ways of thinking and living.  One strain 
of deterministic thought equated technological progress with endless social progress,
27 
                                                 
26 Mumford, Lewis. 1954. In the Name of Sanity. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 106. 
27 Marx, Leo. 2003 (1987). Does Improved Technology Mean Progress. In Technology and the Future, 
edited by A. H. Teich. Toronto, ON: Wadsworth. 
14  
and saw the rationalization of our tools and systems leading inexorably to a utopian 
world.  These optimistic technological determinists, or techno-utopianists, were less 
concerned about agency: why worry about control when technological change is 
universally benevolent?   Others warned about the perils of the ever-expanding, 
rationalizing, de-humanizing technique, mega-machine, or technological grid.  To 
these pessimistic technological determinists, often just denoted as “technological 
determinists,” who have been most attacked for vivifying the abstract noun 
“technology,” the question of agency has necessarily always been paramount.   
The Techno-Utopianists
28  
Techno-utopian thought—the belief that society could be improved socially, 
economically, and politically through the rational pursuit of scientific knowledge and 
technological progress—emerged during the Enlightenment and alongside the political 
revolutions in France, England, and America.
29  Since then, many intellectuals and 
social leaders  from every political perspective—capitalist and communist, libertarian 
and statist, establishment and revolutionary—have proclaimed the benefits of the 
rational reorganization of our sociotechnical systems.  The eloquent Senator Daniel 
Webster expressed the utopian view well in this 1847 speech heralding the dedication 
of a railroad:  
Truly this is almost a miraculous era.  What is before us no one can say, 
what is upon us no one can hardly realize.  The progress of the age has almost 
outstripped human belief; the future is known only to Omniscience.
30
The new advertising amplified this creed by touting the social wonders that 
could be had from a judicious purchase of a particular brand of clothing, food, 
                                                 
28 The following section benefits greatly from Merritt Roe Smith, in Smith, and Marx, eds. Does 
Technology Drive History?  The Dilemma of Technological Determinism. 
29 Marx. Does Improved Technology Mean Progress. 
30 Quoted in Ibid., 6-7.   
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appliance, or automobile.  Advertisers along with politicians exploited the appeal of 
the technological fix: rather than try to solve a problem by the painful old-fashioned 
methods of political conflict and moral introspection, the possibility of the 
technological fix allowed those who were responsible a costless solution.  In some 
cases it worked.   
The Year 2000.  Herman Kahn and Norbert Wiener, exemplify well the 
optimistic and deterministic spirit of techno-utopianism in their book  The Year 2000.  
In this 1967 text, Kahn and Wiener extrapolate various techno-economic trends, 
optimistically predicting a GNP for the United States for the year 2000 of between $7-
23 trillion (1998 dollars), for which the published figure was over $9 billion.   They 
also envisaged a range of likely discoveries, of which 30% came to pass.  
Their corresponding predictions about how this newly grown wealth would be 
used and distributed, and its social consequences, however, were sorely misperceived.  
Kahn and Wiener envisioned dramatic social improvements: welfare services would 
provide a “high ‘floor’ under living standards. . . . The lower middle classes. . . would 
enjoy a greatly reduced work week. . . .”
31
Kahn and Wiener’s work exemplifies a number of facets of techno-utopian 
thought.  First, Kahn and Wiener claimed to predict the future (at least in terms of 
GNP, fairly accurately) half a century distant based on technological and economic 
trends which they believed would persist.  As such they believed that technological 
and economic change follows a benevolent “internal logic,” one that is presumably 
endorsed by society.  Like most determinists, they did not provide insight into the 
mechanism by which these trends perpetuate themselves, and thus into the possibility 
                                                 
31 Kahn, H. and A. J. Wiener (1967). The Year 2000 - A Framework for Speculation on the Next 
Thirty-Three Years. New York, MacMillan Company.  
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for social control were these trends to be no longer acceptable.   Second, Kahn and 
Wiener exemplified the establishment belief that techno-economic progress is 
sufficient for social progress, and that political issues of representation, redistribution 
and environmental conservation need not be salient.   
Technocratic Concept of Progress 
Leo Marx characterizes the kind of argument espoused by Kahn and Wiener, 
and 120 years earlier by Webster, as the “technocratic concept of progress,” wherein 
technological progress is conveniently regarded by the primary owners and 
beneficiaries of technology as the sufficient, if not only, means for broad social 
progress.
32  Langdon Winner summarizes the pattern:  
Since the earliest days of the Industrial Revolution, people have looked to 
the latest, most impressive technology to bring individual and collective 
redemption. The specific kinds of hardware linked to these fantasies have changed 
over the years: steam engine, railroad, telegraph, telephone, centrally generated 
electrical power, radio, television, nuclear power, the Apollo program, and space 
stations-all have inspired transcendental visions. But the basic conceit is always 
the same: new technology will bring universal wealth, enhanced freedom, 
revitalized politics, satisfying community, and personal fulfillment.
33
Techno-Utopianism Today 
Today, an extreme form of techno-utopianism has become commonplace, 
almost invisible because of its ubiquity.  Omnipresent advertising spreads the gospel 
of technological fixes: friendship, romance, happiness, identity, and meaning can all 
be acquired through new possessions.  Politicians wishfully promise technological 
solutions to our problems: nuclear attack can be averted through Ballistic Missile 
                                                 
32 Marx, Leo. 1987. Does Improved Technology Mean Progress. Technology Review;Marx. Does 
Improved Technology Mean Progress.  
33 Winner, Langdon. 1997. Technology Today: Utopia or Dystopia? Social Research 64 (3);Zerbisias, 
Antonia. 2006. Urging People Not to Consume is a Tough Sell. Toronto Star, April 17th.. 
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Defense, “[America’s] addiction [to oil can be broken] through technology.”
34  
Mainstream economists proclaim the simple morality of their “science” that free trade 
and the free market are welfare improving, generally leaving out their theory’s many 
assumptions.
35  Many businesses, ever in search of new sources of revenue, believe 
and espouse the endless promise of the new new thing to their shareholders.   
Respected scientists make claims, such as that by the authors of “Towards 2020 
Science,” that “a scientific revolution is just beginning [which may bring] a new wave 
of global social, technological and economic growth.  The basis for this revolution is 
the emergence of new conceptual and technological tools from computer science.”
36  
This brief sampling of mainstream techno-utopianist thought could be indefinitely 
extended, at a rate roughly proportional to the daily output of “science and 
technology” sections from almost all news and business periodicals.   
To techno-utopianists, who perceive technological progress as leading to social 
progress, the question of control was and is less pressing: even if they could radically 
perturb the system from its current trajectory, why would they?  The techno-
utopianists of the past and present, then, can be partly excused for failing to provide a 
fully specified mechanism for their claims, that is, a theory with micro-foundations.  
They have had less intellectual motive to precisely delineate the room for different 
kinds of human agency, since, most, if not all, of the actors in their story benefit from 
the predicted changes.  However, to the extent that a sociotechnical forecaster 
envisioned possible negative consequences, the techno-utopianist intellectual 
exemption would not suffice.  Techno-utopians, along with the most pessimistic 
                                                 
34 Bush, George W. State of the Union.  2006 [accessed 05/16/2006]. Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/index.html. 
35 For a more balanced economic appraisal of the risks attendant globalization, see Rodrik, Dani. 1997. 
Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. 
36 Emmott, Stephen, Stuart Rison, Serge Abiteboul, et al. 2005. Towards 2020 Science. Venice, 12,  
http://research.microsoft.com/towards2020science/background_overview.htm . 
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forecasters, share the unmet intellectual burden of fully specifying the mechanisms 
propelling change; in other words, all but the most naively optimistic forecasters share 
the determinists’ theoretical shortcoming of failing to explain the constraints on 
individual and group agency. 
The Technological Determinists 
A writer need not be pessimistic to be a technological determinist, as the 
techno-utopians demonstrate.  However, the technological determinists’ most 
significant claim, that historical change is out-of-control, is most pronounced in the 
work of pessimistic sociotechnical forecasters, for whom either false consciousness or 
mass political impotence must exist.  Thus, pessimistic sociotechnical forecasters face 
the technological determinist problematic most seriously: to specify the mechanisms 
driving sociotechnical change and constraining human agency.  In the following pages 
I will survey the arguments of the most pessimistic technological determinists, that is 
those scholars most commonly denoted by the term “technological determinists.”  It 
should be kept in mind, though, that technologically deterministic scholarship also 
includes all the works of those who envision utopian, more moderate, or unpredictable 
social consequences arising from obdurate technical trends.  
 
To the pessimistic technological determinists, the issues of control and 
collective consciousness are most pronounced.  In order to explain the gradual 
crushing of humanity and nature beneath the spreading technological complex and 
technocratic ethos, the pessimists argued that the forces aligned behind technology 
were daunting, and could only be overcome by a collective awakening.  Jean Jacques 
Ellul, while arguing that “technique… is artificial, autonomous, self-determining, and 
19  
independent of all human intervention”
 37, nonetheless saw it as his purpose “to arouse 
the reader to an awareness of technological necessity and what it means[; to] call to 
the sleeper to awake.”
38  Lewis Mumford warned that “man will become a passive, 
purposeless, machine conditioned animal”
 39 unless we are able to throw “off the myth 
of the machine.”
40  According to the pessimists, humanity is in serious trouble, and 
little short of a massive political, if not spiritual, awakening will save us.
 
 
Lewis Mumford famously adopted increasingly pessimistic and deterministic 
language towards the end of his life: “Like a drunken locomotive engineer on a 
streamlined train, plunging through the darkness at a hundred miles an hour, we have 
been going past the danger signals without realizing that our speed, which springs 
from our mechanical facility, only increased our danger and will make more fatal the 
crash.”
41  Merritt Roe Smith summarizes Lewis Mumford as believing that  
‘our overmechanized culture’ was rapidly moving toward a ‘final 
totalitarian structure.’  In the competition for world markets, industrial societies 
pressed hard to develop technological capacities that would give them an edge 
and, in the process, made the machine rather than the human condition the form 
against which all else was measured.
42   
Mumford writes that: 
Man will become a passive, purposeless, machine-conditioned animal 
whose proper functions, as technicians now interpret man’s role, will either be fed 
into the machine or strictly limited and controlled for the benefit of de-
personalized, collective organizations[…] There is no hope for mankind except by 
                                                 
37 Ellul, Jacques. 1962. Technological Order. Technology and Culture 3, 10, quoted in Smith, and 
Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History?  The Dilemma of Technological Determinism., 30.  
38 Ellul, Jacques. 1964. The Technological Society. Toronto, ON: Random House, Inc., 5, 19, quoted in 
Smith, and Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History?  The Dilemma of Technological Determinism.  
39 Smith, and Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History?  The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism., 29.  
40 Mumford, Lewis. 1970 (1964). The Pentagon of Power: The Myth of the Machine. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 435.  
41 Mumford, Lewis. 2000 (1952). Art and Technics. New York: Columbia University Press, 11-12. 
42 Smith, and Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History?  The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism., 29. 
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‘going with’ [the plans of technocratic society] for accelerated technological 
progress, even though man’s vital organs will all be cannibalized in order to 
prolong the megamachine’s meaningless existence.
43   
But despite Mumford’s deterministic language, like many other “determinists,” 
Mumford leaves room for radical human intervention:  
“for those of us who have thrown off the myth of the machine, the next 
move is ours,”
44 for, “what the human mind has created, it can also destroy”
45 
through “quiet acts of mental or physical withdrawal—in gestures of non-
conformity, in abstentions, restrictions, inhibitions, which will liberate him from 
the domination of the pentagon of power.”
46
Jean Jacques Ellul used similarly deterministic language when describing 
how la technique is “artificial, autonomous, self-determining, and independent of all 
human intervention.”
47  Ellul’s writing has served as the basis for many later 
deterministic arguments and caricatures.  While Ellul’s claims remain underspecified, 
lacking plausible and detailed causal mechanisms, his prime purpose was to provoke 
humanity to awareness of their probable fate—for the “sleeper to awake.”  Unlike 
Mumford’s simple political prescription for individual acts of passive resistance, 
Ellul’s hoped for political awakening was but the first difficult step in regaining 
control of la technique.  
Ronald Kline and Merritt Roe Smith have argued that Ellul and other 
technological critics who worry about technological unemployment and environmental 
catastrophes, in their efforts to mobilize political action, ironically paint a bleak 
deterministic picture that leaves little or no room for human agency.
48  Wiebe Bijker 
                                                 
43 Mumford, The Myth of the Machine, vol. 1, Technics and Human Development (Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1966), 200, 435. 
44 Ibid. 435. 
45 Ibid. 420. 
46 Mumford, Lewis. 1962. Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 188-
194,  quoted in Smith, and Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History?  The Dilemma of Technological 
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likewise sees technological determinism as “politically debilitating because [it] 
suggests that social and political interventions in the course of technology are 
impossible, thus making politicization of technology a futile endeavor.”
49  While I 
agree that a theory of technology that leaves no room for human intervention—
Bimber’s extreme nomothetic technological determinism, and the more extreme or 
“hard” definitions posed by Roe Smith and Kline—would be politically 
disempowering, few, if any, “technological determinist” theories are actually that 
hopeless, including Ellul, Mumford, Winner, and Karl Marx.  On the contrary, if our 
technological trajectory is strongly resistant to human intervention, then a theory of 
technology that significantly downplays this obduracy will itself be ineffective and 
debilitating, for it will induce unrealistic expectations and miscalibrated political 
strategies.  Environmental activists do not paint a desperate picture so as to discourage 
political action, but to shatter the comforting illusions that easy reformist social and 
technological fixes will suffice.  President Bush’s recent State of the Nation promise 
to “break [America’s] addiction [to oil] through technology”
50 avoided the political 
cost of confronting entrenched power-holders or the social and mental habits of 
American citizens, but will marginal subsidies for hydrogen fuel research really 
reduce the US’s consumption of fossil fuels?  Controlling autonomous technology 
requires radical social change, the determinists claim; radical social change can only 
be justified if our technological problems resist simple fixes.  In the absence of 
compelling evidence that a politically distorted analysis will have a positive political 
effect, the duty of an analyst should be to not underestimate or overestimate, but to 
accurately assess the obduracy of social processes.   
                                                 
49 Bijker, W. E. 2001b. Technology, Social Construction of. In International Encyclopedia of Social 
and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science, Ltd, 15523. 
50 Bush. State of the Union.  [accessed]. 
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Langdon Winner, one of the most eloquent proponents of technologically 
deterministic views, built upon Ellul’s foundation with a more nuanced, yet still direly 
pessimistic, view of the historical trajectory of technological change.  Langdon 
Winner’s seminal work, “Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a 
Theme in Political Thought”
51 centers the debate squarely, and properly, not on the 
question of whether technical or social factors are more important determinants of 
historical change, but on whether humans have control over their technologies and 
their future, and why it seems that sociotechnical systems posses a dynamism 
autonomous of their human components.  Four of Winner’s many contributions are 
particularly worthy of mention: the ideas of 1) the politics of artifacts, 2) the 
technological imperative, 3) unintended consequences, and 4) the socialization of 
allegiance to the technostructure.   
                                                 
51 Winner. Autonomous Technology - Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought 
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Do Artifacts Have Politics?
52 Langdon Winner argues that some 
technologies have a politics built into them by their creators.  Robert Moses 
allegedly
53 built low bridges so as to keep buses and their poor passengers away from 
Jones Beach.
54  Napoleon ordered broad and linear Parisian roads to facilitate putting 
down riots.  Gates and walls keep people out; keys (hard or digital) selectively allow 
some access.
55  While this point still inspires controversy amongst people unused to 
thinking about technology as a political structure, few scholars of technology would 
argue today that technologies can not be used for political purposes or do not have  
certain modes of action inscribed into them.   Technical power is itself an expression 
of different degrees and kinds of power possessed by various social groups.  
Analytical attention to the social structure of various degrees and kinds of power adds 
an important theoretical nuance that many naïve determinists and constructivists 
ignore.  The more tractable question, avoiding theoretical extremes, is not whether 
“people” have control over their destiny, but whether particular groups of people have 
or can acquire control.  Thus, since historical decision making does not take place by 
all people at one time, but by particular people in particular circumstances, one should 
expect a theory of human agency to be sufficiently nuanced to account for the 
different circumstances facing socially differentiated actors.   
                                                 
52 Winner, Langdon. 1980. Do Artifacts Have Politics. Daedalus 109 (1). 
53 For an empirical rebuttal to this claim, see Joerges, B. 1999. Do Politics Have Artefacts? Social 
Studies of Science 29 (3) 
54 Winner, Langdon. 1986. The Whale and the Reactor - A Search for Limits in an Age of High 
Technology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 23. 
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Technological Imperative.  More controversially, Winner also argued that 
some kinds of technologies have an inherent political valence, often elicited through 
the necessity, or imperative, to adapt other sociotechnical systems to suit the new 
technology.  Nuclear power, for example, requires an authoritarian organization 
structure to ensure against accidents, theft, and terrorism.  Furthermore, nuclear power 
promotes central authority by forcing energy consumers to connect to the provider’s 
electrical network, and hence conform to the provider’s political and economic 
network.   Nuclear power, in and of itself, does not compel these political reactions.  
However, “once nuclear power plants have been built … the kinds of reasoning that 
justify the adaptation of social life to technical requirements”
56 readily arise; the 
construction of nuclear power changes the relative costs of other sociotechnical 
choices, which will have political consequences. Lewis Mumford also advances the 
notion that certain technologies have a specific politics.  Mumford argues that 
throughout history two kinds of technologies “have recurrently existed side by side: 
one authoritarian, the other democratic, the first system-centered, immensely 
powerful, but inherently unstable, the other man-centered, relatively weak, but 
resourceful and durable.”
57   
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Unintended Consequences.  Perhaps the least controversial claim made by 
the “determinists” is that technological change elicits unintended consequences: 
“technology always does more than we intend.”
58  The machine gun and barbed wire 
unexpectedly gave rise to trench warfare.
59  The introduction of the automobile 
transformed American cities and culture.  DARPA research on robust networked 
communication systems led to email and the world wide web.
60  The introduction of 
the snowmobile into the herding practices of the egalitarian Skolt Lapps of Finland 
delocalized and economically differentiated the community.
61  In the words of a 
National Security Council report on the near future, “most experts agree that the IT 
revolution represents the most significant global transformation since the Industrial 
Revolution . . . . [Though] we do not know to what extent technology will benefit, or 
further disadvantage … less developed countries….”  Summarizing the possible 
consequences of the “IT revolution,” and of the unintended consequences of 
technology more generally, this NSC report writes, “As technologies emerge, people 
will lack full awareness of their wider economic, environmental, cultural, legal, and 
moral impact….”
62  
To the extent that the unintended consequences of new technologies exceed 
their intended consequences, the development of technology exerts an unpredictable 
influence on society.  In societies, such as our own, which prioritize technological 
innovation, the “random” buffeting of persistent unintended consequences should lead 
to unpredictable social changes:  
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A multiplicity of technologies, developed and applied under a very narrow 
range of considerations, act and interact in countless ways beyond the 
anticipations of any person or institution.  Except in cases of extreme danger or 
disaster, there are almost no existing means for controlling or regulating the 
products of this chain of events.  People still retain their logical position as users 
and controllers of technology.  But in the broader context which transcends both 
‘use’ and ‘control’, this logic is of little consolation.  As the speed and extent of 
technological innovation increase, societies face the distinct possibility of going 
adrift in a vast sea of ‘unintended consequences’.
63 
   
Were one to demonstrate that technological change has diminished the welfare 
of all (or most) related social groups, the technological determinist position would be 
confirmed, so long as we assume that people act in their own interest.  Why would a 
set of social groups allow the welfare-reducing unintended consequences from their 
technological choices unless they did not have control over their own technological 
development?  But if these unintended consequences consistently yield favored 
results, the determinists’ claim becomes much harder to prove.  A voluntarist—
someone who believes that human will drives history—can easily argue that humans 
willingly choose to be set adrift on a “vast sea of unintended consequences,” because 
the net benefits outweigh the costs.  But while this techno-utopian voluntarist claim 
may be valid, it still fails to specify historical mechanisms that would illuminate the 
levers available to concerned citizens.  Perhaps more condemningly, it is conveniently 
resonant with the interests of concentrated power-holders.   
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The Magnificent Bribe: the Socialization of Allegiance to the 
Technostructure.  Langdon Winner describes a 1969 report by the National Academy 
of Sciences
64 which makes the techno-utopian claim that “the advances of technology 
have yielded and still yield benefits that, on the whole, vastly outweigh all the injuries 
they have caused and continue to cause.”
65  This quote, like much techno-utopian 
literature, implicitly argues that we have accepted technical innovation for its 
beneficial unintended consequences, and that we should continue to do so.  This 
utopian view of technological change, which “has been a part of the tacit knowledge 
and most basic commitment of Western society for the last two hundred years[, 
believes that] technology is most productive when its ultimate range of results is 
neither foreseen nor controlled.”
66  In support of this view one can easily point to 
numerous, seemingly beneficial, unintended inventions, such as the internet and 
penicillin.  Furthermore, as compared to other societies, the last two hundred years 
have seen by far the greatest rise in human welfare in those societies characterized by 
this technological optimism and vigor,
67 measured in terms of life expectancy, access 
to material goods and knowledge, ease of transportation and communication, and in 
the proportion of the population that dies from war.
68  Perhaps Winner is correct to 
identify a tacit bargain between Western populations and the forces of technological 
development: so long as net welfare continues to increase, society willfully drifts on 
the pleasant waters of unforeseeable consequences.     
                                                 
64 Technology: Processes of Assessment and Choice. 1969. Washington, DC: National Academy of 
Sciences, Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives. 
65 Ibid., 11. 
66 Winner. Autonomous Technology - Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought, 98. 
67 Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 31; Jones, Eric L. 1981. The European 
Miracle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-5. 
68 Keeley, L. H. 1996. War Before Civilization - The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 90. 
 
28  
Of course, this simple narrative of progress requires an implicit moral or 
utilitarian calculus whereby we can say that “net welfare” has increased.  Economists, 
when pondering technological development or free trade, escape this paternalistic 
dead-end by envisioning a hypothetical compensation scheme to pay off the losers, a 
scheme that, alas, never quite takes place in the real world.  In the absence of such a 
trans-temporal compensation scheme or unanimous vote, how does anyone, such as 
the National Academy of Sciences, decide that the increased freedoms and production 
possibilities of the internal combustion engine, for example, “vastly outweigh” the 
consequent dispersal of extended communities, suburban isolation, increased 
dependencies of non-drivers, growth of dictatorships in oil-rich regions, and the risk of 
climate change?  By what calculus is the loss of certain cultural traditions by 
information and transportation technologies compensated by increasing economic and 
health indicators?  Thus, the simplistic claim of the unqualified blessings of 
technological advance disguises the complexity of historical change; a serious 
questioning of our technological choices should not just ask if they have been “good” 
or “bad,” but in what ways, to what extent, and for what and for whom have they been 
good or bad?   
Serious interrogation of the total long run costs and benefits of technological 
change rarely take place in private firms, democratic fora, or academia; even short run 
technology assessment has lost resources and legitimacy with the closing of the 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.  Given this lack of actual critical 
analysis, some more cynical social interpretations for the confidence of the techno-
utopianists gain credence.   
The techno-utopian promises of advertisers, business persons, politicians and 
others may proliferate so successfully because: a) many of the benefits of 
technological fixes are immediate and concentrated, while the costs are distant, 
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uncertain, and diffuse; b) technological fixes appeal to the greed, fears, and laziness of 
the audience, and c) they resonate with a techno-utopian ideology instilled into us 
through the technostructure.   
John Kenneth Galbraith, in his analysis of “financial euphoria” where 
economic expectations clearly escape the bounds of common sense, explains a process 
of greed driven collective delusion, which may generalize to other cases: 
Some artifact or some development, seemingly new and desirable—tulips 
in Holland, gold in Louisiana, real estate in Florida, the superb economic designs 
of Ronald Reagan—captures the financial mind…. The price of the object of 
speculation goes up…. The speculation building on itself provides its own 
momentum [and produces a] vested interest in error…. Those involved with the 
speculation are experiencing an increase in wealth…. No one wishes to believe 
that this is fortuitous or undeserved; all wish to think that it is the result of their 
own superior insight or intuition.  The very increase in values thus captures the 
thoughts and minds of those being rewarded.  Speculation buys up, in a very 
practical way, the intelligence of those involved…. Strongly reinforcing the 
vested interest in euphoria is the condemnation that the reputable public and 
financial opinion directs at those who express doubt or dissent.  It is said that they 
are unable, because of defective imagination or other mental inadequacy, to grasp 
the new and rewarding circumstances that sustain and secure the increase in 
values.  Or their motivation is deeply suspect….  The euphoric episode is 
protected and sustained by the will of those who are involved, in order to justify 
the circumstances that are making them rich.  And it is equally protected by the 
will to ignore, exorcise, or condemn those who express doubts.
69   
Further exacerbating this social departure from reality is the  
. . . specious association of money and intelligence…. There is a strong 
tendency to believe that the more money [an individual has] the more astute and 
penetrating his mental processes…. This view is then reinforced by the air of self-
confidence and self-approval that is commonly assumed by the affluent.
70   
 
Could it be that this socio-psychological pattern for every periodic fit of 
“irrational financial exuberance,” from Ponzi’s schemes to Enron, “America’s Most 
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Innovative Company”
71, may also be an accurate description for the ideologies 
sustaining Western Civilization?  Kurt Eichenwald explains how at Enron “the ever-
rising bubble of market prices created a sense of invincibility among corporate 
executives, who read market delusions as proof of their own genius.”
72  Arthur Brief, 
also speaking about the Enron case, agrees that social psychology has clearly 
demonstrated that “incentives and greed really blind.”
73  Could these diagnoses also 
not be true, to a milder but more widespread extent, of modern capitalist societies—
that most of us have been willing to believe a mild techno-utopianism because it 
justifies our short-term material gain?   
Are we the short-term beneficiaries of an unsustainable process, in which we 
borrow from the future, miscount deductions in our capital stock, or otherwise create 
debt and call it income?  Have we been euphorically counting reductions in our capital 
stock as income, such as through the consumption of fossil fuels and the rainforest?   
Have we been incurring a debt to the future, in terms of lost biodiversity, climate 
instability, and other long-term environmental processes, and called it “economic 
growth”?   
Furthermore, besides the self-interested reasons for believing an ideology that 
justifies borrowing from the future and calling it income, perhaps our system is 
systemically biased towards the proliferation of consumerist techno-utopian 
ideologies.  Advocates for simple living and reduced consumption, for example, are 
drowned out by the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on advertising, perhaps 
reflecting the Olsonian tendency of diffuse (environmental and social) interests to be 
overwhelmed by concentrated (business) interests.  Have we moved women into the 
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workforce, outsourced parenting to the television networks, eroded our social 
networks, accepted longer hours at more unstable and less fulfilling jobs, and counted 
it all as “growth” because the numbers are easier to add on the credit side of the 
ledger?   In the rare case where an anti-consumption advocacy group, AdBusters, has 
been willing and able to pay for commercial airtime to spread their message, they have 
been roundly rejected by most networks, who see these “social marketing spots” as 
inimical to their “core business model” of selling effective advertising space.
74   
An example closer to home involves the 1997-1998 radical transformation of 
MIT’s Technology Review in which the entire editorial staff was fired, motivated by 
“years of declining advertising revenue.”  The magazine transformed from a critical, 
policy oriented publication which published and sponsored the projects of those who 
feared an uncritical adoption of new technologies
75 to a publication whose new 
mandate, as characterized by former writer Winner and editor Marcus, respectively, as 
“boosterism” and “cheerleading for innovation.”   In the context of the above 
examples, in which anti-consumerist messages failed to attract or threatened 
advertising revenue, Winner’s description of the construction of technological 
somnambulism, echoing other works by JK Galbraith, seems to ring true: “each group 
with any appreciable social power has gained auxiliary membership in the 
technostructure or has been put on its payroll.”
76  Mumford concurs: “We are being 
asked to ratify … a magnificent bribe.”
77  Perhaps techno-utopianism is so prevalent, 
then, not because it is accurate, but because it is a worldview well rewarded by 
advertisers, conglomerates reliant on advertising, businesses requiring unquestioning 
professional devotion, and ourselves, so as to justify our comfortable way of life. 
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Technological Trends  
If unintended consequences are themselves a regular, and possibly expected, 
aspect of technical innovation, could they exhibit broad tendencies?  While these 
unintended consequences could be effectively “random,” depriving actors of agency 
without necessarily bringing great suffering or betterment, many technological 
determinists observe such long-term trends, be they utopian or dystopian.     
Economist Robert Heilbroner, in his foundational article “Do Machines Make 
History?”, expresses what many people commonly believe, that there is a broad 
sequence to technological progress:   
The steam mill follows the hand-mill not by chance but because it is the 
next ‘stage’ in a technical conquest of nature that follows one and only one 
grand avenue of advance… It is impossible to proceed to the age of the steam-
mill until one has passed through the age of the hand-mill, and in turn one 
cannot move to the age of the hydroelectric plant before one has mastered the 
steam-mill, nor to the nuclear power age until one has lived through that of 
electricity.
78
 
Heilbroner’s grand avenue seems prima facie compelling: surely some 
technologies require the prior invention of other, more basal and simple technologies.  
Science writer Robert Wright points out likewise how, “archaeologists can't help but 
notice that, as a rule, the deeper you dig, the simpler the society whose remains you 
find.”
79  At this point technological determinism makes connections with social 
evolutionism
80, seeing in history a tendency towards “increased hierarchical 
differentiation and …complexity”
81, increased “energy harnessed per capita [and] 
                                                 
78 Heilbroner. Do Machines Make History? : 336.   
79 Wright, Robert. 2000. Nonzero-The Logic of Human Destiny. New York: Pantheon Books, 16. 
80 The following quotes come largely from Carneiro, Robert L. 2003. Evolutionism in Cultural 
Anthropology. Boulder, Colarado: Westview Press 
81 Adams, Robert McC. 2001. Complexity in Archaic States. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 
20:345 
33  
efficiency”
82, “toward increasing social and political complexity”
83, and “toward 
greater complexity.”
84  In fact, there are abundant uncontroversial easily quantified 
trends, which are more robust at larger time and space scales, such as an increase in: 
population size, absolute and per capita GDP, speed of transportation and 
communication, life expectancy, education and access to knowledge, and the lethality 
of weapons, to name just a few.  On more technical criteria the list can be extended in 
almost any direction conceivable: durability of materials, efficiency of engines, 
marginal productivity of labor, costs of storing and reproducing information, height of 
buildings. . . . 
85  These trends need not extend monotonically, that is in one direction 
at all scales of analysis, for them to warrant analysis and explanation.  Even the laws 
of physics, such as gravity, express themselves cleanly only in simple environments 
such as a vacuum, devoid of confounding influences such as wind.  Obviously, any 
laws of or trends in history, if they exist, will coexist with some noise.   
An eminent historian of technology has recently noted, despite the professional 
socialization against such deterministic claims, at least one such obvious technical 
trend.  Historian of computing Paul Ceruzzi states that an “internal logic is at work”
86 
in the evolution of some technologies.  For example, over the past 40 years the 
“exponential growth of chip density has hardly deviated from its slope,”
87 as described 
by “Moore’s Law.”  Ceruzzi infers from this evidence that historians of technology 
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should “step back from a social constructionist view of technology” and consider that, 
in at least some cases, “raw technological determinism is at work.”
88   
The techno-utopians claim that these trends underwrite social progress.  Many 
of the technological determinists who are not caught up in the financial inducements to 
cheerlead for innovation reasonably note that these technological trends have mixed 
and unpredictable consequences for humanity.  Business “reengineering” guru 
Michael Hammer writes that the tendency towards increased social disruptions (or 
dynamism), whether for “boon or bane,” is “the inevitable result of technological 
advances and global market change. The question that we must confront is not 
whether to accept [technology induced change] but what we make of it.”
89  A National 
Intelligence Council futures forecast notes our ignorance of the near-term 
consequences of technology on the welfare of developing countries.
90  Joseph Strayer, 
summarizing the history of Western Europe during the Middle Ages, notes: 
If there is steady progress anywhere, it is in the field of technology, and 
yet this kind of progress seems to have little connection with the stability of 
society or with the degree to which a civilization satisfies those who participate in 
it.
91
 
While there is no a priori reason why technology should not regress, since 
routines, knowledge, and inputs can certainly be lost, technological change does seem 
to be sufficiently “additive” and “cumulative” that old means of doing things tend to 
be superseded by more effective, powerful, and efficient means.  Within the later 
section on Sociotechnical Evolution I will elaborate why technology seems to develop 
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“additively,” so as to exhibit such long-term trends.  Suffice it for now to acknowledge 
the abundance of evidence for these trends.  Langdon Winner succinctly expresses the 
impression that there are long-term technological trends: “In the end, the best ‘theory’ 
for [technology in our world] might well be a series of aerial photographs showing the 
gradual expansion of the technological grid.”
92
 
The technological determinists are right to argue that technological change is a 
powerful historical force.  They failed to provide, however, a plausible mechanism by 
which “technology” had gained such autonomy.  The techno-utopians could be partly 
excused for this neglect because they could credibly say that humanity had unleashed 
the technological forces for their attendant prosperity.  The non-utopian strains of 
technological determinism, however, needed to show how “technology” could so 
easily prod humanity down the plank.  This intellectual failure rightly led to the “self-
evident”
93 voluntarist/constructivist counter-argument: that a human, not “a row of 
machine tools,” is “a compelling historical agent”
94, and that “human beings construct 
machines, not the reverse.” 
95
 
Social Study of Technology 
The study of technology has emerged from a divided disciplinary landscape, 
and it is thus not a surprise to find that it is spread among various research programs in 
different disciplines.  Evolutionary and neo-classical economists, structural and 
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constructivist sociologists, historians, philosophers and political theorists have each 
approached the study of technology from widely different perspectives.  In this section 
I will survey some aspects of the social study of technology, with particular emphasis 
on social constructivist perspectives.  I will emphasize particularly Sergio Sismondo’s 
distinction between radical and mild social constructivism.
 96   
Constructivism in Technology Studies 
A study of technology in terms of functionality foregrounds a number of 
questions.  For what is the technology (supposed to be) functional?  How were those 
ends chosen (or imposed), and how are they changing?  How has the functionality 
been created and maintained?  How do technicians measure the technology’s success 
at functioning?   
Social constructivist scholarship responds to these questions in a way that 
doesn’t take simplistic claims of technical efficacy, economic or military efficiency 
and historical causality at face value.   Social constructivist scholarship looks beneath 
the apparently obvious functionality of a technology and asks how the (perceived) 
need for this technology arose in the first place, and how this artifact (among others) 
fulfilled this need.  In other words, how were the means (technology) and the ends 
(desired functionality) constructed. 
For example, a naïve economist might argue that a product emerges to fill a 
market niche and that the product will diffuse proportionally to the product’s technical 
efficacy/relative cost.  A social constructivist, on the other hand, will highlight the 
many points of contestation and active social shaping by key actors and groups.  A 
firm doesn’t just ‘fill’ a niche with a new product, but will often create the niche for its 
product to fill.  Consumers do not judge products on some obvious linear objective 
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scale, but instead interpret the product in different ways, again often helped by the 
producer.   Furthermore, “consumers” are not a homogenous population, but will 
interpret and engage with products in distinctive, culturally contextual ways.   
Social constructivist approaches to technology emerged partly in reaction to 
and as rejection of ‘technological determinism’.  As discussed above, ‘technological 
determinism’ refers to the belief that 1) there is some broad sequence of scientific and 
technical advance that 2) profoundly shapes historical change, and 3) is in some sense 
independent of social choice.  In response to this view, social constructivist 
approaches to technology emphasize that any given technology 1) can have 
interpretive flexibility, such that its meaning is not obvious or technically inherent, 
and 2) contingently develops within the discourses and conflicts of various social 
groups.  Therefore, a particular technology is not a static self-evident thing, but rather 
a “bundle of meanings”
97 that are contested by different groups.    
Sergio Sismondo argues that “‘social construction’ … does not generally mean 
the same thing from one [S&TS] author to another,” nor often “even within the same 
work.”  Some scholars, such as Karin Knorr-Cetina, speak as if “constructivism is a 
very specific research programme,” while others, such as Pinch and Bijker, “call all 
recent sociology of scientific knowledge social constructivist.”
98  Sismondo divides 
socially constructivist literature into two categories, which Trevor Pinch also adapts: 
radical and mild.
 99  Mild constructivism includes those works that “display the social 
processes that lead to institutions, epistemologies and knowledge… [and have] helped 
to erase the positivist picture of science [and technology] as a purely rational activity,”
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100 while still leaving room, at least implicitly, for Berger and Luckmann’s “reality 
(without scare quotes)…the real world, objective reality, or that which cannot be 
wished away.”
101   
Radical constructivism (also sometimes called idealism or relativism) 
advocates that “representations routinely create their objects,” and that “nothing but 
negotiation makes up knowledge.”
102  Sismondo writes that “while many 
constructivists seem to want to buy into [the] radical claim that knowledge depends 
upon nothing but negotiation, their work tends not to lean on it in any important way, 
and often seems to contradict it.”
103  Sismondo emphasizes that radical constructivism 
“has weak arguments supporting it and, contrary to the standard rhetoric, is [of little 
importance] to most of the actual work done.”
104  
In 1987 The Social Construction of Technological Systems
105 was published, a 
foundational text for constructivist approaches to technology.  In it were represented 
the three main theoretical approaches that are commonly labeled socially 
constructivist: the social construction of technology (SCOT), the technological 
systems model, and actor-network theory (ANT).   SCOT is nominally radically 
constructivist, though, as Sismondo points out, “most of the actual work done” is mild 
constructivist.  Hughes’ systems model, in particular his concept of technological 
momentum, should be coded as mild constructivism, with sufficient path dependency 
to make it “somewhere between the poles of technological determinism and social 
constructivism.”
106  ANT reflexively defies categorization.  
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SCOT: the Social Construction of Technology 
The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) rests on the idea that there is 
“interpretive flexibility” surrounding any given artifact, apparent in the way that 
different “relevant social groups” attribute different meanings to the same object.  This 
shows that “neither an artifact’s identity nor its technical ‘working or ‘nonworking’ is 
an intrinsic property of the artifact but is subject to social variables.”
107  The next stage 
of the analysis is to map the changing degrees of “stability” of meaning that the 
artifact possesses, as various “closure mechanisms” are enacted.  In the classic bicycle 
example given by Pinch and Bijker, the highwheeled Ordinary was “at least two vastly 
different artifacts: the Unsafe Machine for women and older men, and the Macho 
Machine for ‘young men of means and nerve’.”  In this case, two different groups had 
very different ideas about what the function of a bicycle should be, and thus different 
ideas about how to improve it, which consequently led to divergent bicycle models 
(the safe Singer Extraordinary and the faster, more dangerous Rudge Ordinary).   
The above classic example, as Sismondo has argued, does not live up to the 
radical theoretical rhetoric that accompanies it.  The two relevant social groups of 
“macho men” and “women and old men” seem to agree on each other’s interpretation 
of the content or technical workability of the artifact.  These social groups would both 
agree about the intrinsic properties of the highwheeled Ordinary: it is high off the 
ground and fast, and hence dangerous on both counts.  What is socially constructed, or 
socially derived, is their preferences for a certain kind of bike.  The macho men prefer 
dangerous and daring bicycles, and thus interpret the high and fast Ordinary as a 
“Macho Machine.”  The women and old men prefer safe bicycles, and thus interpret 
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the high and fast Ordinary as “Unsafe.”   Social construction operates not on the 
technical qualities of the artifact, but on the relationship between those properties and 
the desired functionality of the relevant social groups. 
Radical constructivism is not theoretically compatible with most other theories 
of technology.  Mild constructivism, on the other hand, is “fully compatible with 
either empiricism or realism,”
108 and is consequently amenable to theoretical cross 
fertilization with other realist fields.  Within the section on Sociotechnical Evolution I 
will attempt to outline a meta-theoretical structure within which different realist 
approaches to technology can be unified. This cross fertilization, however, is unlikely 
to take place if mild constructivist scholarship persists in advocating for untenable 
radical constructivist claims.   
Bijker states that the “truth of scientific statements and the technical working 
of machines are not derived from nature but are constituted in social processes”
109.  
Likewise, Pinch argues that work “carried out in the recent sociology of science has 
shown how the very entities of modern physics are socially constructed.  It is such 
approaches that SCOT attempts to emulate.”
110  According to Pinch, it is not enough 
to say that “technology is embedded in human affairs.”  Radical constructivism shows 
how “an artifact, including its workability, can be subject to radically different 
interpretations.”
111  Do Bijker and Pinch intend to imply that the technical workability 
of machines is solely a product of social processes, and has no relationship to the 
inherent technical qualities of the artifact?  This semantic ambiguity is worth noting.  
To say that “X is socially constructed/constituted” is not, strictly speaking, to say that 
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it is only socially constituted, and can’t also be materially constituted.  But it does 
seem to imply it.   
In other writings, Bijker seems to retreat from his (self-acknowledged) radical 
constructivism by discouraging “social reductionism” and encouraging “symmetrical” 
attention to “technical factors.”
112  Furthermore, the actual research done by Pinch and 
Bijker does not rely on, nor support, these radical claims.  This issue arises as early as 
in the bicycle case study, where Pinch and Bijker argue that the differences of 
interpretation are: 
 ’radical’ because the content of the artifact seems to be involved.  It is 
something more than what Mulkay rightly claims to be rather easy [or mild]—‘to 
show that the social meaning of television varies with and depends upon the 
social context in which it is employed… It is much more difficult to show [that] 
what is to count as a ‘working television set’ is similarly context-dependent in any 
significant respect.
113
But have Pinch and Bijker truly shown that the content of the bicycle is 
interpreted in different ways, rather than just the meaning of technically determined 
content?  Both social groups would agree that the highwheeled Ordinary is technically 
high and fast.  They would just disagree over whether these are desirable traits in a 
bicycle.   
Perhaps the debate reduces to semantics.  ‘Workability’ is a concept that 
relates the technical properties of the artifact to the preferences (or desired end or 
functionality) of the user.  To show that ‘workability’ is dependent on context is not to 
show that the technical properties of the artifact is dependent on context.  An example 
is Mulkay’s hard-case for radical constructivism.  The ‘workability’ of a television set 
may mean different things for different people, such as whether it displays the proper 
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programs, signals wealth and status, or even serves as a horizontal surface for resting 
drinks.  But the technical properties underlying these different desired functions are 
not interpretively flexible.  The television either turns on or it doesn’t.  The television 
is either the expensive brand or it is not.
114  The television’s horizontal surface holds 
drinks or it doesn’t.
115   In this case where preferences or desired functionality are 
uniform, the artifact and its workability, as Mulkay argues, does not seem 
interpretively flexible.   Thus, even in Pinch and Bijker’s primary case study for 
radical constructivism they did not achieve their radical aims.   
A more generous illustration of the radical constructivist 
epistemological/ontological claim of interpretive flexibility comes from the prelaunch 
decision of whether the Challenger mission should go ahead, despite cold weather.  
Though possessing the same set of data, critics argued that the “O-ring test data could 
not be extrapolated to the low temperatures,” whereas NASA managers believed that 
the extrapolation was valid.  In this case, the two groups ostensibly disagreed over the 
technical safety of the shuttle launch, allegedly illustrating how technical issues are 
interpretively flexible and thus find closure through (and only through) social 
negotiation.
116  In this example, too, there are a number of theoretical holes that drain 
the radical force from the idealist constructivist claim.  A mild, yet cynical, 
constructivist could see this narrative not so much as an example of how technical 
properties are completely flexible in their interpretations and thus strictly socially 
determined, but of how social actors use partially ambiguous data to manipulate 
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underdetermined technical arguments towards their preferred outcome.  The NASA 
managers had an incentive to meet the shuttle launch deadline which gave them reason 
to ‘err’ on the side of risk.  If anything, this example illustrates not how technical 
properties are strictly socially determined, but of how partially ambiguous technical 
properties will be interpreted to suit the interests of the particular social group.  It is a 
cynical view of the world, but not relativist.   
Social constructivism can tell the strongest stories during times of technical 
disputes, often early in a technology’s development.  This is a case of where the 
exception illustrates the rule: constructivist stories are compelling when the technical 
properties of an artifact are still underdetermined.  As technologies “age” they lose 
interpretive flexibility not just because they gain inertia (a la Hughes) or undergo 
social closure mechanisms, but also because more is known about the technical 
possibilities of a given technology.  In Pinch and Bijker’s classic paper, the technical 
usefulness of the air tire was originally disputed and flexibly interpreted.  After a 
series of competitive public races, though, bicycles with air tires repeatedly 
demonstrated themselves to be the fastest.  In this case, the technical properties of the 
air tire lost its interpretive flexibility as it lost its underdetermination: through repeated 
public observation of the technical workings of the artifact (rather than exclusively 
through social negotiation).  The materiality of artifacts can only be ‘wished away’ 
where technical matters remain largely underdetermined or the consequences of 
inaccurate technical models are insignificant.   
 
These substantial flaws in radical constructivism, however, are irrelevant to 
most of the work done under the SCOT and constructivist flag, since radical 
constructivism is “the least important of these different constructivisms to most of the 
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actual work done in [S&TS].”
117  As an example of mild constructivism, SCOT has 
been very fruitful.   
The core strength of SCOT is the attention it pays to the non-linear evolution 
of technologies.  Preferences are not uniform, nor are they simple and given.  The 
meaning of a technology will differ among groups, and the final shape of the 
technology will reflect the complex and contingent social contest among these groups.  
Sometimes a technology will split and specialize into a number of new technologies in 
order to satisfy the various desired functions of different groups.  Other times, one 
group is able to impose its will, and hence its meaning, onto other groups. 
In more recent work, SCOT has been able to address issues that were 
originally under-theorized.  Recent work has corrected the initial emphasis on 
construction at the design stage by showing how users are much more than passive 
consumers, but themselves often ‘hack’ the technical workings of a technology and 
inspire future design innovations.  Users, that is, contest and co-construct the 
perceived purpose of the technology (its intended function).
118    
A good example of the agency of users in shaping technology comes from 
Kline and Pinch’s account of some uses to which the automobile was put in rural 
U.S.A.   Many rural users, instead of passively accepting the automobile as a 
necessary improvement on transportation technology, passionately opposed it, calling 
it the “red devil” and the “devil wagon.”  Some groups went further in their resistance 
by sabotaging roads with ditches and sharp metal objects, and attacking motorists.  
Furthermore, even when users had purchased an automobile their interpretation of its 
uses were complex.  Far from simply being a mode of transportation, some rural users 
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used the automobile as a source of power for their various machines (such as corn 
shellers, grinders, saws, pumps, and washing machines).
119    
In other recent work, Bijker has improved SCOT by filling the theoretical hole 
linking “the wider society in which the technology is immersed and its development 
path”
120 with his concept of the ‘technological frame.’  A technological frame can be 
thought of as a frame of meaning that shapes the way future groups understand and 
react to a technology.  The frame is built up from the “set of practices and the material 
and social infrastructure”
121 around an artifact, and is applicable to all social groups.  
Unfortunately, this concept still suffers from the theoretical incompatibility between 
realism and radical constructivism.  Bijker states, in a move apparently opposed to 
radical constructivism, that technology cannot have “unbounded flexibility,” but is 
constrained by “the solidity and momentum of sociotechnical ensembles”:
122  
Can relevant social groups fantasize whatever they want, without 
constraints?  Of course, they cannot.  Attributions of meaning are social processes 
and, as such, are bound by constraints.  Previous meaning attributions limit the 
flexibility of later ones, structures are built up, artifacts stabilize, and ensembles 
become more obdurate.
123
And so, though Bijker recognizes that not all technological interpretations can 
be “wished away,” he attributes this “obduracy” to vague social “constraints,” 
“structures” and semiotic inertia.  No where in his description of the constraints on 
interpretation do technical or natural facts figure in.   
Why do Bijker, Pinch and other scholars choose to employ radical 
constructivist rhetoric, especially if it doesn’t contribute to, nor is it supported by, their 
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empirical research?  Sismondo, supported by a quote from Barnes, provides a 
compelling explanation for this tendency of mild constructivist scholarship to “adopt 
the … radical, constructivist claim as a slogan [and yet] ignore it in practice”
124.  The 
impression from reading some constructivists texts that: 
. . . reality has nothing to do with what is socially constructed…we may 
safely assume …is an accidental by-product of over-enthusiastic sociological 
analysis, and that sociologists as a whole would acknowledge that the world in 
some way constrains what is believed to be.
125
Sismondo’s “sketch of an answer” to the question of why “sociologists of 
science come to hold that nature can be literally constructed” in the radical sense, is 
equally applicable to sociologists of technology: 
Detailed studies of actual scientific activity seem to indicate that there 
exists a large amount of contingency in our scientific knowledge before it 
stabilizes.  The intuition is that ‘It could easily have been otherwise.’
126   
Furthermore, the methodological agnosticism required by constructivist 
sociologists about “truth” and the “workability” of a technology easily leads to an 
ontological agnosticism (or relativism) about truth and materiality, a theoretical slip 
referred to by realists as the “epistemic fallacy” because epistemology (what we can 
know) is conflated with what is (ontology).
127    
One final reason why radical constructivist rhetoric is frequently adopted in the 
study of technology has to do with the ways research programs position themselves 
relative to each other to emphasize (or construct) their epistemic importance.  
Constructivist scholarship of technology is forced to respond to criticisms, like those 
of David Edgerton, that (mild) constructivism offers nothing new to the study of 
technology.  Scholars of technology have long accepted the “embeddedness of 
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technology in the human world”
128 – SCOT and other constructivist approaches is just 
a repackaging of what everyone already knew.  In response to this, Trevor Pinch 
deflects Edgerton’s criticism by saying that it is “directed towards the mild form of 
social constructivism.  And perhaps he is right.”   Radical constructivism, Pinch avers, 
offers something radically new and noteworthy.  
In other words, scholars who embrace radical constructivist claims may do so 
as a means of distinguishing their scholarly enterprise from the more humdrum, 
mainstream, and well established history of technology.  If Sismondo and I are correct 
in arguing that radical constructivism is grounded in weak arguments and is not 
necessary for the actual work done by self-labeled radical constructivists, then 
constructivist scholars should not brush off mild constructivism by saying that “the 
stronger [radical] form of social constructivism does offer something more.”
129  
Instead, when responding to criticisms like those of Edgerton, constructivists should 
expand on the less exciting, but more tenable and important claim that “mild social 
constructivism allows historians to repackage what they have always done in a new 
way.”
130  
Mild social constructivist approaches have much to offer the study of 
technology.   Constructivism offers a more nuanced understanding of how different 
groups interpret the meaning of technology differently and thereby shape the future 
evolution of the technology by advocating, consuming, and ‘hacking’ in ways that 
promote certain interpretations over others.  Constructivism also reminds scholars that 
the very perceptions of a technology’s desired functionality and technical properties 
can be partly shaped, through advertising, ideology, and other social processes.  
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Constructivism raises the awareness of how artifacts may embody and reinforce a 
certain politics.
131  Returning to the theoretical antagonism that helped give rise to 
constructivism, social constructivism challenges simplistic ‘just so’ technologically 
deterministic historical narratives.   Thus, social constructivism may be a repacking of 
what has always been done by most historians of technology, but it is a repacking that 
adds considerable value in the attention it draws to the social, contested, path-
dependent and political.  Radical constructivist rhetoric is not needed to justify the 
novelty and value of social constructivism.  Radical rhetoric is also unhelpful because 
it hinders scholarly cross fertilization. 
 
Technological Momentum (or SCOT + Sunk Costs)  
Historian Thomas Hughes, also unsatisfied with either intellectual extreme, 
sought “an alternative to technological determinism and social construction”
132 in the 
concept of technological momentum.  From his study of energy systems, Hughes 
found that while technological systems are well described by social constructivism 
when the they are young, as the systems mature and grow they seem to gain an inertia, 
which is often confused for autonomy: “they have a mass of technical and 
organizational components; they possess direction, or goals; and they display a rate of 
growth suggesting velocity.”
133   
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Hughes’ theoretical contribution can be conceptualized in the language of 
“sunk costs”: assets have been bought, standards set, employees trained, social 
networks formed, interactions routinized, and vested interests entrenched, all of which 
reinforce earlier technological choices.  Members of a mature technological system 
facing future decisions will be biased towards the use of those assets—be they 
technical, economic,  social, or political—already in place.   
A particularly stark example of the effects of sunk costs comes from the 
Muscle Shoals Dam.  This massive hydroelectric dam was constructed during World 
War I to provide the energy needed to manufacture nitrogen compounds.  Hughes 
writes:  
Muscle Shoals Dam … became a solution looking for a problem…. In 
1933 [it became part of] a regional development project of enormous scope…. 
This durable artifact acted over time like a magnetic field, attracting plans and 
projects suited to its characteristics.
134   
The concept of technological momentum finds resonance in the works of many 
other scholars.  Hughes notes that technological momentum is similar to, but even 
more obdurate than, the iron-cage fate of Max Weber’s bureaucracies.  Anthony 
Giddens argues for a theory of structuration in which the actions of individuals 
establish the structures which constrain the actions of future individuals. Bijker 
introduces the concept of the “technological frame” which is built up from the “set of 
practices and the material and social infrastructure”
135 and thus constrains, with its 
“solidity and momentum” the flexibility of future technological choices and 
interpretations.   
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In short, “men make history, but under circumstances … transmitted from the 
past.”
136  Technological systems are still designed, built, and altered by and for people, 
but individuals at any point in time face a choice set largely determined by the acts of 
their predecessors.   
 
Actor-Network Theory 
Unlike SCOT and Technological Momentum, Actor-Network Theory (ANT), 
as a research enterprise, was not born from a single or small set of programmatic 
publications, nor does it today have a single axiomatic expression.  In the flagship 
text
137 that, as the story goes, launched the constructivist enterprise into technology, 
two articles by Michel Callon and John Law can be read as ancestors to the ANT 
tradition.  More generally, ANT can be traced back to the work of Michel Callon, John 
Law, and Bruno Latour.
138   Describing an intellectual lineage for ANT is easy, 
however, compared to the task of summarizing what is a self-consciously anti-
essentialist scholarly enterprise.  John Law writes that he “feels uncomfortable” when 
asked to summarize ANT.  What does it mean, Law asks, “to be a ‘faithful 
representative’ [for] a theory that talks of representation in terms of translation [and] 
seeks to undermine the very idea that there might be such a thing as fidelity [, of] 
faithful translation.”
139   If one of the founding and still contributing scholars of ANT 
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has difficulty summarizing ANT, then any attempt to do so must be read with caution.  
Nonetheless, as one of the most productive theoretical frameworks used in the study of 
technology, ANT must be accounted for.  In the following section I will summarize 
and criticize some of the theoretical insights of ANT, as well as begin my own 
translation of ANT to serve my interests in this paper.   
Actor-Network Theory began as a sociology of science and technology, or in 
Latour’s phrase: technoscience.
140  ANT conceptualizes the creation of knowledge and 
technologies by analogy to Machiavellian power politics, where political actors seek 
to ally themselves with other actors in such a way as to maintain and increase power 
against hostile external alliances (or networks).  A scientist or technician “enlists” 
allies, who may be both human and material, to support their claim to “truth” or 
“feasibility,” and hence power.  Latour gives the example of Rudolf Diesel who 
sought to build a new engine.  In order to do so, Diesel needs to build a reliable 
network of allies, including engineers and scientists, investors and entrepreneurs, as 
well as pumps and fuel.  Concerning the latter, Diesel had to “shift his system of 
alliances”
141 when he was “betrayed” by his various early fuels which refused to ignite 
under high pressure.  A successful technology must accommodate the “interests” of 
both consumers, engineers, legislatures, and businessmen, as well as physical 
processes, materials, and other technologies.   
Laboratories are such powerful centers of knowledge production because they 
are able to interrogate actants (such as electrons, gravity, chemicals and stars) by 
making them human scale, and by subjecting them to tests that reveal their interests 
and their potential fidelity to different political projects.   These tests also allow 
scientists, through “inscription devices,” to “transform pieces of matter into written 
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documents.”
142  These inscriptions are called “immutable mobiles” because they have 
been abstracted from their context and can then be transported to other contexts.
143  
Laboratories, thus, allow scientists and technicians to break Nature into components, 
to stabilize those components, and then translate them into other more mobile forms, 
such as a graph or standardized compound – all for the purpose of enlisting reliable 
and mobile allies for the political purposes of the network builder.   
 
One of the main methodological principles of ANT, then, is to treat social and 
technical elements “super-symmetrically.”  David Bloor famously laid out the tenets 
for the Strong Programme of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, one of which 
was that an analyst should be symmetrical in her causal explanations of “true and false 
beliefs.”
144  ANT extends this principle by acknowledging that:  
. . . the ingredients of controversies are a mixture of considerations 
concerning both Society and Nature.  For this reason we require the observer to 
use a single repertoire when [case studies] are described. . . . The principle of 
generalized symmetry [states that] we must respect. . . not to change registers 
when we move from the technical to the social aspects of the problem studied.
145
ANT conceptualizes the world as a “seamless web” of actants that are 
incorrectly traditionally dichotomized as either the Social or the Technical.  John Law 
coined the term “heterogeneous engineering” to denote the ways engineers must 
configure both the social as well as the technical in order for a technology to function 
coherently.
146  Latour provides a charming illustration of this in a discussion of the 
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difficulties of devising a wall-hole (a door) that will be open for researchers to enter 
and exit, but closed against the cold air entering and warm air exiting.  One (technical) 
solution is to install a door with an automatic shutting mechanism, but these have 
problems, such as making it too difficult for some humans to open or slamming shut 
on slower moving humans.  Another (social) solution is to “configure the user” 
through a sign that reads “The Groom Is On Strike, For God’s Sake, Keep The Door 
Closed.”
147  All technologies require some understanding on the part of the “user.”  
Technologies do not exist independently of the social, but rather the two are 
seamlessly enmeshed.    
Actor-Network Theory is born from work that emphasized the metaphor of 
translation.  Callon talks about a “sociology of translation” wherein “translation” is the 
focal metaphor for a general social theory that can apply equally well to humans as 
non-humans (fulfilling the principle of super-symmetry).  “Translation” refers to the:  
. . . moments [when] the identity of actors, the possibility of interaction 
and the margins of maneuver are negotiated and delimited… To translate is also 
to express in one’s own language what others say and want, why they act in the 
way they do and how they associate with each other: it is to establish oneself as a 
spokesman.  At the end of the process, if it is successful, only voices speaking in 
unison will be heard.
148   
If ANT is to be summarized in one word, it is “anti-essentialist.”  John Law 
writes, in what is the closest thing to a summary of ANT as one will find, that the 
overriding theme of work categorized as ANT is that, 
Essentialist divisions are thrown on the bonfire of the dualisms.  Truth and 
falsehood.  Large and small.  Agency and structure.  Human and non-human. … 
Materiality and sociality.  …Though [ANT’s anti-essentialist] scandal may 
sometimes be more metaphysical than practical… Actor-Network Theory is, has 
been, a semiotic machine for waging war on essential differences.
149
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This approach is consonant with the constructivist propensity to reject claims 
about the essential nature of technologies.  ANT, however, takes this movement 
further, or reflects it across another axis of symmetry, by arguing against traditional 
SSK which believes that “Nature is uncertain but Society is not.”
150 Thus ANT also 
rejects the essentialization of Society.  What is left is a set of seamless networks that 
translates the interests of other actants and networks so as to avoid dissolution by other 
hostile networks.   
This anti-essentialist predilection of the scholars whose work has been grouped 
under the heading of Actor-Network Theory explains why in an edited volume on 
ANT a reader finds not summaries of the axioms and corollaries of Actor-Network 
Theory, but an insistence to move beyond the fixity of names and “a notion of theory 
that says that it is or should necessarily be simple, clear, transparent.”
151  Bruno 
Latour, in his chapter, cites “four things that do not work with actor-network theory: 
the word actor, the word network, the word theory and the hyphen!”
152  On this note, I 
will criticize two elements of the above representation of “Actor-Network Theory” 
before also moving onward. 
Does it make sense, as John Law and other ANT scholars suggest, to “treat 
natural and social adversaries in terms of the same analytical vocabulary”?
153  On the 
one hand, I share this methodological premise: theoretical generalizability and cross-
disciplinary dialogue are epistemological virtues.  If we can analyze Nature and 
Society with the same conceptual tool box, then we can finally move beyond the 
intellectual limitations that have kept the study of sociotechnical reality 
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unsatisfactorily divided into the various disciplines of the social sciences and 
engineering.  ANT, however, proposes a theoretical unification by the translation of 
treating all things like humans: all things have interests and the ability to strategically 
translate the interests of others to suit one’s purposes.   There are three problems with 
this argument.   
The first problem is that human actors and material actants may be sufficiently 
different from each other to warrant separate analytical tools.  The ANT solution, to 
treat material actants as if they were intentional, strategic, self interested political 
actors, dilutes the meaning of ‘interests’ and ‘intentionality’.  The concepts of 
“interests” and “strategic intentionality” connote a number of behavioral 
characteristics: a tendency to strive towards some goal, the ability to enact a number of 
strategies to achieve said goal, the ability to act with foresight (in Jon Elster’s words, 
“one step backward, two steps forward”), and the ability to act strategically against 
those who oppose their interests and collectively with those who share their interests.  
Sociotechnical scientists, in other words, should be able to make the same distinction 
between intended and accidental behavior that, according to Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ aphorism, dogs do when they distinguish “between being stumbled over and 
being kicked.”
154  When John Law describes the “struggle between the Atlantic and 
the galley [where] the Atlantic was the winner” because it was “a stronger adversary,” 
he is indulging in a form of anthropomorphism that humans have elaborated since 
Zeus tossed lighting bolts.  These entities, the Atlantic and lightning, have been 
challenges for human networks, yes.  But they were indifferent, oblivious, adversaries.  
The Atlantic did not adapt or act strategically in the struggle against the Portuguese 
(say by vindictively flooding Portuguese ports, or by giving fair sailing weather to the 
                                                 
154 Holmes, Oliver Wendell. 1881 (1991). The Common Law. London: Dover Publications 
56  
enemies of Portuguese), nor did it have any particular reason for opposing Portuguese 
vessels.  The imposition of intentional language on to a non-intentional entity only 
serves to dilute the meaning of our intentional vocabulary, when the simpler causal 
language of the natural sciences suffices to explain non-living phenomenon.     
The second problem with ANT concerns what it means to be able to translate 
an actant’s interests.  First, to clarify terminology, I use “preferences” whenever 
possible to indicate the most fundamental priorities of the actor.  From those basal 
preferences are derived instrumental “goals,” “means,” or “interests” that inform 
strategies that are most likely to satisfy the underlying preferences.  “Interests,” then, 
are derived from the basal preferences and dependent on the strategic context.   
There are three interpretations of the claim that actors/actants translate each 
other’s interests, which I’ll call 1) radical, 2) game theoretic, and 3) differential.  1: 
The radical interpretation, like radical constructivism, would argue that interests and 
preferences are completely flexible and subject to unrestrained social construction.  
All priorities and identity are subject to socialization and modification.  2: The game 
theoretic interpretation would argue that actors have a set of basal preferences (a 
utility function) which are, at least partially, unmalleable.  Preferences or interests can 
be “translated,” then, to the extent that one actor can restructure the payoff matrix 
facing another actor through intervention or the provision of information.  Pasteur, for 
example, was able to convince the French army that support for his research was a 
means to achieve their underlying preference of having a strong army.  In this 
interpretation, then, the French army’s basal preferences were not distorted or 
manipulated, rather, the means to achieve those interests were clarified.  This 
distinction is congruent with, but the inverse of, that made by SCOT regarding the 
interpretive flexibility of the bicycle.  In the bicycle case, the actors agreed on the 
technical properties of the Ordinary (as dangerous), but differed over its derived 
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meaning (since they had different preferences).  In the case of Pasteur, the French 
army (game theoretically speaking) had constant preferences, but modified its 
instrumental means due to informational differences.  3: The mild or differential 
interpretation – a compromise position -- would argue that though the interests of 
actors may be fundamentally malleable, for the most part they differentially resist 
certain translations, depending on the obduracy of the particular interest and the 
degree of translation.  Thus, though there are occasions when the most fundamental of 
human preferences,
155 self preservation for example, is reinterpreted through effective 
“translations” by ideologues (for example, by using promises of the afterlife), for the 
most part, people obdurately reject this translation.   
A third aspect of ANT’s ontology of strategic actants deserves discussion. 
ANT’s ontology runs counter to the unifying epistemological tendency in most other 
disciplines to treat more and more of the social world as if it were explainable by 
reductionistic, mathematical laws.  Game theory in political science and economics 
reduces strategic interaction in general into mathematically specifiable and tractable 
situations.  Economics seeks to model human behavior and long-term economic 
processes according to precisely defined mathematical models.  Mathematical 
reductionism seeks to explain human interests and alliances in terms of their (at least 
partly) endogenous objective interests and rational strategic calculations.  ANT, on the 
other hand, wants to open up the deterministic (and hence mathematically 
reductionist) world of the natural sciences and engineering to the indeterminate 
Machiavellian intrigue of uncertain alliance building and the unconstrained translation 
of perceived interests.  On the other hand, this may not be a “problem” with ANT, but 
                                                 
155 I do not assume, nor do I need to, that all humans share the same fundamental preferences, nor that 
individual humans have the same fundamental preferences throughout their lifetime.  What is important 
for this argument is that humans have preferences that are partly independent of their social 
environment.   
58  
may be its virtue, since it provides an alternative universal ontology for explaining 
sociotechnical phenomenon to the dominant mathematically reductionistic paradigms.
 
Herein lies ANT’s ontological paradox.  On the one hand, ANT can be read as 
offering a realist, materialist ontology – identical to that offered by the mathematically 
reductionistic social sciences.  On this reading of ANT, the world consists of actants 
who exist in strategic networks or alliances, and seek to dissolve rival networks while 
reinforcing their own.  In this world there are real contests of power going on, with 
outcomes determined, presumably, by characteristics of the respective networks.  This 
is a world where interpretive meaning is shaped by the victorious alliance - since rival 
networks each desire conflicting interpretations of technologies and truth, they must 
resolve these conflicts through appeal to power.  Though ANT scholars never specify 
exactly how power should be measured, aside from conceptual hand-waving about the 
“size” of the network,
156 they implicitly support the notion that there is some calculus 
of power, based on the ability to enlist allies, to dissect, stabilize and mobilize actants, 
to make of oneself an obligatory passage point for all others, and so forth.  This is a 
realist, materialist ontology which is susceptible, in theory at least, to the 
measurement, specification, and logical formulation undertaken by the other realist,  
social sciences.   
On the other hand, ANT scholars share an epistemological tradition of 
challenging essentialist and causal claims, and more generally, of just being 
challenging.  Bruno Latour and John Law both recently laid their claim to the future 
                                                 
156 ANT scholars never specify how one would measure the “size” of a network.  Do we sum the mass 
of its parts?  Do we measure the volume of space the network occupies?  Do we count the number of 
humans?  We could never count the number of actants, since there is no definition about what is (or 
more accurately, what is not) an actant.  While the above metrics that I have suggested each have some 
evidence to commend it, they offer a very simplistic adaptive topology for which it would be easy to 
provide counter-examples.  Perhaps ANT scholars should look to the work of technological 
determinists, who have explored this problem in much more rigor.   
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agenda for ANT.  Latour, Cheshire Cat like in his pleasure at making semi-logical, 
often self-contradictory, theoretically challenging arguments, argues that,  
ANT is a way of delegitimating the incredible pretensions of sociologists 
who, to use Bauman’s forceful expression, want to act as legislators and to open 
yet another space for interpretive sociology.  …[ANT realized that] it could not 
stick to a theory of social order [because] the whole theory of society soon 
appeared to be enmeshed in a much more complex struggle to define an 
epistemological settlement about: a) what the world is like outside without human 
intervention; b) a psychology inside—an isolated subjectivity still able to also 
comprehend the word [sic] out there; c) a political theory of how to keep the 
crowds at bay without them intervening with their unruly passions and ruining the 
social order; and finally d) a rather repressed but very present theology that is the 
only way to guarantee the differences and the connections between those three 
other domains of reality.
157   
 
Latour, instead of endorsing either an idealist or materialist ontology, seems to 
prefer the uneasy middle ground of supporting, as well as undermining, the 
pretensions of both.   
Whereas Latour lays out an agenda which seems to embrace every form of 
investigation, from science to interpretive sociology to theology, John Law rejects 
simple, totalizing, generalizing claims to knowledge, preferring an open, undefined, 
disorientating, ontology: 
What I am trying to do is attack simplicity---and a notion of theory that 
says that it is or should necessarily by simple, clear, transparent…The God eye
158 
is alive and well and seemingly incurable in its greed for that which is flat and 
may be easily brought to the point.  But, or so I firmly believe, the real chance to 
make differences lies elsewhere.  It lies in the irreducible.  In the oxymoronic.  In 
the topologically discontinuous.  In that which is heterogeneous.  It lies in a 
modest willingness to live, to know, and to practice in the complexities of 
tension.
159
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158 The ‘God eye’ refers to the outsider epistemological perspective presumed by most sciences: that 
we, as observers, can separate ourselves from our own history and our own partial perspective.  The 
God eye strives to abstract the generalizable from the partial and specific.   
159 Law. After ANT: complexity, naming and topology 
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To summarize, Actor-Network Theory does not have a singular ontology or 
theoretical contribution.  The most central practitioners of ANT reject the label 
“Actor-Network Theory,” and any attempt to limit the meaning or possibility of their 
work.  Actor-Network Theory, then, should better be thought of as a family of 
research which is sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary, and never 
closed to dialogue and argument with other epistemologies and ontologies.   
Technological Politics and Technical Power 
Implicit to all, except radical constructivist, accounts of technology is the idea 
of power: the ability of some groups to achieve outcomes against the will of others.  
Mild constructivism, as Stewart Russell pointed out,
160 risks a simplistic pluralist 
model of social negotiation if power and social structure are not taken into 
consideration.  Rather, during a process of social negotiation different groups 
strategically mobilize their resources and allies to achieve their preferred outcomes.  
Furthermore, relevant social groups themselves are not unitary actors, but are often 
beset by internal conflicts of interest which can affect the outcome of social 
negotiations.  Analysts employing the idea of technological momentum introduce a 
temporal concept of power, in which present day social groups have power over the 
future, through the construction of obdurate artifacts, ideas, social networks, and 
systems.   Actor-Network Theory centrally employs an, unfortunately under-theorized, 
concept of power; under ANT various social networks mobilize allies to defeat rival 
networks, though it is unclear exactly what allows one network to succeed over 
another.  
                                                 
160 Russell, Stewart. 1986. The Social Construction of Artefacts: A Response to Pinch and Bijker. 
Social Studies of Science 16 (2) 
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Technologies thus evolve in the context of social negotiation among groups 
with different degrees and kinds of power.  For example, consumers, engineers, and 
politicians all have different kinds of power affecting the construction of technologies. 
Technologies also have political consequences, and therefore can be used to reinforce 
political objectives, the classic (apocryphal) example being Robert Moses’ racist 
bridges, as described by Langdon Winner.  With these two premises—that the social 
construction of technology is biased towards the interests of the powerful, and that 
technologies themselves can have profound political consequences—a classist (or 
Marxist) theory of technology becomes tenable.  Under an extreme interpretation, 
technologies are a product exclusively of the interests of the powerful classes, and 
serve only to further reinforce their interests and power.  Under more modest 
interpretations, technologies have social and political consequences of which we 
should be more aware, for example, the lay-out of furniture will structure social 
interaction.
161  David Noble, Richard Sclove, and Langdon Winner, among others, 
have explored these issues, and, especially the latter two, have looked at ways to better 
democratize technological decision making.  Langdon Winner explains that: 
“technological innovations are similar to legislative acts or political foundings that 
establish a framework for public order that will endure over many generations.”
162  
Just as legislation and the constitution should be of concern to all citizens, so should 
the shape of our technologies be seriously debated by political bodies.    
From the perspective of technological politics, the perception of deterministic 
or autonomous technological systems may in fact be the interests of the ruling class 
expressed through technologies.  Thus, the majority of people, in the first and 
                                                 
161 Sclove, Richard. 1995. Democracy and Technology. New York: Guilford Press, 13. 
162 Winner. The Whale and the Reactor - A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology, 29. 
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especially third world, may correctly perceive technological systems structuring their 
world, whether it be through new workplace technologies that increase control or the 
social dislocations of globalization and the IT revolution.  In all these cases, the 
scholars of technological politics would argue, while it is true that certain 
technological changes are inducing other social or political changes, these 
technological changes are themselves caused by—often hidden—political forces.  
Thus, the claim of the technological determinists that (most) people are losing agency 
to rationalizing forces may be largely correct; it should, however, be nuanced to 
appreciate that the cause of these powerful rationalizing forces are not immutable 
technical trends or necessary laws of history, but the ever-present interests of the 
powerful.   
Another significant theoretical corollary of considering technologies as a 
product of, and a factor in, power-laden social negotiations arises.  Imagine a 
hypothetical social negotiation where two equally powerful social groups are each 
trying to realize their preferred technical design.  If one technical design conveys 
significant power to the group that adopts it, then this social negotiation will be 
resolved in favor of the more powerful technical design because of the technical 
properties of the artifact.   In other words, powerful technical designs (or 
interpretations or uses of technologies) are more likely to dominate because of the 
advantage conveyed to those groups who prefer it.  It is thus theoretically possible that 
some technical designs will convey sufficient power that, so long as some group 
adopts it for whatever reason, the design will be implemented and will proliferate.  
Thus, SCOT + technical power => the possibility of technical determinism. 
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Scales of Analysis 
Misa’s Correlation 
Thomas Misa has surveyed the scholarship studying the social role of 
technology and found an important correlation.  Larger scale (macro) studies are more 
likely to be technologically deterministic than smaller scale (micro) studies.  Misa 
found that philosophers of technology are the most likely to be technologically 
deterministic and also tend to have the largest scale of analysis.  Furthermore, in order 
of diminished technological determinism and smaller scales of analysis are: business 
history, urban history, physical science history, technological history and labor 
history.  Labor history, the most constructivist and micro, emphasizes the many ways 
workers have challenged, transformed and rejected new technologies.  That is, 
macro or micro [scales of analysis]. . . correlate with disciplinary 
traditions of affirming or denying technological determinism.  Similarly, within 
each discipline, the authors affirming some version of technological determinism 
adopt a ‘macro’ perspective, whereas those denying technological determinism 
adopt a ‘micro’ perspective.  
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Misa illustrates his point using the following diagram: 
 
Figure 1 - Misa's Correlation: Macro = Deterministic
163
Misa’s diagram provides an entry point to a systematization that I develop in 
this paper of different theories of sociotechnical systems, which I will elaborate in the 
section on sociotechnical evolution.  Rather than listing different disciplinary 
approaches to the study of technology like Misa, I have arrayed different scholarly 
approaches to studying technology based on their theoretical premises, which 
themselves correlate with disciplinary traditions. The bottommost theories (most 
white) are the most constructivist, have the smallest scales of analysis, and assign the 
greatest agency to individuals.  The top most theories (most black) are the most 
deterministic, tend to have the largest scales of analysis, and assign the least agency to 
individuals.  
                                                 
163 Misa. How Machines Make History.  
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Figure 2 - Theories of Technology from Micro-Constructivism (White) to Macro-
Determinism (Dark) 
Technological 
Determinism 
with 
underspecified 
micro-
mechanism.   
A Missing 
Mechanism? 
Technical 
Power, 
Technological 
Politics 
Technological 
Momentum 
Mild Social 
Construction of 
Technology, or 
Historical 
Contextualism 
Radical Social 
Construction of 
Technology 
From Misa’s correlation he concludes that the higher the scale of analysis (the 
more black), the easier it is to invoke ‘the Machine’ as an actor, to personify an 
abstraction.  Because philosophers and other macro-scholars look at such a sweeping 
range of phenomena, they are susceptible to erroneous abstractions, such as positing 
that a machine can be a historical actor.  Were these macro-scholars to take a closer, 
more detailed, analysis, they would find that machines are mere constructions of 
humans, and that it is humans, and only humans, who are historical actors.  Misa 
writes: 
 Again and again, historians writing large-scale or deterministic accounts 
deploy the Machine to structure social change, while as soon as the historical 
microscope is unveiled, the Machine as such dissolves.  This causal chain results 
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from the exigencies of synthesis and the assumptions .. inherent in a macro 
viewpoint.  From a shop-floor perspective, the Machine is an irrelevant 
abstraction, and what makes history is individuals (perhaps classes) in conflict or 
accommodation.  A row of machine tools is not itself a compelling historical 
agent.
164
Misa’s correlation holds for all the determinists and constructivists surveyed in 
this paper.  The technological determinists tend to look at sweeping histories, abstract 
general trends, archeological remains spanning centuries, and economic data, from 
which they read patterns and attribute historical causality to technological change.  
The social constructivists, on the other hand, look more closely, watch the human 
actors, record their speech, and read their letters, and they see humans making history.  
At their scale of analysis it is, as Rosalind Williams writes, “self-evident” to the social 
constructivists that “human beings construct machines, not the reverse.”
165
Implicit to this constructivist critique is an epistemological belief: the findings 
of micro-analyses are epistemologically superior to—are more “real” than—those of 
macro-analyses.  While I agree with the epistemological prior that any macro analysis 
should be, ultimately, ontologically congruent with a micro-analysis of the same 
phenomena, as a methodological principle it is dangerous to privilege micro-analyses.  
In complex systems, there are often emergent patterns visible over larger scales of 
analysis which may be impossible to derive from the findings of smaller scales of 
analysis.  If such large scale, emergent patterns are observed, then scholars should 
seek to find an explanatory mechanism.  The absence of a plausible mechanism, 
though, does not warrant the dismissal of the findings from the larger scale of analysis 
and the privileging of the findings from the smaller scale of analysis.  To elaborate this 
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Technology, & Human Values, Vol 13, no. 3/4 1988 
165 Williams. Retooling: A Historian Confronts Technological Change, 116. 
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point, I will provide a short scholarly parable about a hypothetical community of 
“Wave Studies” scholars.   
The Lunar Determinist: A Parable 
A young sandcastle consultant who was concerned about the water waves that 
interfere with his client’s castles went to the annual Coastal Wave Studies Conference 
to present a new theory he was working on, and to better understand these waves.  He 
said to the conference attendees: “I’ve been watching my beach for a few days now, 
and I noticed that the sandcastles built highest on the beach only touch water when the 
moon is directly overhead, so I think that the moon somehow causes day long 
waves—or “tides”—in the ocean.”   
The consultant’s proposal was not well received.  A senior scholar stood up 
and declared that in his own detailed analysis of one square decimeter of ocean over 
the span of three seconds, he demonstrated the complex hydrodynamics of a passing 
breeze that creates little waves.  “I won’t deny your acclaimed passing breeze theory 
of waves” said another scholar, “but I’ve found the largest cause to be, in my twenty 
minute analysis of a diving area, rotund boys who do cannonballs into the water.”  
Still another scholar pointed out how, in his one hour analysis of a beach, large 
passing boats were the single most important cause of large waves.  “In all the 
research to date,” said the first, “the only mechanism for wave formation is physical 
interaction, be it the displacement of water by passing boats or the influence of wind 
patterns.  Since the moon does not physically interact with water or wind, as anyone 
can plainly see, these findings must be mistaken.”  Other senior scholars agree that 
this theory is totally un-tethered to the self-evident reality observed through micro-
studies, and opt to label this kind of reasoning “lunar determinism,” liberally 
dismissing any future scholars who make similarly misguided claims.  
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This “Wave Studies” parable illustrates two elements of the technology studies 
impasse: first, studies at different scales of analysis can (and often do) find different 
processes to be important; second, dismissing a macro-observation (or a whole library 
of them) because no one has yet found a plausible mechanism for their occurrence is 
intellectually misguided.  The patterns described by the technological determinists 
ought to not be entirely dismissed simply because no one has yet found a plausible 
mechanism for their existence.  It is a common feature of complex systems that micro 
processes will give rise to emergent properties at a higher level of organization. For 
example, as if by magic, highly disordered and unpredictable gas molecules give rise 
to Boyle’s predictable gas law, the chaotic and uncoordinated actions of the market 
give rise (when factors are priced correctly) to an efficient allocation of resources, the 
incomprehensible firings of millions of neurons give rise to human thoughts.  
Likewise, the varied perceptions, and contingent and largely free actions of billions of 
individuals may, in theory, give rise to deterministic long-term trends.   
 
Epistemological Responses to Conflict: Dismiss Other or Seek Nuanced 
Synthesis  
When two scholarly communities purportedly studying the same phenomena 
come to seemingly contradictory results, an epistemological choice must be made.  
Either 1) each community can dismiss the findings and claims of the other, or 2) the 
communities can seek to understand what assumptions, methods or logics cause such 
divergent findings, and thereby work towards a coherent synthesis.  Perhaps the two 
communities are not in fact studying the same phenomena?  If not, what parameters 
define the relevant phenomena for each community?  Perhaps each community is 
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based on fundamentally different assumptions?  If so, what evidence or reasoning 
exists to support either assumption, and in what contexts?   
The study of technology faces such an epistemological dilemma.  Serious 
scholarly communities radically disagree about the relationship between technological 
and social change.  Winner summarizes the contradiction facing the study of 
technology well:  
… at the very moment that notions of contingency and social construction 
of technology have triumphed among social scientists and philosophers of 
technology, in the world at large it appears that the experience of being swept up 
by unstoppable processes of technology-centered change is, in fact, stronger than 
it has ever been. Social scientists may call them naïve, but the perception that 
institutions and individuals are driven by ineluctable technological change is 
fairly widely embraced among those who work in fields of computers and 
telecommunications, … who write on the emerging global economy [and 
amongst] economists and businessmen.
166   
And, I would add, amongst military planners, and most scholars of large-scale 
historical change.   
 
I propose that it is time to seek theoretical synthesis through mutual intellectual 
respect.  The label of “technological determinism” has been used as a rhetorical gate 
keeping device to dismiss scholars whose findings happen to disagree with the 
dominant approach within the social study of technology.  Instead of taking seriously 
the perception amongst many other scholars and non-scholars that technology seems 
to be autonomous and strongly determining of historical change, the social study of 
technology has caricatured and dismissed all such claims.  The label of “technological 
determinism” has, in effect, allowed constructivist scholars of technology to assume 
their desired conclusions by using the following logic: all scholars worth listening to 
find technology to be socially constructed and contingent; if a scholar finds otherwise, 
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they are not worth listening to; therefore technology is socially constructed and 
historically contingent.   A research community’s major theoretical findings should 
not become their required axioms for admission to scholarly dialogue.    
If we wish to criticize a technological determinist, we should do so on 
reasonable intellectual grounds.  We may criticize Ellul and Mumford for failing to 
provide a plausible mechanism for their claims, we may point out that their findings 
seem to contradict those from the micro-social study of technology, we may argue that 
they pessimistically overstate the likely harm from new technologies.  We ought not, 
though, to label them with our “critic’s term” that serves only to silence the debate on 
the question of historical causality: the significance of human agency should be the 
results of our studies, not their premise.   
But, until the determinists can provide a plausible mechanism for their claims, 
the constructivists are not obliged to seek a synthesis with the determinists’ seemingly 
contradictory findings.   Thomas Hughes has elaborated the mechanism of 
technological momentum to partly explain the technical shaping of society.  Langdon 
Winner and Bruno Latour, among others, have argued that elite groups use technology 
to further their political ambitions: the elite control the technical shaping of society.  
But thus far none of these possible mechanisms can produce the full panoply of trends 
observed by the technological determinists.  I will now elaborate a mechanism which, 
rooted in micro-social interaction, can give rise to the most extreme technologically 
deterministic claims. 
Returning to the wave studies parable, the moon drives the tides through the 
mechanism of gravity, an invisible force even now hard to comprehend, and nearly 
impossible to observe on microscopic scales of analysis.
167  I argue that technology 
                                                 
167 On small scales of analysis, gravity is by far the weakest force.  Only through its additive nature 
does it come to exert the power with which we are so familiar.   
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drives history through the mechanism of competition, both military and economic, a 
process that operates most comprehensively over long-time horizons and, because it is 
internalized by actors as the drive for power and profit, nearly invisibly in micro-case 
studies.   
Sociotechnical Adaptationism 
Sociotechnical entities exhibit variety; for example, there are a breadth of 
styles of hammers, parenting and tax codes, and new variants persistently arise.  
Sociotechnical entities proliferate at different rates (some negative); certain styles of 
artifact, technique, and institution are reproduced, imitated, imported to other context, 
or expand in scale.  Other styles—most styles—of artifact, technique or institution, of 
course, die out.   Any population which has these properties of variation and 
differential proliferation
168 will evolve towards those configurations which were most 
favorable or adapted to proliferation.   
The social constructivists are right to argue that humans exhibit an incredible 
variation in their interpretation of reality, and in their objectives.  However, the 
adaptationists ask, what would happen to any individual or group that persisted in 
holding an interpretation of reality that was uneconomical or militarily impotent, in a 
word: maladaptive?  While the severity of economic and military competition has 
varied over time, there has never been a place that has been lastingly exempt from this 
competition. 
Sociotechnical adaptionists—also sometimes called social, cultural or 
technological Darwinists—investigate the competitive processes behind the 
differential proliferation of different sociotechnical entities.   Adaptionists expect that 
                                                 
168 Proliferation means both to increase in number and to grow in size.  Both meanings are appropriate 
for selectionist processes, since proliferating entities may do both (eg. a successful firm may grow, 
spin-off new firms in other markets, and other firms may imitate them). 
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the population of sociotechnical entities will become more adapted to succeed with 
respect to the competitive—or selection—pressures.  Sociotechnical Adaptionism is 
most compelling in contexts where sociotechnical variability is relatively broad and 
plastic (a large population in which successful traits are easily copied) and competition 
is intense and uncontrolled.   
Selection: Competition for Scarce Resources 
In the construction of technology (and more generally, in any living system) 
there will always be one or more factors that are scarce.  Of all the technical 
possibilities, only some will find people willing and able to think them; of all the 
technical ideas, only some will find the writing materials, time, and a receptive 
audience to be shared; of all the promising technical designs, only some will find the 
resources to be tested; of all the technical prototypes, only some will be selected to be 
reproduced; and most importantly for the adaptationists, of all the sociotechnical 
systems only some will acquire the human, manufactured and natural resources to 
survive.
169   In order for a technical idea to be thought, communicated, tested, and 
mass-produced, scarce resources have to be allocated to that technology’s 
construction.  Thus, there is competition among potential technologies (and their 
advocates) for limited resources at every stage of their creation; the process by which 
this competition is resolved—the selection environment—will determine what kinds of 
technologies are constructed.  To understand why sociotechnical systems (such as 
                                                 
169 The above language treats non-humans as capable of action.  In this respect, I agree with scholars of 
ANT that humans do not have a monopoly on the capacity for action.  Evolutionary biologists will often 
speak about genes or simple life-forms as if they made decisions and had interests.  I do not think that 
this language is necessarily dangerous anthropomorphism.  It makes sense to speak about replicators as 
if they had interests (their own replication) and choices (the range of variation).  Just as saying that a 
person learned to do X is short-hand for a complex neuro-physiological process of variation and 
selection, speaking about a replicator’s interests and choices is shorthand for a complex evolutionary 
process.   
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states or firms) consist of the technologies that they do, adaptationists look at the 
competition for human, manufactured, and natural resources among  these systems.   
Sociotechnical adaptationists don’t think in terms of specific technologies 
(artifacts, techniques or institutions), but in terms of proliferating populations of 
systems.  A technology does not find use or replicate by itself; rather, it requires other 
factors, such as human input, instructions, electricity, raw materials, and so forth.  The 
factors are all integrated into larger proliferating systems that compete with other 
systems (and with “nature”) to acquire more of the scarce factors required for 
proliferation.  In this sense, these largest sociotechnical systems (such as business 
firms and states) may be more appropriately called sociotechnical organisms because, 
like living entities, they are in the business of acquiring the factor inputs needed to 
sustain, grow, and reproduce themselves.  Sociotechnical organisms do not share all of 
the traits that people tend to associate with other living organisms, however.  As will 
be discussed below, this failure to map directly on to the evolutionary biology 
metaphor is not a theoretical problem, because 1) biological systems are only a subset 
of the evolutionary process, and 2) biological evolution is more complex than most 
people presume.
170
Sociotechnical adaptationists look at the competition amongst large 
sociotechnical organisms—the highest levels of selection—because that is where most 
of the deterministic external “natural selection” takes place which constrains the 
dreams of many social entrepreneurs.   Thus, even when analyzing the evolution of a 
particular technology, sociotechnical adaptationists tell large-scale narratives about 
                                                 
170 For example, the ideas that horizontal transmission of traits does not take place in nature and that 
the definition of the organism or individual is self-evident are both mistaken, as will be explained 
below.  
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economic and/or military conflict because it is only at the highest levels of selection 
that the functional adaptiveness of sub-systems can be properly understood.   
Adaptationists argue that in a world of competition, sociotechnical organisms 
will evolve to be most adaptive for the particular competitive context. Thus, in a world 
of militarily competing states, states will evolve to be adapted to the creation and use 
of military power.
171  In a world of economically competing firms, firms will evolve to 
maximize profit through maximizing revenue and minimizing cost.
172,173   
 
Sociotechnical Variation  
The logic of Sociotechnical Adaptationism is most compelling when 
sociotechnical entities (including humans) exhibit broad and plastic variety, which is 
ironically also the human condition preferred by radical social constructivists.   Many 
other social sciences assume or infer that humans behave in a specific set of ways: 
economics usually assumes selfish, rational, all knowing, actors; some schools of 
sociology and anthropology state that humans are constrained by their cultural and 
institutional structures; psychology tends to explain human behavior by subconscious 
cognitive mechanisms, often rooted in evolutionary biology.  Sociotechnical 
evolutionists, about whom more will be said later, are able to combine the 
adaptationist emphasis on selection pressures and an awareness of behavioral, cultural 
and institutional constraints, to construct rich, plausible narratives of historical change. 
                                                 
171 For examples, see Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press;Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. 
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172 This argument exists at the core of neo-classical and evolutionary economics.  In the short run, 
individual firms will satisfice to meet the selection criteria, but in the long-run in an infinitely 
competitive market with a large population, the process of satisficing amidst continual competition will 
lead to optimal firm decisions. 
173 In both cases, the sociotechnical systems always face two adaptive strategies: to refine the current 
system (eg. weapon or production system) or to pursue radical innovations.   
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There is much evidence supportive of the claim that humans and sociotechnical 
systems are capable of broad variation, which supports the preferred assumptions of 
the constructivists and adaptationists.  Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd, in their 
excellent recent work on sociotechnical evolution, try to convey the breadth of human 
social variation: 
Consider, for example, the Copper Eskimo and the Trobriand Islanders.  In 
the winter, the Copper Eskimo lived in snow houses built on the frozen sea.  They 
obtained food by spearing seals at breathing holes in the ice, sometimes waiting 
motionlessly for hours in the bitterly cold darkness. . . . They dwelled in groups of 
families linked together by a web of reciprocity without chiefs or councils.  On 
the Trobriand Islands, many families shared a large wooden house.  They 
subsisted on yams and taro gardens that had been cleared and cultivated by hours 
of backbreaking labor in the humid tropical sun.  They were ruled by a hereditary 
aristocracy with an elaborate system of rights and privileges based on 
membership in large matrilineally organized clans.  Now add to the list nomadic 
pastoralists living in the starkness of central Arabia, the rice farmers of Java with 
their intricately nuanced social life, and the teeming economic and ethnic 
complexity of Los Angeles, and you will be convinced of the magnitude of human 
variation.
174   
 
In contrast with the social constructivists, the sociotechnical adaptationists take 
seriously—even exaggerate—the importance of technical properties in determining 
historical outcomes.  In many ways, this difference is similar to that between an 
internalist and a mild constructivist history, in terms of whether the analyst 
emphasizes the technical properties or the social perception of those properties as 
determinant.  This difference, it should be noted, shy of theoretical extremism (of the 
postmodern relativist or naïve economistic varieties) cannot be resolved theoretically, 
but only empirically.  In some cases, the particular social circumstances surrounding a 
technology’s evolution deserve more attention, in others, the social circumstances 
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were secondary, if not largely irrelevant, in comparison to the technology’s 
characteristics   
Thus a sociotechnical adaptationist looks at competitive settings, and argues 
that a particular technology proliferated because it facilitated the proliferation of the 
larger sociotechnical organism; under economic competition, the technology helped 
the firm reduce costs or increase revenues, under military competition, the technology 
contributed to the power of the military complex.  Sociotechnical evolution is rarely so 
clear cut in the real world—there are often countervailing selection pressures, and 
variation may be limited or path-dependent.  The sociotechnical adaptationist analysis 
captures the extreme of intense selection and broad variation; the radical social 
constructivist analysis looks at the other extreme of weak selection and broad 
variation; and the many other approaches to studying technology are at a middle levels 
of selection and limited variation.   
Competition: the Constraint on Action 
Differential proliferation is most easily conceptualized in terms of competition. 
The ultimate consequence of competition between social entities for access to scarce 
resources is that the less competitive social entities will wither and eventually 
disappear, while the more competitive social entities tend to flourish.  Thus, inter-
group competition is one of the main causes of sociotechnical selection, and perhaps 
also the most interesting.   
In a sufficiently competitive environment, the range of adaptive—and for any 
length of time, possible—behavior for a sociotechnical organism and its components 
is severely constrained.  Under perfect competition, a firm has no option except to 
produce the optimal quantity of goods.  Under mortal military threat, a state and 
people have no option but to mobilize their political and military resources as best that 
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they can for defense.  Under competition, actors always have the full range of options 
trivially available to them, though, in the long run only the adaptive behaviors will 
succeed.  From the point of view of an evolutionary analyst, it makes no sense to 
consider the severely maladaptive options available to organisms, since any organism 
that became thus maladaptive would no longer be around.  This is why you find so 
few, if any, firms in a competitive market that, in the long run, consistently lose 
money; the same is true for states and military prowess.   
In summary, competition constrains action, not in the immediate or proximal 
sense, but in the ultimate, evolutionary sense: in a competitive environment, any 
action/trait/behavior which is maladaptive will ultimately vanish from the population.  
Uncontrolled competition in a large population, when taken to the limit, removes all 
human agency from the system.  The extent of agency present in any given context, 
then, cannot be decided a priori, but is an empirical question, though one that must be 
embedded in a coherent sociotechnical theory.  This will be explored at greater length 
in the section on Agency, under Sociotechnical Evolution below.     
Competition: the Motor for Technological Progress 
Competition does not just “constrain” sociotechnical evolution, it also enables 
adaptive change by persistently redirecting resources to a functional subset of 
sociotechnical variants.  In the absence of selection, a population will just diffuse in 
form according to its internally generated rates of variation.  Complex, well adapted 
sociotechnical constructions are not possible without some selection; sociotechnical 
adaptationist argue in particular that individual human genius and social selection is 
not sufficient to generate all the impressive sociotechnical structures that humans have 
created.  Rather, economic and military competition have been essential drivers of 
technological progress, in the technical sense of the many trends described earlier 
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(stronger materials, higher buildings, faster transportation).  The reason is that, while 
humans will often enough borrow technologies that seem beneficial, they also often 
exhibit resistance to novelty, or the leaders of particular cultures will be opposed to 
certain changes.  Just as market competition ensures against grossly inefficient or 
complacent firms, economic and military competition more generally ensures against 
languid sociotechnical systems. This argument is central to Joel Mokyr’s The Lever of 
Riches: 
The struggle for survival [in Europe] guaranteed that in the long run rulers 
could not afford to be hostile to changes that increased the economic power of 
their realm because of the real danger that an innovation or innovator would 
emigrate to benefit a rival.  Technological improvements made abroad were 
pursued and imitated, foreign artisans were tempted and bribed to immigrate.  
Regimes that did not follow this course, such as Spain and the Ottoman Empire, 
fell behind and lost their economic and political power.  Comparatively tolerant 
states, such as England and the Netherlands, became the cutting edge of economic 
progress and acquired political influence out of all proportion to the size of their 
populations.  Competition between states stimulated innovative activity directly 
through government intervention…. The technological center of gravity of Europe 
moved over the centuries, residing at various times in Italy, southern Germany, 
the Netherlands, France, England, and again in Germany.  Political fragmentation 
did not inhibit the flow of information from technological leaders to followers in 
Europe, and so it came to pass that the technology used in Europe always 
eventually settled on the best-practice technique in use regardless of where it had 
been invented.
175
Jan Fagerberg points out how other eminent scholars of technology shared this 
emphasis on the mechanism of competition: “Schumpeter, extending an earlier line of 
argument dating back to Karl Marx, held technological competition … to be the 
driving force of … long run economic change.”
176   
                                                 
175 Mokyr, Joel. 1990. The Lever of Riches - Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. 
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The Fatal Conceit  
Humans have a tendency to infer intelligent design for functional structures.  
Prior to the Darwinian revolution, it was widely held—by scholars and laypersons—
that only an intelligent being could have created the many complex adaptive forms of 
life on Earth.  Evolutionary thinking has shown how processes of variation and 
selection can alone explain the emergence of the most complex functional entities, 
entities whose complexity and sophistication far exceeds the best efforts to date of 
humanity to understand them.   Nobel Laureate Friedrich Hayek argued that complex 
social decision making, such as the allocation of productive resources, and complex 
social systems, such as “language, morals, law and money[,] are all the result of 
spontaneous growth and not of design….”
177  “The structures formed by traditional 
human practices are neither natural in the sense of being genetically determined, nor 
artificial in the sense of being the product of intelligent design, but the result of a 
process of winnowing or sifting, directed by the differential advantages gained by 
groups from practices adopted for some unknown and perhaps purely accidental 
reasons.”
178   No group of planners could be capable of designing such an impressively 
functional system as our civilization: “if anything is certain it is that no person who 
was not already familiar with the market could have designed the economic order 
which is capable of maintaining the present numbers of mankind.”
179   
Hayek thus argued that the belief that central planning could effectively build a 
complex social system or make complex social decisions was a “fatal conceit.”  This 
fatal conceit stemmed from ignorance about the evolutionary processes giving rise to 
cultural traditions; “tradition is not something constant but the product of a process of 
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selection guided not by reason but by success…. There is certainly room for 
improvement [on our social systems], but we cannot redesign but only further evolve 
what we do not fully comprehend. ”
180  The economic fate of centrally planned 
economies has lent much credence to Hayek’s claims.   
A further line of evidence—the issue of the timing of social innovation—
supports the evolutionist’s view of social systems.  If humans are truly capable of 
effective design,
 181 as rational choice economists often assume and social 
constructivists who don’t mention (at least social) selectionist processes implicitly 
endorse,
182 then we should expect that major social innovations should all take place 
within a few human generations.  And yet, “the basic tools of civilization,” in Hayek’s 
words, “language, morals, law and money,” each emerged over hundreds, if not 
thousands of years of gradual change.  The gradual emergence of these systems does 
not suggest rational design.  Furthermore, most, if not all, ‘users’ of these technologies 
were oblivious to the causes of their functionality, just as the native speaker of a 
language does not understand the complexity of his own means of communication.  
Many technologies, such as the Japanese sword
183, were refined over hundreds of 
years to an impressive level of sophistication, and yet only now are the scientific 
reasons behind the success of these technologies becoming understood.  To those who 
hold up human intelligence as the sufficient or primary cause of innovation, the 
question remains unanswered how the Japanese sword-smiths or linguistically 
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ignorant language entrepreneurs could possibly construct their technologies without a 
basic formal understanding.  And besides, what took them so long?   
Competition: the Missing Mechanism for Technological Determinism   
Joel Mokyr argues that, “By and large, the forces opposing technological 
progress have been stronger than those striving for changes.”
184  But, “as long as some 
societies remain creative, others will eventually be dragged along.”
185  According to 
Mokyr, then, how is that the “stronger” social forces opposing technological progress 
have been so consistently and soundly defeated since the industrial revolution?  
Because while they are presumably proximally stronger, the social groups embracing 
technological change become stronger by virtue of their attitude towards technology.  
So long as some societies remain outside of the control of the status quo, all societies 
will eventually be “dragged along.”  Thus, in these quotes, and in many others, we 
find the missing mechanism for technological determinism.  Competition compels all 
actors to adapt, even when the change is proximally resisted by most social groups.  
So long as some social group embraces change, an event most likely within an 
anarchic political system, than technological “progress” will persist.   
Friedrich Hayek, like Joel Mokyr, sees technological progress largely in a 
positive light, but he also identifies how competition has restrained human agency, 
compelling many social groups to accept “progress”:  
. . . it was the evolution of tradition which made civilization possible, 
[thus] spontaneous evolution is a necessary if not a sufficient condition of 
progress.  And though it clearly produces also much that we did not foresee and 
do not like when we see it, it does bring to ever-increasing numbers what they 
have been mainly striving for.  We often do not like it because the new 
possibilities always also bring a new discipline.  Man has been civilized very 
much against his wishes.  It was the price he had to pay for being able to raise a 
larger number of children.… The indispensable rules of the free society require 
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from us much that is unpleasant, such as suffering competition from others, seeing 
others being richer than ourselves, etc., etc.
186   
Man is not and never will be the master of his fate: his very reason always 
progresses by leading him into the unknown and unforeseen where he learns new 
things.
187
Hayek here too argues that competitive processes have propelled the 
technological trends called by some “progress,” while also identifying that this 
progress has come at a cost of increasing “discipline,” “competition from others,” 
inequality, and “much else that we did not foresee and do not like when we see it.”   
When we look back at the (pessimistic) technological determinists, we find 
that competitive processes are active in their narratives, though they did not highlight 
their significance.   Winner, for example, suggests a general technological trend 
characterizing history which is implicitly adaptationist: “More highly developed, 
rational-artificial structures tend to overwhelm and replace less well-developed forms 
of life.”
188   
In Ellul’s writing we see that, while he emphasizes the “technical” as the 
proliferating dominant form of life, his underlying mechanism remains the 
proliferation of the adaptive (which in his case he believes to be always the 
“technical”):  
Nothing can compete with the technical means.  The choice is made a 
priori.  It is not in the power of the individual or the group to decide to follow 
some method other than the technical.  The individual is in a dilemma: either he 
decides to safeguard his freedom of choice, chooses to use traditional, personal, 
moral, or empirical means, thereby entering into competition with a power against 
which there is no efficacious defense and before which he must suffer defeat; or 
he decides to accept technical necessity, in which case he will himself be the 
victor, but only by submitting irreparably to technical slavery.  In effect he has no 
freedom of choice.   
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We are today at the stage of historical evolution in which everything that 
is not technique is being eliminated.  The challenge to a country, an individual, or 
a system is solely a technical challenge.
189   
Finally, Lewis Mumford hints at both economic and military competition as 
driving the trends that he describes.  Merritt Roe Smith summarizes some of 
Mumford’s claims:  
In the competition for world markets, industrial societies pressed hard to 
develop technological capacities that would give them an edge and, in the process, 
made the machine rather than the human condition the form against which all else 
was measured.
190  
In a section of Technics and Society, Mumford draws out the importance of 
military competition in the origins of industrial society:  
The state of paleotechnic society may be described, ideally, as one of 
wardom.  Its typical organs, from mine to factory, from blast-furnace to slum, 
from slum to battlefield, were at the service of death.  Competition: struggle for 
existence: domination and submission: extinction.  With war at once the main 
stimulus, the underlying basis, and the direct destination of this society, the 
normal motives and reactions of human beings were narrowed down to the desire 
for domination and to the fear of annihilation—the fear of poverty, the fear of 
unemployment, the fear of losing class status, the fear of starvation, the fear of 
mutilation and death.
191
 
On a more theoretical level, the question arises why competition necessarily, or 
at least has so consistently, selected for the trends described by the determinists, such 
as increasing population size, energy intensity, complexity, and so forth.  At the most 
abstract level, we could restate this observation by saying that the adaptive topology—
that is, the relationship between form and fitness—trended towards those 
characteristics.  At a proximal level, we can look at the major processes of selection 
and explain, to a reasonable degree, why certain kinds of sociotechnical system have 
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proliferated.   Thus, in a world where energy consumption has had large short term 
economic and military advantages, sociotechnical organisms would evolve to 
thoroughly exploit all energy sources, leading to historical deforestations in Europe, 
China and elsewhere, and the rapid burning of fossil fuels.  In the case of energy 
sources where nearly the “full cost” is internalized by a single sociotechnical 
organism, such as traditional agriculture in Europe, sociotechnical organisms evolved 
to optimize more long-term returns, as with through the three-field system.  Large 
armies tend to be beat smaller armies, though that trend has often been qualified by 
other parameters, such as training, armament, distance from home, access to resources, 
motivation, etc…   
Trends have also been observed in biological evolution, though they are more 
controversial because they are mostly only trends “in the maximum,” meaning that the 
maximum values of some metric have increased, with less clear changes in the rest of 
the distribution.  For example, within the set of non-human living organisms, speed, 
geographical distribution, metabolic range, complexity, functional differentiation and 
specialization, cognitive capacity, sensory acuity and breadth have all increased in the 
maximum, over the long run.  Over the short run, many of these trends have 
decreased.  Paleontologist Daniel McShea has looked at the idea of directionality in 
evolution, and while the evidence is complex and the scholarly majority resistant to 
the idea, McShea and others present a solid case that there may be trends, and that 
these trends may be driven by a number of possible (passive and active) mechanisms.   
Ultimately, the question of the existence and mechanism behind evolutionary trends is 
an open empirical question, and has eluded theoretical understanding.   
Perhaps, if we squint when observing long-term trends, as the loose abstract 
language of Ellul and Mumford and Winner allowed them to do, we can state simply 
that sociotechnical organisms become increasingly “technical” or “rational.”  If by 
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technical and rational we mean that which is adaptive for military and economic 
competition, then by definition, sociotechnical adaptation will trend towards 
increasingly “technical” forms.  These technical forms may conflict with human 
instincts, such that modern society may feel “unnatural” and “unfair”.  Human 
instincts evolved in a certain evolutionary context, to solve certain kinds of problems, 
under a certain set of relatively egalitarian social configurations.
192  Since 
sociotechnical change will probably lead away from environments similar to our 
evolutionary origin, it is not a surprise that people will sometimes perceive our 
sociotechnical system to be ”unnatural.”   
I don’t believe that this interpretation does sufficient justice to the many 
technological trends.  Why, for example, has the size of the largest organization unit 
(measured in terms of population of cells/people, energy input required, complexity, 
numbers and extent of non-kin relationships), and in sociotechnical evolution, the 
mean organization unit, continued to increase?  Why do large armies, more times than 
not, beat small armies, and large empires beat small, large firms beat small?  This isn’t 
to say that large always beats small, only that trends can be observed in the maximum, 
and probably also the mean, towards larger size.  Put differently, economies of scale 
and scope seem to be common in many sectors.  Empires, armies, and firms rise and 
fall; but subsequent empires, armies and firms tend to be larger and more complex 
than the previous.  Why?  As yet, we have no reasons to infer the increasing 
adaptiveness of large, complex, energy intensive, forms from the laws of physics or 
biology.  The problem is an empirical one, especially relevant to sociotechnical 
evolution: Why, on Earth, have complex (name-your-preferred-trend) sociotechnical 
organisms tended to proliferate at the expense of their rivals?   
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Criticisms of Sociotechnical Adaptationism 
A fundamental criticism about selectionist theories is that they are tautological.  
In simple terms, selectionist theories state something like: that which was good at 
proliferating proliferated; or that which is abundant today MUST have been good at 
proliferating by virtue of its abundance today.  This criticism is appropriate to the 
extent that adaptationists 1) fail to  acknowledge the constraints on variation and 2) 
naively postulate selection pressures without independent evidence.   
“Adaptationism” in evolutionary biology is used to refer critically to those 
evolutionists who naively assume that every trait and organism must be adaptive.  This 
intellectual tendency is also sometimes called “adaptationist storytelling” because it 
contorts any history into the adaptationist “just-so” narrative framework. In contrast to 
adaptationism, some scholarly work that is attentive to selection pressures emphasizes 
the “internal” constraints on variation that limit the extent to which organisms (or 
other entities) can adapt to selection pressures.  Analyses that emphasize the internal 
constraints on variation tend to be more path-dependent, since the internal constraints 
are a product of past events and adaptations.  In the evolutionary biology literature, 
this criticism is most famously expressed by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard 
Lewontin
193, who note that traits can also arise because of structural constraints that 
locked in during earlier evolution, optimization trade-offs between different selection 
pressures, random drift in small populations, and transmission bias (or adaptation for 
lower levels of selection).   Adaptationists, they argue, will often apply a low burden 
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of proof for adaptationist claims, as well as conflate current function with its historical 
reason for proliferating.  
While this critique is a welcome reminder of the dangers of excessive 
emphasis on selection pressures, it does not challenge the usefulness of the core 
adaptationist assumption (that most traits exist because they were—and often still 
are—adaptive).  In the following section about sociotechnical evolution, a balanced, 
unified theoretical enterprise will be outlined in which the main criticisms of extreme 
adaptationism (and of naïve technological determinism) will be integrated, while 
maintaining their theoretical virtues of these approaches.  Sociotechnical evolutionism 
balances the crucial insights from an emphasis on dominant selection pressures and 
adaptation, while still allowing for attention to historical path dependency, 
contingency, and countervailing selection pressures. 
More generally, it should be said that the circular nature of adaptationism does 
not render it useless, so long as each side of the equation can be operationalized 
independently of the other, thereby opening up rich theoretical and empirical questions 
and insights.  For example, 1) an adaptationist would hypothesize that under intense 
competition, most actors within the system will be motivated and designed to win 
(because those who were not, are no longer present).  Thus, it is reasonable to infer 
that Olympians, having gone through many rounds of competition, will be highly 
motivated and trained to win.  If the adaptationist hypothesis is false, such a scholar 
would know to look for either constraints on the variation of behavior or on other, 
more subtle selection pressures.  Thus, if we found that some or most Olympians were 
not motivated or not maximally fit to compete in their sports, we would then ask if 
perhaps humans have some constraint on their possible variation (no matter how many 
rounds of selection, no human will be able to fly the 100m), or whether perhaps there 
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are other sources of selection (such as drug tests selecting against the drug-enhanced 
variant of Olympian).   
Lastly, it should be stated that most fruitful paradigms themselves reduce to 
some form of tautology, for example, Newton’s famous relationship between force, 
mass and acceleration: F=M*A.
194  Ultimately, this equation is a tautology, since mass 
cannot be defined independently of its ability to resist acceleration, nor can force be 
defined without the concept of acceleration.  And yet, this equation is still fruitful: if I 
see something “massive” accelerate quickly it is fair for me to infer that much force 
was applied to it (which requires much energy) or that it was in fact less massive than 
I assumed, a Styrofoam car perhaps?   A tautology should be judged by whether it 
yields new questions and insights.  Likewise, since with evolutionary theory the 
selection pressures and character of variation can be operationalized independently of 
the evolutionary outcome, evolutionary theory can a be a fruitful semi-tautology.  
Other critics of adaptationism offer counter-examples to refute an 
adaptationists’ claim.  While counter-examples are helpful empirical challenges to an 
adaptationist claim, they are rarely in and of themselves sufficient evidence to 
undermine an adaptationist claim for two reasons: 1) evolution is complex; an 
adaptationist claim offers a “first-order” approximate explanation of historical 
causality, and 2) evolutionism and adaptationism are statistical claims.  Evolution, be 
it biological or sociotechnical, is a very complex process; just because the rainforest is 
full of millions of species (many undiscovered) living through complex and changing 
ecologies that researchers barely understand, does not mean that adaptationist 
approaches have been unproductive.  Sociotechnical adaptationism offers a first 
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approximation for long-term causal processes, one that is especially appropriate in 
contexts of extensive and intense competition.  
Furthermore, many critics will attack a simplistic strawman version of 
adaptationism (possibly for good reason), but this, again, does not undermine the 
broader enterprise.  For example, a sociotechnical adaptationist may claim that states 
with more powerful militaries have proliferated over time.  But, a critic might argue, 
the war in Vietnam demonstrated how a more powerful military could lose (or at least 
stalemate) against a weaker military; the adaptationist response would point out that, 
while military power is often best measured using the typical metrics of man-power, 
level of technology, access to resources, economic support, and so forth, these all 
depend on the context; guerilla warfare is just such a context where military 
adaptations of imperial powers do not extend into new environments.  This counter-
example, then, requires added nuance from the adaptationists’ operationalization of 
the concept of military adaptiveness, but would only undermine the adaptationist 
enterprise if the selection environment was so variable that the traits of the organism 
had no consistent relationship to its proliferation.  
Likewise, adaptationism offers a statistical claim, which means that individual 
counter-examples are possible and sometimes common.  To take another example 
from biological evolution, biological evolutionists have noted that if a new gene yields 
a fitness advantage of only around 1% (an organism with this gene will have 
approximately 0.01 more offspring), then after a 500 hundred generations the gene 
will be present in almost all organisms.
195  Thus, if there has been sufficient time 
(hundreds of selection events), then even very minor probabilistic selective advantages 
will predictably proliferate.  That a critic could point out some counter-examples (in 
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the above case, 100 counter examples for every 101 examples) does not undermine the 
strength of the adaptationist argument, so long as the time frame and/or selection 
pressures are sufficient.  In most cases the selective advantage will be more substantial 
(say 30%), and the time frame more reasonable (around 20 selection events).  A 
sufficient span of time (and space), because it covers more selection events, is a 
crucial parameter for strong adaptationist analysis.   
Adaptationists who have kept their epistemological perspective know that their 
ultimate intellectual aim is to weigh the varying obduracy of different constraints on 
variation and varying strengths of different selection pressures so as to explain the full 
complexity of history, not by ignoring counter-examples but by using them as impetus 
for further theoretical nuance.  
 
One last concern about adaptationism, and evolutionary theory more generally, 
especially when applied to social systems, is that it has dubious normative 
implications and political potential.  In the early 20
th century racists and imperialists in 
the United States and Europe employed “Social Darwinism” to further their political 
agendas, most notably by Hitler to justify genocide.  More generally, the “survival of 
the fittest” has often been understood to justify an amoral, “every man for himself,” 
attitude.  These connotations and misunderstandings have done much to detract from 
the appeal of an evolutionary theory, but the concerns are misguided.   
First, it should be noted that no scientific theory brings with it a single set of 
normative prescriptions.  Instead, every descriptive and theoretical work can be 
interpreted in a number of ways to yield varying normative inferences.  A theory of 
technology provides an understanding about how things work, not how they should 
work.  While it is possible that some theories about technology may have political 
implications, such as the concern that technological determinism discourages political 
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action, these consequences do not follow simply from the theory but from the context 
in which the theory is developed, employed and understood.  As argued above, 
technological determinism can also be seen as politically empowering vis-à-vis social 
constructivism because it gives political activists warrant to push for radical, rather 
than reformist, change.  Environmental and labor activists often invoke deterministic 
claims because it gives them greater justification for their large demands and because 
many of them truly believe that reformist measures will be insufficient against the 
forces of capitalism.   
The normative implications of the interpretive flexibility of theory can be 
grasped by a cursory summary of the major ideological justifications for imperialism.  
The subjugation of neighbors has been justified because of the responsibility to spread 
the Gospel (and every other religion), political order, “peace,” the free market, 
security, and in our own time, “freedom and democracy.”  That the Ten 
Commandments, and more amazingly, Jesus Christ’s sermons of love and forgiveness, 
have been distorted in the ideological crafting of justification for war by “Christian” 
powers suggests that any belief system, no matter how benevolent, can be misused by 
political opportunists.  Bruno Latour, in a typically provocative piece, has even argued 
that social constructivism may have gone too far in allowing itself to become 
ammunition for the neoconservative denial of global warming and other “liberal 
theories.”
196   I think Latour exemplifies the best antidote to political misuse of 
intellectual scholarship: to speak out against its misuse, even if it may come at a 
personal cost.  The political risk is greater if we censor entire research programs 
because of their possible ideological misuse, than if we encourage rigorous debate 
from a critical, responsible standpoint.   
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Richard Dawkins exemplifies how a scholar can intellectually advocate for a 
particular theory of how the world works, and politically advocate against the 
consequences of the process that this theory describes, a position that would be 
impossible or ineffective without a sufficient development of this theory.  Dawkins 
prefers:   
. . . to agree that natural selection is the dominant force in biological 
evolution, admit its unpleasantness, and fight against it as a human being. I hear 
[evolution’s] bleak sermon as a call to arms[…] At the same time as I support 
Darwinism as a scientist, I am a passionate anti-Darwinian when it comes to 
politics and how we should conduct our human affairs.
197
Likewise, it is possible to advocate for an evolutionary understanding of 
sociotechnical systems, while endorsing political programs that seek to control the 
very processes of economic and military competition that our scholarship seeks to 
understand.  In fact, I believe that political action will be most effective when it is tied 
to a theory of sociotechnical evolution; neither extreme of naïve technological 
determinism nor radical social constructivism seem to me to be politically efficacious 
because of their neglect of, respectively, the possibility of political intervention and 
the obduracy of certain technological trends.  To intervene effectively one must 
understand what processes are driving change, and how, and thus what actions will be 
most likely to divert the trajectory of sociotechnical systems in a way favorable to 
one’s values.  Agency is not just the absence of determinism (obdurate historical 
trajectories), but the possibility to perturb the historical trajectory in a predictable way.  
This can only be achieved by mapping the mechanisms that give rise to deterministic 
processes. 
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Sociotechnical Evolution: Unifying Social Science  
A unified theory of sociotechnical evolution begins with the belief that most 
scholarly approaches to sociotechnical systems have some insight to offer, and that 
most disagreement among approaches arises because of the different premises of the 
various approaches.  These different premises, however, can be thought of as 
parameters that vary across historical contexts, such that each scholarly approach is 
appropriate in some contexts.  In this section I lay out the most important parametric 
differences in these approaches, so as to create a theoretical space where these 
different approaches can speak to each other, ultimately with the aim of constructing a 
meta-approach for studying technology.  The critical component to this task was a 
specification of the mechanism that could give rise to the claims of the technological 
determinists.  Having shown how the most deterministic claims could emerge from a 
mild constructivist ontology through selectionist processes, the theoretical bounds of 
sociotechnical evolution can be drawn. Within its circumference are most approaches 
to technology, with the absence of the irreconcilable extrema, which in our case 
includes radical social constructivist and naïve technological determinist claims.  A 
selectionist or evolutionary theoretical unification in the study of technology has many 
advocates
198, and even more in the study of social systems from other disciplines.
199
                                                 
198 Advocates for explicitly selectionist theories in the study of technology include, among others:  
Boyd, Robert, and Peter J. Richerson. 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. New York: Oxford 
University Press;Geels, Frank W. 2005. Technological Transitions and System Innovations. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing;Mokyr. The Lever of Riches - Technological Creativity and 
Economic Progress;Mokyr, Joel. 2002. The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge 
Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press;Murmann, Johann Peter. 2003. Knowledge and 
Competitive Advantage: The Coevolution of Firms, Technology, and National Institutions. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press;Nelson, Richard R. 1995. Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About 
Economic Change. Journal of Economic Literature 33 (1):48-90;Nelson, Richard R., and Sidney G. 
Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press;Nelson, Richard R., and Sidney G. Winter. 2002. Evolutionary Theorizing in 
Economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (2):23-46;O'Connell, J. 1992. The Fine-Tuning of a 
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I begin this synthesis by laying out the major theoretical approaches to 
technology, as systematized in Figure 3 in descending order from most deterministic 
and most macro (Dark background) to the least deterministic and most micro (White 
                                                                                                                                              
Golden Ear - High-End Audio and the Evolutionary Model of Technology. Technology and Culture 33 
(1):1-37;Vincenti, Walter G. 1990b. What Engineers Know and How They Know It - Anylitical Studies 
from Aeronautical History. Edited by M. R. Smith and T. P. Hughes, Johns Hopkins Studies in the 
History of Technology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press;Ziman, John, ed. 2000. 
Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
199 Other advocates of an evolutionary theory of society, to offer a random sample from other 
disciplines such as political science, philosophy, sociology, linguistics, and ecology, include: Aunger, 
R. 2000. Darwinizing Culture: the Status of Memetics as a Science. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press;Blackmore, Susan J. 2000. The Meme Machine. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press;Campbell, 
Donald T. 1982. Evolutionary Epistemology. In Learning, Development, and Culture: Essays in 
Evolutionary Epistemology, edited by H. C. Plotkin. New York: John Wiley & Sons;Carneiro, Robert 
L. 1992. The Role of Natural Selection in the Evolution of Culture. Cultural Dynamics 5:113-
140;Cziko, Gary. 2001. Universal Selection Theory. In Selection Theory and Social Construction - The 
Evolutionary Naturalistic Epistemology of Donald T. Campbell, edited by C. Heyes and D. L. Hull. 
Albany: State University of New York Press;Dennett, Daniel C. 1995. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: 
Evolution and the Meaning of Life. New York: Touchstone;Giere, Ronald N. 2001. Critical 
Hypothetical Evolutionary Naturalism. In Selection Theory and Social Construction - The Evolutionary 
Naturalistic Epistemology of Donald T. Campbell, edited by C. Heyes and D. L. Hull. Albany: State 
University of New York Press;Gintis, Herbert. 2000. Game Theory Evolving: Princeton University 
Press;Grantham, T. A. 2000. Evolutionary epistemology, social epistemology, and the demic structure 
of science. Biology & Philosophy 15 (3):443-463;Hayek. Law, Legislation, and Liberty, volume 3: The 
Political Order of a Free People;Henrich, J., and Francisco Gil-White. 2001. The Evolution of Prestige. 
Evolution and Human Behavior 22 (3):165-196;Henrich, J., and R. McElreath. 2003. The evolution of 
cultural evolution. Evolutionary Anthropology 12 (3):123-135;Hodgson, G. M. 1996. An Evolutionary 
Theory of Long-Term Economic Growth. International Studies Quarterly - Special Issue: Evolutionary 
Paradigms in the Social Sciences 40 (3);Hull, David L., ed. 2001. Science and Selection: Essays on 
Biological Evolution and the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press;Kauffman, Stuart. 1993. The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. 
New York: Oxford University Press;Kauffman, Stuart. 1995. At Home in the Universe: The Search for 
the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity. Oxford: Oxford University Press;Knudsen, Thorbjorn. 
2003. A neo-Darwinian model of science. In The Evolution of Scientific Knowledge, edited by H. S. 
Jensen, L. M. Richter and M. T. Vendelo. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar;Linares, O. F. 2002. Cultural 
evolution: Contemporary viewpoints. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 12 (2):277-279;McNeill, 
William H. 2001. Passing Strange: The Convergence of Evolutionary Science with Scientific History. 
History and Theory 40:1-15;Sanderson, Stephen K. 1997. Evolutionism and its Critics. Journal of 
World-Systems Research 3 (1):94-114;Sanderson, Stephen K. 2001. The Evolution of Human Sociality - 
A Darwinian Conflict Perspective. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers;Spruyt. The Sovereign 
State and Its Competitors;Thompson, William R, ed. 2001. Evolutionary Interpretations of World 
Politics. New York: Routledge;Trigger. Sociocultural Evolution;Wilson, D. S., and E. Sober. 1994. Re-
introducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioural Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 
(4):585-654;Wilson. Darwin's Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society. 
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background).
200  This typology could be modified and expanded in various ways, for 
example, to include various other schools of thought which have been neglected in this 
paper, such as that of Weberian socio-economics and specific schools within political 
science.  Appendix A offers a more complete table, from which the following is based.   
  
Sociotechnical Adaptationism  
 
(Sociotechnical Evolution by the 
Mechanism of  Military and      
Economic Competition) 
Technical 
Power, 
 
Technological 
Politics 
Endogenous 
Growth 
Economics,  
Diffusion 
Studies, 
Evolutionary 
and Institutional 
Economics 
Technological Momentum 
Mild Social  
Construction of Technology, 
 
or Historical Contextualism 
Radical Social Construction of 
Technology 
Figure 3 - School’s of Thought in the Study of Technology  
(Macro Determinism = High Selection) 
 
Figure 3 is an expanded form of Figure 2.  I have included some economic 
approaches, including Endogenous Growth Economics, Diffusion Studies, and 
                                                 
200 Again, credit to Thomas Misa for his insight on the correlation between scale of analysis and 
propensity to determinism.  
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Evolutionary and Institutional Economics.  Endogenous Growth Economics builds off 
of neoclassical growth economics by endogenizing the rate of technological 
progress.
201  Diffusion Studies explores why innovations diffuse (or fail to) through a 
population.
202  Evolutionary and Institutional Economics appreciate that actors are not 
perfectly rational, information is not perfect, and that firms and markets are situated 
within political institutions and social norms; these strands of economics allow for 
much more path-dependency.   
I have also included in Figure 3 the missing mechanism leading to 
deterministic outcomes: military and economic competition.  Figure 3 illustrates how 
as the scale of analysis increases, the tendency to determinism increases because the 
intensity of military and economic competition increases.  That is, over larger scales of 
analysis there will 1) be more instances of economic and military competition, and 2) 
cultural forces will be less coherent and collective action more costly, further 
exacerbating the “deterministic” selection for economically and militarily adaptive 
traits.   
The different levels of selection can be listed as follows.  From the lowest 
levels to the highest, we have cognitive/behavioral selection, social selection, 
economic selection, military selection, and then ecological selection.  I will discuss 
these levels of selection in more detail later, suffice it for to note that under this 
typology, social selection is below economic and military selection.  Thus, over larger 
scales of analysis we tend to observe more the effects of higher levels of selection, 
such as, for the purposes of this paper, military and economic selection.   
                                                 
201 See, for example, Romer, Paul M. 1990. Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political 
Economy 98 (5):S71-S102; 
Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman. 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. 1998. Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
202 Rogers, Everett M. 1995. Diffusion of Innovations. New York: The Free Press. 
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Path-Dependency of Variation 
There is a second axis on which we can lay out the various approaches to 
technology, and that is on the path-dependency of variation.  Evolutionary theory, and 
the study of living systems more generally, tend to offer two kinds of explanations, the 
mechanistic and the functionalist, also called proximal and ultimate explanations.    
Proximal/mechanistic explanations are those that trace forward, “normal” causality, 
and explain the rise of new variation.  Ultimate, functionalist explanations explain the 
characteristics of an organism
203 by the functions that they serve, and thus describe the 
character of selection. To take the classic example in evolutionary biology: plants tend 
to grow towards the light.  They do this because A) some cells in a plant have a 
particular configuration that makes them phototropic, and/or B) the function of 
growing towards the light was adaptive for most plants.  Ultimate, functionalist 
explanations have also been labeled “downward” causation because the form of the 
higher level interactor causes the configuration of lower level entities; as in the 
example, the functional requirements of the plant (higher level interactor) causes the 
configuration of the cells within the plant (lower level).  Just as we could arrange 
                                                 
203 The term organism is readily understood, but philosophically ambiguous.  Theoretically speaking, an 
evolutionary system consists of 1) replicators, which are the basic unit of information transmission, 
such as the gene in biological evolution, and 2) interactors, which are the functional expression of a 
group of replicators on which selection is acting, such as the individual creature.   In socio-technical 
evolution the concept of the replicator is not as immediately useful as in genetic evolution, though 
technically there must be some lowest entity that carries adaptive information.  Note also that there are 
often overlapping or encompassing interactors; the interactor is the relevant “phenotype”, which 
depends on the selection environment.  For example, a gene may proliferate based on 1) intra-
organismic competition such as meiotic drive, 2) the proliferation of individual organisms, 3) the 
proliferation of groups of individuals (kin or non-kin), through for example the evolution of 
cooperation.  The interactor for a gene, then, could be the gene, the individual organism, a group of 
organisms, or even the species or clade (group of related species), depending on the selection context.  
In David Hull’s words, the interactor is, “that entity for whom its characteristics will most directly 
determine the proliferation rate (of its replicators).”   
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different theories of technology according to the character of selection (see Figure 3), 
so we can arrange different theories of technology according to the character of 
variation. 
For our purposes, the most important characteristic of proximal/mechanistic 
variation is the extent to which it is path-dependent.  If variation is not path-
dependent, then selection pressures will move a population towards the most adaptive 
forms possible.   However, if variation is path-dependent, then the particular course of 
an evolutionary system will determine what future variants are possible.  Thus, in 
systems with path-dependent variation, analyses that pay more attention to history will 
be more plausible.  The richness of evolutionary theory is that, depending on the 
character of variation and selection in a particular evolutionary system, it allows for a 
balance between contingency and inevitability, or paraphrasing the title of Mokyr’s 
fortcoming book, between “Chance and Necessity.”
204   
In the following pages I describe how different theories of technology could be 
situated in terms of the two parameters of 1) the level and intensity of selection, and 2) 
the path-dependency of variation.  I will introduce the full figure in parts, because the 
final figure is quite dense.  I hope that working through these figures will be a 
productive way of conveying a set of ideas because it will allow for a methodical 
discussion and will yield a single graphical representation of what could otherwise be 
a daunting theoretical apparatus.   
 
                                                 
204 Mokyr, Joel. forthcoming. Neither Chance nor Necessity:  Evolutionary Models in Economics and 
History. 
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Figure 4 - Theories of Technology by Variation and Selection 
In Figure 4 we have the two principal axes.  On the y-axis we actually have 
three axes which correlate: 1) the scale of analysis; 2) the degree of determinism; 3) 
the level of selection.  That is, as we go “up” the y-axis we increase our scale of 
analysis, which tends to yield more deterministic scholarship (as Misa noted), and we 
tend to observe more instances of higher level selection, such as military and 
economic competition.  On the x-axis we have the degree of path-dependency in 
variation.     
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Radical Social Constructivism exists in the bottom left corner, where military 
and economic selection do not exist, and actors have (seemingly) unlimited variation.  
Mild Social Constructivism occupies a broad space in which military and economic 
selection pressures are weak at most, and extends across most of the range of possible 
path-dependency in variation. Mild Social Constructivist scholarship looks in a 
detailed way at historical particulars and contingencies.  Theories of technological 
momentum, by introducing the constraints that past actions have on present behavior 
but still avoiding central attention to selection pressures, is situated in the bottom right.  
Thomas Hughes was correct to claim that his theory held a middle ground between 
radical constructivism and technological determinism, as possible variation is limited 
by the actions of the past.  Hughes’ writing does also occasionally employ economic 
selectionist processes, though he does not foreground such processes in his writing.   
Sociotechnical adaptationism covers those theories that emphasize higher 
levels of selection (such as economic, military, and occasionally ecological), and 
covers, like mild constructivism, the whole range of possible path-dependency in 
variation.  Sociotechnical Adaptationism emphasizes the selectionist convergence of a 
diverse population towards an adaptive equilibrium.  In the top-left corner we have 
those arguments that I’ve labeled as Naïve Technological Determinism.  There is no 
simple distinction between Naïve Technological Determinism and more acceptable 
types of Technological Determinism and Sociotechnical Adaptationism, though 
probably the most important distinction is whether the analyst takes seriously the 
problem of providing a mechanism for the observed deterministic trends.  Scholarship, 
like much of Ellul’s, that frequently naively posits causal power to technological 
trends belong in this category.   
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Figure 5 - Theories of Technology with Gradient of Increasing Technological 
Determinism  
In Figure 5 I have added two arrows to help illustrate how technological 
determinism increases along this two-dimensional typology.  In the bottom left, where 
the background grey is lightest, we have those theories of technology that assign the 
most agency.  In the top left corner, where the background grey is darkest, we have 
those theories of technology that are the most deterministic.  As we move up the figure 
and up the levels of selection, we find more deterministic theories of technology.   
Interestingly, though, as we increase the path-dependency on variation we have 
a more complex relationship with agency.  Starting in the bottom left, as we add 
102  
momentum we have increasing determinism, as Thomas Hughes and Wiebe Bijker 
point out.  Technological systems carry the intentions of the past and structure the 
present.  Under higher selection (the top of the figure) as we increase the path-
dependency of variation we actually get more agency.  If variation is not path-
dependent, then under intense high levels of selection entities will evolve to the most 
adaptive state possible.  With path-dependent variation, though, there will be critical 
moments in history where small changes could perturb the system into a different 
long-term outcome.  Imagine a technological system with returns to scale; whomever 
first initiates the system will have an opportunity to set various standards and 
configurations that will become more costly to change as the system grows.  Thus, if 
there is path-dependent variation, system builders and other actors at critical moments 
in history will have agency even under intense high levels of selection.   In future 
figures I will not include the arrows, though the grey-background gradient can serve as 
a reminder of the relationship between the two axes and agency.   
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Figure 6 -  (Economic) Theories of Technology by Variation and Selection 
In Figure 6 I have added some economic schools of thought.  On the left we 
have Endogenous Growth Theory and other economic approaches that believe that 
“the pace and direction of industrial innovation” responds to the “expected 
profitability of inventive activity,”
 205 and seek “general-equilibrium” solutions that 
correspond with their data-sets.  General equilibrium solutions are only possible in 
systems without returns to scale and thus without path-dependence.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
205 Grossman summarizing Schmookler approvingly: Grossman, and Helpman. Innovation and Growth 
in the Global Economy, 5.  
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endogenous growth theories tend to posit actors who are capable of a breadth of action 
as they are usually blessed by perfect rationally, complete markets, and costless 
transactions.  Endogenous Growth Economics, except in the cases where the 
population is small, tend to equilibrium outcomes where the selection environment 
(market competition) is the determinant of the historical trajectory. 
On the right hand side, stretching across different levels of section and scales 
of analysis, we have, from top to bottom, evolutionary economics, institutional 
economics, and business history.  We could also add diffusion studies towards the top 
of this oval.  These economic approaches all emphasize history in the inertial 
construction of complex social systems, though they to increasing degrees also 
emphasize economic selection as a central process in their explanations.   
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Figure 7 - (Political) Theories of Technology by Variation and Selection 
In Figure 7 I have added some approaches to studying technology that 
emphasize political or military power.  These approaches begin in the bottom right, 
near Technological Momentum, where power is passively expressed through the 
structures of the past.  Under theories with Technological Momentum, the past has 
some power over the present, though the political dynamic of the present is 
underspecified.  These approaches, what I’ve called “Technological Politics”, believe 
that artifacts (and systems) can have politics built into them, and thus that 
technological creation is political.  The source of power and politics under these 
106  
approaches, though, is always previous political groups.  Technologies are not “born” 
with their own politics.   
As we follow this oval up to the left, this category merges with what I’ve 
called “Technical Power”, which is those schools that believe that certain technologies 
do not just have politics built into them, but actually have their own politics: that 
certain kinds of technologies are politically valenced.  Winner’s claim that nuclear 
technology is valenced towards authoritarian regimes and Mumford’s view that some 
technologies are democratic while others are authoritarian are an examples of this.  
This category slopes up and to the left because as technologies themselves are “born” 
with their own politics, the past politics that have been built into structures becomes 
less and less important.    
The top-left of this category merges with what I’m calling Darwinian politics 
which includes those military and political historians who argue that the emergence of 
superior technologies led to the proliferation and domination of whatever groups 
happened to possess those technologies.  Thus, Darwinian politics might include 
Kenneth Pomeranz’s argument that England came to dominate the world because it 
happened to have sufficient density of and proximity to coal to initiate the industrial 
revolution.
206  Or we might include Philip Hoffman’s argument that Europe had a 
comparative advantage in violence due to its superior “market” for military goods and 
ideas.
207  In Darwinian Politics the technologies of the dominant actors matter more 
than any other of their characteristics, and it’s always just a matter of time before 
some other power imitates, innovates and surpasses the dominant state.  This category 
is similar to Realism within political science, where states behave maximally 
                                                 
206 Pomeranz. The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. 
207 Hoffman, PT. 2005. Why Is It That Europeans Ended Up Conquering the Rest of the Globe? Prices, 
the Military Revolution, and Western Europe's Comparative Advantage in Violence. 
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rationally so as to perpetuate their power amidst a ruthless inter-state competition for 
survival.  In Realist theories, adaptive new sociotechnical configurations alter the 
balance of power, to the detriment of those systems which cannot adapt.   
 
Finally, in order to complete this stage of the figure, I’ve drawn a thick white 
border which demarcates the breadth of scholarship that can (or should be able to) 
speak to each other within a theory of sociotechnical evolution, so long as the scholars 
recognize that their theoretical strengths are most appropriate under their particular 
parameters of selection and variation.  
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Figure 8 - Sociotechnical Evolution 
The main claim at this point is that almost all approaches to technology can 
speak to each other, once their theoretical context of variation and selection is 
appreciated, except the extremes within constructivism and adaptationism, 
respectively: radical social constructivism and naïve technological determinism.   
Levels of Selection/Scales of Analysis 
The final theoretical insight required to unify the study of technology involves 
an appreciation of the ubiquity of selectionist processes (even in mild constructivist 
contexts), and the different kinds (or levels) of selectionist processes.  That is, 
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processes of differential proliferation are operative under all contexts of analysis, 
though the processes are different and they select for different traits.   
Darwin introduced at least three kinds of selection: natural, artificial and 
sexual.  These different kinds of selection are not discrete, but they are 
distinguishable.  The adverb preceding “selection” is meant to indicate the kinds of 
processes that are “selecting” the different rates of proliferation.  Darwin used 
artificial selection to refer to selection processes guided by humans, such as selective 
breeding.  Natural selection referred to all those “natural” processes that led to the 
differential proliferation of organismic variants.  Sexual selection was a subset of 
natural selection, in which intra-species sexual behavior led to differential 
proliferation of some, often seemingly maladaptive, traits.   
Likewise, it is productive to distinguish between different kinds of selection 
that operate on sociotechnical entities.  These different kinds of selection—or 
processes of differential proliferation—have different consequences for the evolution 
of a sociotechnical entity.  Once again, though, I will note that these different kinds of 
selection are not discrete: there are many processes that cannot be easily categorized 
into only one category.  Nonetheless, the categorization of different kinds and levels of 
selection is productive, for reasons that will be made more clear during this section.  In 
the following section I will descend the levels of selection, discussing ecological, 
military, economic, social, and cognitive/behavioral selection.   
The reason different selection processes are often framed as “levels,” with 
some above or below others, is because 1) some kinds of selection operate on longer 
(“higher”) time scales, and 2) some selectionist processes are embedded within each 
other (in which case the “higher level” are those selectionist processes which are 
higher on the organization hierarchy and, again, tend to operate on longer time scales).  
Joel Mokyr, for example, argued that technological change in firms occurred through 
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embedded levels (or layers) of selection: the market selects firms, firms select design 
options, cognitive routines and personnel, and personnel select ideas from a broader 
scientific, technical or commercial community.  If there are long-term trends in history 
we should look for them within the highest levels of selection, and only need to 
consider the lower levels to the extent that they affect the production of variants.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 - Theories of Technology, Levels of Selection
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Ecological Selection.  Ultimately, all kinds of selection reduce to the differential 
proliferation (or survival) of the organism that possesses the trait under selection.   To 
take the most extreme example, to illustrate the absolute limits of a theory of 
technology that neglects selectionist processes (such as radical social constructivism), 
imagine that a social group constructs an interpretation of a dagger as something that 
everyone should impale prior to sleep.  This example is ridiculous, but it illustrates the 
point: a trait (such as an interpretation of a technology) that immediately kills its 
interactor (the entity possessing the trait) will itself not proliferate, because the trait 
will die with the interactor.  We could create an infinite list of sociotechnical traits 
which are this maladaptive, though the list would be ridiculous (because no one “in 
their right mind” would ever adopt such a trait):  the use of lethal amounts of cyanide 
as a mandatory cooking ingredient, the annual spread of salt onto agricultural fields 
right after harvest, the placement of dead creatures into the water supply, plugged-in 
toasters as bath toys, etc…   Note that I am not arguing that it is maladaptive for 
components of interactors to die.  Just as it could be adaptive for an ant colony for 
some soldiers to die in defense, so could it be adaptive for a culture to have some of its 
members die “for the cause”.  It would, however, be maladaptive if an interactor had 
all of its members (human and non-human) die “for the cause”.   In history we do have 
kinds of sociotechnical “suicide,” but they tend to operate over much longer time 
scales, probably because humans are intelligent enough to modify behavior that leads 
to severe short-term consequences.  Toynbee wrote that “Civilizations die from 
suicide, not by murder.”
208  While the relative importance of self vs other inflicted 
civilizational death is up for dispute, that some civilizations have died from their own 
actions can not be disputed.  Jared Diamond’s recent book Collapse lists a few of 
                                                 
208 Aridan, Natan. 2006. Abba Eban, The Toynbee Heresy. Israel Studies 11 (1):91-107 
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these suicides, exploring “how societies choose to fail”
209 with examples including 
Easter Island, Norse Greenland, and the Maya.  In these cases, the sociotechnical 
configurations of the respective societies interacted with the environment and itself in 
a self-destructive manner.   Almost all sociotechnical traits within these societies died 
(or failed to proliferate) with the failure of these societies.  From an evolutionary point 
of view, those traits that contributed to the sociotechnical suicide, such as the Easter 
Islander’s excessive propensity to cut down trees to construct their impressive Moai 
and other artifacts, were ecologically maladaptive, and were selected against.  There 
were other “linked” traits that died with these societies, but did not themselves cause 
the death; these traits are adaptively neutral because if they were part of another 
interactor they could have proliferated: they did not influence the interactor’s ability to 
proliferate.  Every sociotechnical system, or community of systems, must, in the final 
analysis, be able to extract from the environment the resources that it needs to survive.  
If not, that sociotechnical system will die, along with its traits.  Those traits that 
prevent the largest interactor in which the trait resides from surviving—those that are 
ecologically maladaptive—will themselves fail to proliferate.  More generally, those 
traits that hinder or encourage the ability of their larger interactor to proliferate will 
themselves proliferate less or more rapidly and extensively.  The highest level of 
selection, the process of differential proliferation under which severely maldaptive 
traits will lead to the suicide of sociotechnical interactors, is ecological selection.   
Processes of differential proliferation that we can label as exclusively 
“ecological” are rare in history; however, ecological processes are always important in 
determining the success or failure (rates of proliferation) of societies.  There is thus 
messiness in the processes of selection; most of the time many different processes of 
                                                 
209 Diamond, Jared. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Penguin 
Group 
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selection change the rate of proliferation of (embedded) interactors, and at all times 
almost all processes are significant.  Even in the ideal examples of ecological 
selection, such as the society on Easter Island, social processes were obviously at 
work.  From a theoretical point of view, though, we can distinguish between the 
complex social processes of variation (proximal/mechanistic causation) which led to a 
certain kind of society, and the deterministic processes of selection (ultimate, 
functionalist causation) which are theoretically distinct from the social processes.  In 
this model, variants cause selective effects; the effects emerge predictably from the 
ecological environment given the particular variant.  Put simply, social processes 
decided what kind of society would exist, the ecosystem “decided” if that society 
would persist.  The interactor was part social, the selection environment was not.   
114  
Military Selection.  In biological evolution, one of the biggest priorities of 
any organism, right after being able to acquire the necessary inputs (food, water, heat), 
is to defend itself against predators.  The same is true in history.  Whether Toynbee 
was right about suicide being the leading cause of civilizational death, murder is an 
uncontested second.  In the story of sociotechnical evolution, from the conquests of 
Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, and Europe, to take just Western examples, 
sociotechnical configurations such as literacy, forms of government, and productive 
and military technologies have proliferated through military conquest.  Any 
sociotechnical organism that could survive ecological selection had to, eventually, 
prepare for military selection.  Many scholars have argued that military competition 
has been the driving process in the evolution of many sociotechnical entities, including 
the state itself.
210   
Again, what does it mean to say that military selection is independent of social 
processes?  Certainly, the military is composed of social entities and is designed by 
social actors.  This explains the variation in military forms.  But why do different 
military forms proliferate?  To a substantial extent there is imitation and other social 
processes that lead to the evolution and convergence of military forms.
211  But, there 
are times in history when different social groups refuse (or don’t have the opportunity) 
to imitate their enemies; in those circumstances where both groups literally fight to the 
death, the determinant of which sociotechnical system survives depends on the relative 
strengths of the respective military configurations.  When the ruthless gun-bearing 
Maori sailed to and attacked the non-violent Moriori on the Chatham Islands,
212 the 
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process that determined which sociotechnical configuration was dominant was 
independent of the social processes of the respective groups.  In any battle, both 
groups have different interpretations about what the outcome of the battle should look 
like.  The determinant of which interpretation survives involves a military process 
independent of the social groups concerned.  The traits of the sociotechnical systems 
in battle are like the inputs to a function, where the structure of the function is 
independent of the input variables.  Factors like morale, religious cohesion, 
enforceable discipline, training, and so forth, are all social variables, but they are 
inputs for the independently determined function of military superiority; they are 
variants to be selected by the military process of differential proliferation.  The 
outcome of a battle is a probabilistic function of the weaponry used, the training and 
condition of the soldiers, the terrain, and other factors.  Some factors lead to a higher 
probability of successful outcomes.  Military competition, even without social 
processes such as imitation and learning, would lead to the evolution of those 
sociotechnical systems that are most effective at battle, in the circumstances in which 
they evolve.  When we include imitation and learning as further mechanisms for 
sociotechnical interactors to evolve, we should expect even faster adaptation, as will 
be discussed in the section on Vicarious Selection.     
To conceptualize from another vantage point, consider the game of chess. The 
players, and humans (and now computers) more generally, create strategies.  The 
strategies are socially constructed (if we allow, for the sake of argument, that 
computers are social too).  And yet, is there anything social about the dominant 
strategy?  The rules of the game, and therefore the emergent topology of dominant 
strategies, are independent of the social processes of the players.  The players 
imperfectly explore this topology so as to maximize their probability of success, but it 
is this emergent topology that “decided” which strategies would be maladaptive 
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against other strategies; at a young age I discovered that my favorite strategy of 
freeing my two rooks to roam the board was consistently beaten by most opponents, 
including myself.  On occasion there will be a radical innovation in a game with static 
rules.   In these cases, there must have been some social or cognitive constraints on all 
earlier variants, perhaps a critical missing technique. When the new innovation is 
finally discovered, the population of players will soon learn of its merit, and began 
employing it where appropriate.  Social and cognitive processes are central to the 
construction of new variants; their success, though, is determined by the asocial 
selection environment.    
Economic Selection.  Within, or along with, every large sociotechnical 
interactor is some mechanism for deciding how to allocate resources and labor.  These 
economic systems have a number of semi-social components.  The economic 
processes of differential proliferation, especially under capitalism and anarchic 
political systems, tend to lead to outcomes that are, in most senses, autonomous of 
social control, for reasons similar to those applicable to military selection.  While the 
demand for final goods are socially constructed, in the sense that they are a product of 
social actors, the economic system that evolves to serve these ends is often 
autonomous of the wishes of social groups, with the significant exception of when 
economic actors acquire substantial political influence.  
To appreciate this level of selection, imagine a firm within a perfectly 
competitive industry.  The demand for the product is set exogenously (by the 
consumers), as is the production function (by “nature”).
213  The only choice that an 
individual firm has is what strategy it will adopt, and if it fails to adopt the most 
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adaptive strategy, it will fail to survive, its resources being consumed by other more 
successful firms (sociotechnical systems).  
Often, though, a firm can affect the demand for its product and its production 
function, through mechanisms such as advertising, regulatory capture, and lobbying.  
In some cases, as could be found most blatantly within a number of formerly 
communist countries, the economic proliferation (profitability) of a firm would be 
sustained by government decree and support.
214  In all these cases, economic processes 
blend with social, and thus these two processes of differential proliferation cannot be 
perfectly distinguished.  Nonetheless, the fact that the production function—the 
various ways that people have for building things—is not entirely a product of social 
wishes, interpretations or decrees, leads to the possibility of deterministic outcomes 
from economic selection.  To the extent that economic competition transcends 
political control, the technological trends associated with the increasing efficiency of 
production will likely continue.  But, ignoring the unforeseeable future, the reader 
should remember that throughout history these economic trends have ultimately been 
enforced by military competition, which selected against any polity that had 
thoroughly mismanaged its economy.   
Does economic selection necessarily have to be nested inside military selective 
processes?  Yes and no: economic processes of differential proliferation always exist 
within a context of controlled potential violence (some property rights); but economic 
processes are not dependent on a particular interactor, they are capable of switching 
interactors and existing in many (that is, firms can move their capital, and exist within 
the control of multiple states).  Many scholars argue that it was Europe’s political 
anarchy that gave rise to early capitalism because merchants could always seek safe 
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haven in a less parasitical state; but it must be remembered that the reason that the 
interests of these merchants survived in and proliferated from these safe havens was 
because of the military advantages accruing to capitalistic states.  Thus, while 
economic processes and actors can negotiate and gain power vis-à-vis states, they are 
ultimately dependent on some rule of force, and their power was always contingent on 
adaptiveness for higher order military competition.
215
Social Selection.  Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker explicitly built their earliest 
formulation of the Social Construction of Technology on the selectionist logic 
advocated throughout this paper, inheriting their ideas from the evolutionary 
epistemologist Donald Campbell, an intellectual ancestor to most of the ideas in this 
paper.   Bijker explains how these processes work under his model: 
  A variety of problems are seen by the relevant social groups; some of 
these problems are selected for further attention; a variety of solutions are then 
generated; some of these solutions are selected and yield new artifacts.  Such an 
evolutionary representation would thus not exclusively deal with artifacts, but 
would consist of three layers: variation and selection of (1) problems, (2) 
solutions, and (3) the resulting artifacts.  Thus the results of variation and 
selection on the level of problems is fed into a further evolutionary process of 
variation and selection of solutions, which subsequently generate the artifacts.
216
In SCOT’s terms the selection pressures are not strictly economic or military, 
but are culturally constructed; the selection pressures are whatever criteria the relevant 
social groups use to judge the artifacts.  In asking about these selection pressures, or 
“why some of the variants ‘die,’ whereas others ‘survive’”
217 the analyst must 
“consider the problems and solutions presented by each artifact at particular 
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moments”
218 to particular groups.  Thus, the selection pressures under SCOT are 
dependent on how the relevant social groups interpret the technology; weapons might 
be selected for their ‘aesthetic beauty’ or propensity for ‘individual heroism’ as much 
as for ‘efficiency’ or ‘military superiority’ – it all depends on the perception of the 
problem and solution by the relevant social groups.   
Thus, SCOT should be conceptualized as a selectionist theory, in which the 
selection environment is entirely social.  This theoretical underpinning was later 
neglected because the metaphor of evolution was thought to be too deterministic.
219  
For the purposes of this paper, the explicit linkage between SCOT and selectionism 
situates SCOT well into the schema here developed.  SCOT describes a context in 
which only social selection pressures are operative, and though SCOT does not discuss 
this in as much detail, it does not endorse any formal theory regarding the constraints 
on possible variants.   
Thus, social selection is a well understood level of selection to sociologists and 
historians of technology.  It is those contexts in which social groups select, through 
their consumption choices, interpretations, votes or actual use, which technical designs 
will proliferate.  Social selection is likewise applicable to engineering design teams as 
they socially select which designs to work on, and what criteria they will privilege.  In 
fact, most historical decisions about the future of sociotechnical configurations are 
socially decided (selected), explaining the prima-facie strength of the radical social 
constructivist position.  Just as ecological selection is rare compared to military 
selection, all higher forms of selection are rare compared to social selection.  Social 
selection operates on faster time scales than most cases of the higher levels of 
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selection, minutes or days for a social decision about the life or death of an idea or 
artifact, weeks or months for most economic “decisions” about a product or firm, 
years or decades for most military “decisions” about weapon system or state survival.   
And yet, even for contexts in which only social selective processes are present, 
a unified evolutionary framework provides insight into the motives and beliefs of 
these social actors that a constructivist position may miss, because those motives have 
been shaped by higher levels of selection.  This idea of vicarious selection will be 
discussed below.   
Cognitive/Behavioral Selection.  Finally, below social selection are the 
processes that give rise to individual behavior, which unfortunately is much less well 
understood than the higher levels.  “Cognitive” selection refers to those processes 
when a human selects an idea to act upon, such as choosing a technical design to work 
on further.  For example, some ideas may be difficult to conceptualize; these ideas, 
because of the adverse cognitive selection, will proliferate less rapidly than other more 
easily conceptualized ideas, all other things being equal.  “Behavioral” selection refers 
to what humans can and tend to do, given the space of all possible behaviors.  Some 
humans may want to fly unassisted, but this kind of behavior is constrained by 
behavioral selection.   
 
These levels of selection have been introduced into Figure 9 as a background 
color gradient so as illustrate the relationship between different approaches to 
technology and the levels of selection that they tend to emphasize.  Thus, scholarly 
approaches higher on the figure tend to emphasize those kinds of selection that are 
most deterministic (economic and military, and occasionally ecological), as well as 
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looking at longer time frames during when many selection events take place, even 
further reinforcing the processes that lead to technologically deterministic outcomes.  
“Variation” Emerges from Lower Level Selection
The categories of variation and selection are analytical categories.  The real 
world is not so neatly labeled.  Given this conceptualization of the world, it should be 
noted that while the model of variation-selection may be suitable for any particular 
context, within a unified theoretical framework the categories blur.  That is, the 
various traits of entities under one level of selection are themselves often the product 
of a process of selection at a lower level.  Thus, the cognitive and behavioral products 
that emerge from cognitive/behavioral selection constitute the variants of social 
behavior.  The products of social selection constitute the variants of economic 
selection; firms are made up of groups of human beings who advance the product 
designs which may lead to the economic success of the firm.  The products of 
economic selection constitute the variants of military selection; states rely on their 
national economy to efficiently build their war-machine.  The products of military 
selection constitute the variants of ecological selection; ironically, military and 
ecological selection seem to be so at odds that we often find that the most militarily 
adaptive interactors are ecologically maladaptive.   The above figure, then, should also 
be read as indicating the units of variation (one level lower) for any particular level of 
selection.  
 
Nested Hierarchies of Selection 
Selection processes need not form a neat hierarchy as described, and there are 
certainly examples where multiple selection processes operate at the “same level,” or 
selection processes at different scales are not neatly nested within each other.  To a 
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certain extent, this formalization is a simplification to grasp the basic structure of 
different scales of sociotechnical evolution.  However, in many cases selection 
pressures can be reasonably delineated in terms of different “levels,” and they are 
often found in nested hierarchies.  Historian of aerospace technologies, Walter 
Vincenti, employs the concept of Nested Hierarchies of Selection to explain how an 
airplane is built.
220  At a low level, individual engineers select amongst many design 
possibilities.  At a higher level, groups of engineers discuss amongst themselves which 
design possibilities are the most promising.  At a still higher level, these engineers test 
their few preferred designs in simulated environments, such as a wind tunnel.  Those 
designs which, when built, are most successful at the various tests, are then built into 
planes for the final test.  Over time, these plane designs are compared to each other, 
and firms will imitate the technologies of their more successful rivals.    
 
Vicarious Selection 
The nested levels of selection are not independent each other.  Rather, the 
higher levels structure the lower levels (through the process labeled ultimate, 
functionalistic, or downward causation) so as to be most adaptive for the higher levels.  
That is, higher level interactors evolve internal selection environments that are 
themselves adaptive for the higher level interactor.  To see this, Vincenti’s example is 
helpful.   
An aerospace firm would not succeed if its internal components acted 
irrespective of the needs of the larger interactor (the firm’s profitability).  Rather, the 
larger interactor actually shapes the nested lower levels of selection in such a way as 
to maximize the larger interactor’s fitness.  In order to do this, the larger interactor 
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forms internal representations of the external selection environment, so that its internal 
selection processes can quickly adapt to the needs of the larger selection environment.  
Thus, rather than going through the costly process of building and testing a new plane 
for every wing design, the firm internalizes the selection pressures (aerodynamics, cost 
of materials, etc.) and designs new traits (planes or parts of planes) in vicarious 
selection environments.  Engineers test new wing designs in a wind tunnel first; other 
employees calculate the expected cost of the different materials used in these proto-
designs and select the design that best balances the internalized representation of the 
cost/effectiveness trade-off.  At a lower level, design teams select those designs that 
they think have the best chance of success according to the firm’s needs, not based 
upon whatever notion they happen to have, but based upon ideas and attitudes that 
themselves have been selected for their past success (either in university, or in 
employment—few employers hire a design team leader who consistently builds 
overpriced, dysfunctional prototypes).  Even the cognitive selection taking place 
within every engineer’s mind reflects the larger physical and economic reality, 
internalized through years of education and work experience.  A successful interactor 
is one which has sub-components (and sub-sub components) that each adapt 
themselves to the specific needs of the larger interactor.  Thus, even when we look just 
at the level of social selection, an evolutionary approach hypothesizes that we will 
tend to find attitudes and cognitive representations that are largely adaptive for the 
larger interactor (if this interactor exists in a competitive milieu).  Personnel within 
economic firms and military organizations behave in particular ways, not just because 
that is the idiosyncratic life history of this socio-cultural entity, but partly because 
there has been selection for adaptive ways of behaving which internalize external 
selection pressures.   
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With this concept of vicarious selection we have a useful mechanism for 
explaining why we may have such deterministic tendencies in history though with so 
few deterministic selection events (most evolution takes place through imitation, not 
the death of stubborn interactors).   Cognitive routines, people, design teams, firms, 
and states (and any other interactor) do not generally stubbornly cling to unsuccessful 
configurations.  Rather, at some point the maladaptiveness of the configuration 
becomes clear through some signal (such as a drop in the stock price, or a major 
military failure) and the interactor begins to self-consciously adapt to its perceived 
selection pressures.  At this point, all the problems made clear by the study of the 
Social Construction of Knowledge are present: representations are always imperfect 
because they are necessarily indirect social constructions.  However, an evolutionary 
framework makes clear that the sociotechnical mechanisms that interactors use to form 
representations of the external selection environment has itself been selected in the 
past for its effectiveness.  Thus, much like how the human eye was selected for its 
ability to perceive color and motion over those wavelengths most relevant to our 
ancestors, our sociotechnical routines for vicarious selection have been selected for 
their ability to internalize the external selection environment.  The behavior of 
engineers within a firm trying to understand the external selection environment facing 
an airplane does not arise willy-nilly, but emerges from years of evolution in which 
other firms, pedagogical strategies, and testing techniques have themselves been 
selected.   
This evolutionary insight also explains why large organizations so often 
require strong adverse signals before adaptation begins—why, as the saying goes, the 
military is always preparing to fight the previous war.  Organizations and individuals 
are adaptively rational, learning from trial and error in past selection environments; 
they are not perfectly rational or otherwise.   While higher level selection events are 
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rare in history, lower level interactors will internalize the higher selection 
environments, thereby internalizing the tendency to evolve towards greater 
adaptiveness (for the higher selection environment).  With vicarious selection, then, 
the processes of differential proliferation due to military and economic competition 
that give rise to technologically deterministic trends will be manifest in lower level 
social and cognitive processes.  Thus, while many scholars are right to point out that it 
is the spread of certain cultural beliefs that sustain technologically deterministic 
outcomes, they are wrong to suppose that these beliefs may not be supported by and 
based upon powerful external processes.   
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I have constructed a table to elaborate the concept of a nested hierarchy of 
selection, based and extended upon Vincenti’s example in aerospace design: 
 
Level of 
Selection/ 
Scale of 
Analysis  
Competition 
Among
221: 
Examples  Selective Agent  Selection for: 
Macro-
Economic-
Military 
-economic 
regions, states, 
cultures 
1)Booming 
economy from 
cost-effective 
aeronautical 
transportation.   
2) Aerial combat 
and campaigns 
(strategic 
bombing). 
Emergent ‘rules of 
the game’.  
(eg. Who selects 
what strategies are 
adaptive (will win) in 
chess?) 
Adaptive sociotechnical 
systems based on 
emergent criteria; may 
exhibit deterministic 
trends. 
 
Meso-
Politico-
Economic 
-systems, 
corporations or 
industries 
Profitability of 
airline industry.   
Consumer.  Political 
(& cultural) climate. 
 
Technical-economic-
macro-social 
characteristics based on 
social, economic and 
political determination of 
criteria.  
Micro-
Economic  
-products or 
components of 
systems 
Sales to a hobbyist 
or commercial 
consumer.  
Consumer (price, 
ideology, 
effectiveness) 
Technical-economic 
characteristics based on 
social and economical 
determination of criteria.  
Technical 
Feasibility 
-artifacts  A test flight of a 
new plane design. 
Physics as it relates 
to full artifact and 
selection criteria. 
Technical characteristics 
based on socially 
internalized criteria.   
Testing 
(Vicarious 
Selection) 
-artifacts, or 
components of 
artifacts 
A wing in wind 
tunnel. 
 
The laws of physics 
as it relates to the 
testing setup and 
criteria.   
Technical characteristics 
based on socially 
internalized criteria.  
Group 
Discussion 
(Vicarious 
Selection) 
-ideas 
-plans 
-strategies 
-blueprints 
Engineers 
strategizing how to 
build a wing. 
 
Shared cognitive 
perspectives.  Social 
relations. 
Socially internalized 
characteristics. 
Individual 
Cognitive 
(Vicarious 
Selection) 
-ideas  An engineer’s self-
rejection of his 
own idea.   
A schooled mind.  
Intuition. Internalized 
experience.   
Cognitively internalized 
characteristics. 
Figure 10 - Levels of Selection/Scale of Analysis (begin reading at the bottom) 
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Agency and Determinism in Evolution 
We return to the issue that motivated this paper: the question of historical 
agency.  Agency is defined as the ability to perturb the historical trajectory in an 
intended manner (thus, unintended perturbations do not count).
222  From an 
evolutionary point of view, there are two processes that define the extent to which an 
individual or group can perturb a system in an intended way: the processes of 1) 
upwardly causal variation and 2) downwardly causal selection.  The first process, as 
previously mentioned, is the typical run-of-the-mill kind of causation: an actor or 
group can do whatever it can do (which itself is a difficult analytical problem to 
resolve).  The second process asks what will happen in the long run in a selective 
environment to the possible variants of different interactors: will an action help or 
hinder the acting entities struggle for existence against economic, military, and 
ecological selection.    
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Weak Selection, Extensive Variation.  Under contexts of weak or no 
selection, the question of agency is the conventional problem dealt with by non-
evolutionary social scientists.  The problem is a complex one.  Radical social 
constructivists represent the most extreme position in this typology, since they argue 
that individual human actors have limitless (or no definable limits on the) possibility 
to reinterpret and reconstruct their world.  In this case, each actor has unlimited, or an 
undefinable, degree of agency; if an actor can reinterpret their world however they 
please, then are they not perturbing their own historical trajectory to suite their 
interests?   Even less realistically, if an actor is capable of almost any action, than the 
only constraints facing this actor’s agency is the unpredictability of consequences 
stemming from the complexity of the system.  If the system is too complex, then the 
ability to act is futile because it cannot bring about predictable change.  Most scholars 
of social systems introduce some constraints on possible action.   
 
Weak Selection, Constrained Variation.  One set of scholars argues that 
human and social variation is constrained or determined by our cognitive or behavioral 
disposition, that is humans actually have far less choice in our behavior than we like to 
tell ourselves.  Our beliefs and motives are structured or determined by: genes, 
childhood, socialization or other environmental factors.   To these scholars, an 
individual has “agency” to the extent that she can choose to act despite her innate 
inclinations.  At this level, the question of agency is almost philosophical because it 
involves distinguishing the “will,” whose agency we are concerned about, from other 
aspects of the “programmed” self.   
More scientifically, we can ask how much controlled difference any historical 
actor or group could have made to the historical trajectory, as if their behavior was 
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solely a product of will.   Most of these scholars acknowledge that resource 
availability (both natural and political) heavily structures our space of possible 
decisions.  These scholars can be said to ascribe to technological momentum, since 
resource availability is partly a product of past political decisions.  To these scholars, 
then, the agency of all humans (the possible perturbation if all humans acted in 
concert) is undefined, but the agency of individual humans is constrained by past 
actors.   One possible framework holds that some actors have tremendous agency (to 
build low-hanging bridges, for example) while others have little.  The political 
calculus that determines who has power and who doesn’t remains undefined for most 
theories, but without some exogenous sources of power, these theories should be 
strictly passive in the sense that they at most propagate the interests of past actors.  
With some exogenous source of power, these theories introduce economic or military 
processes of selection.  An alternative framework that some scholars may hold is that 
agency is constrained by past actions, but that the system is sufficiently complex for 
actors to effect predictable consequences, and thus all actors are equally constrained 
by the random vagaries of past actions.   
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Strong Selection, Extensive Variation.  Under this ideal-typical 
adaptationist context, the space of possible variation from the lower level (be it 
cognitive/behavioral, social or otherwise) is relatively extensive.  Social groups are 
highly plastic, capable of an amazing and under-observed breadth of organization.  At 
the same time, selection pressures are ideal-typically intense, with a large population 
of interactors immersed in intense military and/or economic competition.  Under this 
historical context, human actors have a very small space of choice: they may choose to 
pursue the adaptive solution, or they may choose to perish or be controlled.  In either 
case, the “free” actors are those who are choosing exactly what they must—these 
actors are only free in the trivial sense of being able to choose whether they will lead 
adaptation, or be forced into it by another interactor, or eliminated.   
To illustrate the context, ponder the freedom of action that the a world chess 
champion, such as Gary Kasparov, has in his games.  If Kasparov only plays against 
his nephew, he could play just about any move that he wants.  If Kasparov is playing a 
ranked tournament, though, he is compelled to play the moves most likely to give him 
a win, because he is motivated to hold his title.  But even if Kasparov’s motives 
changed, and he no longer cared about the prize money, fame or title, what would 
happen?  Kasparov could make whatever move he pleased, but if he chose to make 
maladaptive moves he would quickly lose his title, and his admission to world 
championships.  At this point, Gray Kasparov the human being could still play chess 
however he pleased, but Gary Kasparov would no longer be the world chess 
champion.  Instead, someone else would become the “world chess champion,” and 
would select movenos from the vanishingly small set of best moves.  In the world of 
grandmaster chess, Gary Kasparov and his “irrational” moves had been selected 
against, replaced by an interactor willing to make the moves that he wouldn’t (though 
probably to a marginally less adaptive extent).  Under strong selection pressures, as 
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was often formerly the case in our world of inter-state conflict, and is largely the case 
in our world of inter-firm competition, leaders of interactors are constrained to act in 
the best evolutionary interests of their interactor.   Unless our global society is able to 
fully reign in the forces of military and economic competition, then the world’s 
interactors will continue to adapt to selection pressures not of our choosing (mostly 
economic), and possibly not to our long-term benefit under ecological selection 
pressures.  To the extent, then, that individuals or groups can control the long term 
selection pressures of military and economic competition, they may have agency over 
their long-term future.   Enduring political power does not come from one-step 
reinterpretations of a situation, or simple pluralistic decision processes, but from the 
reshaping of the selectionist topology in which the large interactors are adapting.
223   
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Strong Selection, Constrained Variation.  Perhaps ironically, having certain 
kinds of constrained variation that lead to path-dependent outcomes can increase the 
agency of certain actors even in a highly selectionist environment.   In the presence of 
economies of scale, the “first mover” advantage can often outweigh other factors in 
determining which interactor will proliferate.  The classic example given is that of the 
QWERTY keyboard, that is allegedly much less efficient than other keyboard designs 
such as the DVORAK keyboard, but became the dominant design because it achieved 
early dominance through its use in typewriters.
224  Thus, even though technologies of 
information production exist in a highly competitive environment, some of these 
technologies have such strong path dependence that other traits of the interactor make 
little difference next to contingent, idiosyncratic events that perpetuate this form 
through time.   
To the extent that there are these path dependent processes (stemming from 
positive feedback processes), detailed historical narrative regains its importance as the 
best generalizations that social science can hope to offer: social systems in these 
contexts are contingent.  The question remains empirical: to what extent do military 
and economic processes of differential proliferation select for adaptive sociotechnical 
configurations, as opposed to history being driven by contingent trajectories, social 
selection or other processes.  Or, in the economic language of Paul David, would “the 
agents choosing one or another path [have been] led back to a single, globally stable 
attractor of the kind that characterizes a[n] ergodic dynamical system.”
225
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Does Technology Drive History? 
Under the specific range of evolutionary parameters, then, we can make sense 
of the claim that technology may in fact drive history.  Technology enables new 
sociotechnical variants—if there is an agreed definition for technology it is this.  
Processes of differential proliferation select a subset of variants to proliferate.  
Therefore, under intense, constant selection pressures, a new technology, by 
expanding the range of possible sociotechnical variation, enables new adaptive forms, 
which will proliferate, radically transforming the population of interactors (see Figure 
11).  Lynn White was right to note that technology “merely opens a door; it does not 
compel [us] to enter.”
226  It is military and economic competition that shoves us 
through.   
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Figure 11 - Technology Opens the Door, Competition Shoves us Through 
 
Figure 11 illustrates how a new technology, in a competitive environment, can 
cause radical social change.  (1) On this plane are represented six theoretically 
possible sociotechnical configurations.  Only the three configurations encapsulated by 
the circle can be realized with the current level of technology.  (2) The selection 
environment selects for “star shaped” configurations.  (3) Only the “flower” shape 
proliferates, because the other two shapes are not sufficiently star shaped.  This world, 
then, consists of variations of the flower shape.   
(4)  A new technology arrives, through imitation or invention, and enables 
three new variants, (5) as illustrated by the expanding circle of realizable 
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sociotechnical configurations.  Under the same selection pressures, a new variant 
proliferates, leading to (6) radical and ubiquitous population change.  A macro-
historian of this world would see a population of flower shapes (3), a new technology 
arrive (4), and then a population of stars (6).  They would be correct to say that the 
technology (4) changed the world (3) –> (6).  An evolutionist could explain how.   
We could narrate this figure with an actual historical example: for example, 
Pelto’s account of the change in reindeer herding practices by the Skolt Lapp’s after 
the introduction of the snowmobile.
227  The Skolt Lapps, for over a hundred years, had 
herded reindeer throughout the winter using dogsleds and skis (= flower shape). (1)  
This method worked.(2)  The consequent social structure was highly egalitarian, all 
were “employed”, and pre-modern. (3)   
With the introduction of Snowmobiles (4), a number of new herding strategies 
became possible. (5)  One of the new strategies was to let the herd run “wild”, and to 
later bring them in with an organized snowmobile corral (= star shape).  Those who 
adopted this strategy were successful and made money, while many of those who 
didn’t (= flower shape), or failed to do so effectively (= wriggly star), had to sell their 
herds and seek wage labor.  The population of reindeer herders, then, was radically 
transformed (6) in just a few years, caused by the introduction of a new technology 
into a competitive system.   
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Case Study 
What would counter-evidence to a sociotechnical evolutionary theory of 
technology and history look like?  An historical case that would provide substantial 
counter-evidence against a sociotechnical evolutionary theory, and in favor of a social 
constructivist argument, would involve an interactor amidst a competitive milieu 
whose behavior could not be explained by adaptive considerations (and should thus 
diverge from the behavior of similar other interactors) but could be explained 
exclusively or primarily by consideration of social factors internal to the interactor.   
More concretely, an empirical socially constructivist rebuttal to the military 
Darwinist’s argument would require showing a historical case where a military 
interactor chose to pursue inferior military techniques for social constructivist reasons, 
and was able to survive.  A number of possible case studies could be examined to 
plausibly provide such a challenge to evolutionary theory, such as when interactors 
collectively fail to embrace a superior technology, as with the reluctance of European 
powers to adopt the (in retrospect powerful) machine gun in World War I, a collective 
rejection of ostensibly superior technologies, as with the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, or a sustained deviation from an adaptive evolutionary trajectory as with 
the Japanese “reversion to the sword.”   
 In this paper I have chosen to focus on the latter example because it represents 
one of the strongest possible refutations to a directional evolutionary understanding of 
technological change under military selection.  This “historical regression” is one of 
the most significant counter-examples to a strong sociotechnical evolutionist thesis 
because it purports to show how even the development of a critical military 
technology was not determined by a logic of military-technological supremacy, but 
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was radically shaped by local social forces, thus revealing the breadth of possible 
historical choice and contingency.   
In this case, however, the exception proves the rule.  Japan “regressed” in 
military technologies only for that period characterized by a lack of military 
competition, caused by centralized rule and the absence of foreign military threats.  
During the periods prior to and after Japan’s “regression,” when military conflict was 
present, military technologies rapidly developed, as an adaptationist would expect.  
Furthermore, it turns out that the Noel Perrin’s compelling message of social agency 
over technology, to quote the sympathetic postscript of the Japanese translation of his 
book, does “not take as its goal the empirical examination of the events of the past.”
228  
In other words, Perrin overstated some of his factual claims so as to make a broader 
theoretical argument, a surprisingly frequent academic occurrence.
229  Nonetheless, 
Japanese firearms technology did radically regress during the Tokugawa period, 
temporally sandwiched between two periods of rapid development in firearms 
technology.  This radical regression poses a challenge to the sociotechnical 
adaptationists analysis.  In the following pages, these three periods will be discussed, 
providing an opportunity to illustrate some of the theoretical themes of sociotechnical 
evolution.   
The story of firearms in Japan has can be divided into three periods.  The first, 
from the introduction of guns in 1543 to the unification of Japan under the Tokugawa 
Shogunate in 1603, follows the adaptationist ‘diffusion of innovations’ narrative: guns 
were introduced, were immediately recognized as powerful, and proliferated 
throughout the country.   The second period follows a plot line less familiar to 
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Westerners.  The island of Japan, controlled by the Tokugawa Shogunate, gradually, 
over a hundred years, eradicated firearms from the commoners and drastically reduced 
gun-smithing from the economy.  The strength of the samurai class, the repugnance at 
foreign influence, and the cultural valorization of the sword as a heroic and spiritual 
weapon have all been offered, most notably by Noel Perrin, as partial explanations for 
this dramatic ‘regression’.  As such, this period seems to lend itself readily to a social 
constructivist analysis.  Though a constructivist approach provides insight to the 
processes at work during this period, it remains insufficient because it ignores the 
historical context that allowed this technological regression, namely: the absence of 
military competition.  Finally, the third period begins with the submission of China 
during the Opium Wars and Commodore Perry’s 1853 demand that Japan open itself 
to trade.  Following Perry’s visit, debates raged and civil war flared up over the 
question of how Japan should meet the threat of the foreigner.  A complex back-and-
forth process took place in which various groups eagerly adopted the West’s 
technologies so as to better reject the West’s political and cultural encroachment. The 
industrialization and modernization of Japan followed the outcome of this national 
decision.   
The Evolution of Firearms Through Japan: 1543-early 1600s
230  
Tanegashima 
In 1543, a Chinese vessel brought some Portuguese adventurers and their 
arquebuses to the shores of Tanegashima, a small island off the southern coast of 
Japan.  These guns came to the attention of the feudal master of Tanegashima, Lord 
                                                 
230 I owe a great debt to Noel Perrin’s Giving Up the Gun which was the text that first pointed me to 
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139  
Tokitaka, who asked for firing lessons and later paid an extraordinary sum for the two 
guns.  Tokitaka ordered his chief swordsmith to reverse engineer the guns.  Within a 
year the first ten native Japanese guns had been made, “by the end of the decade it was 
possible for firearms to decide the outcome of battles.”
231  
Firearms were so immediately embraced that by 1549, Lord Oda Nobunaga, 
who later, with the help of his successor Toyotomi Hideyoshi, unified Japan, placed an 
order for five hundred ‘tanegashima’ (the early Japanese word for matchlocks, 
reflecting their geographical origin).
232  By 1571, only twenty-eight years after the 
first arquebus came to Japan’s shores, Takeda Shingen, who controlled one of the 
largest Japanese armies, ordered his commanders that “Hereafter, guns will be the 
most important arms.  Therefore, decrease the number of spears [in your armies], and 
have the most capable men carry guns.”
233  
Nagashino  
The importance and effective use of guns found fullest expression in the 1575 
battle of Nagashino where one quarter of Oda Nobunaga’s army of 40 000 was armed 
with matchlocks, and “of these, the three thousand best trained were the chief cause of 
his great victory.”
234  Lord Oda arranged those three thousand matchlockmen to stand 
behind a stream and a palisade, with orders to fire in groups of a thousand men, and 
for all to hold their fire until the enemy was close, a “key tactical innovation” that was 
“independently discovered, at about the same time as Western Europeans.”
235  Oda’s 
                                                 
231 Chase. Firearms: A Global History to 1700, 179. 
232 Brown, Delmer. 1948. The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98. The Far Eastern 
Quarterly 7 (3), 238. 
233 Turnbull, S. R. 1977. The Samurai: A Military History. New York: Macmillan Company, 140. 
234 Perrin, Noel. 1979. Giving Up the Gun - Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879. Boston: David 
R. Godine, 19. 
235 Hoffman. Why Is It That Europeans Ended Up Conquering the Rest of the Globe? Prices, the 
Military Revolution, and Western Europe's Comparative Advantage in Violence. At: 
http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/files/Hoffman.pdf, 3.  Access Date: 24/06/2006 
140  
enemy, Takeda Katsuyori, ordered his cavalry to charge the central palisade.  When 
the cavalry reached the edge of the stream: 
 . . . a devastating volley from a thousand arquebuses tore into them.  
Volley after volley followed, until men and horses were scattered around the 
slopes. . . . Katsuyori then ordered up his reserves, and personally led an assault 
on the stockade.  But the alternate volleying was still calm, controlled and 
efficient.  Every twenty seconds a hail of bullets tore into the ranks and blasted 
the Takeda samurai to eternity.
236
The Battle of Nagashino was paradigmatic of the revolutionary changes taking 
place in military tactics and weaponry in Japan in which “muskets and pikes came to 
dominate the battlefield and cannon beg[an] to influence siege and naval warfare.”
237  
Future military conflicts looked like they would rely more on a disciplined and 
distanced use of firearms than on the traditional “monster fencing matches,”
238 
courageous cavalry charges, and legendary heroic duels.  This period exemplifies the 
adaptationist paradigm in a number of ways: 1) the adaptive technology diffused 
broadly and rapidly, as expected by the ‘diffusion of innovations’ school; 2) the 
adaptive technology and the means of its manufacture were improved upon; 3) the 
larger interactors were reconfigured to better exploit this new technology through 
altered tactics, factor prices, and logistics considerations. 
 Cannon technology likewise proliferated during this time because of its 
military advantages.  Nobunaga, in particular, “built seven large ships armed with 
cannon and plated with iron” which he sent to blockade a recalcitrant Ōsaka.  During 
1578 his ships came under attack by hundreds of smaller boats; “the cannon on 
Nobunaga’s ships kept the smaller enemy ships at bay and prevented them from 
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approaching. . . the cannon on Nobunaga’s ships prevailed.”
239  Cut off from the 
ocean, Ōsaka was forced to surrender.   
By 1590, less than 50 years after firearms first arrived, Nobunaga’s successor, 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, had unified Japan.  The age-old conflict between different 
warlords on Japan, during these years, had undergone a phase-shift due to the 
introduction of firearms.  Kenneth Chase, in his excellent global history and analysis 
of firearms, explains how firearms:  
. . . confer[ed] an advantage on the larger warlords. . . creat[ing] a 
snowball effect that helped make unification possible.   
When armies were composed of mounted warriors, large armies were 
difficult to hold together.  The individual warriors had political ambitions that 
outweighed their loyalty to their superiors. . . .  
When armies came to be composed of footsoldiers armed with pikes and 
firearms, the advantage went to the warlords who commanded larger populations 
and greater resources.  Because anyone could be trained to wield a pike or fire a 
musket, large armies could be assembled by recruiting and training peasants.  
Insubordination became more difficult, as the organizational demands of 
supporting an army increased.  Defeat was more decisive, as an army could not 
continue to resist for long after its source of supplies and ammunition was 
overrun.  It was now possible for a single leader to grow at the expense of his 
rivals without becoming vulnerable to his own subordinates.
240
Delmer Brown concurs, adding that firearms gave new superiority to those 
military entities that could best coordinate their gunners and footsoldiers:  
. . . the military advantage came to lie with large armies under a central 
command—a significant factor in the concentration of military power that led to 
the establishment of a single government for all Japan in 1590, fifty years after 
guns were first used in Japanese warfare.
241
 
This period lends itself perfectly to a sociotechnical adaptationist analysis.  
The critical factor shaping history during this time was not the actions and 
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interpretations of individual warlords.  In fact, the unifiers didn’t even have a 
“decisive superiority in firearms,”
242 nor were they preternaturally insightful as to the 
advantage of firearms, as “the effectiveness of firearms was recognized by most if not 
all the major warlords.”
243  Instead, the trajectory of history towards a unified Japan 
was impelled by the altered strategic environment in which larger peasant-based 
musket-wielding armies tended to dominate.  Firearms changed the relative 
advantageousness of different military configurations providing large returns to the 
scale of the army, in the sense that those warlords who could field and support the 
largest pike-musket armies had a decisive advantage.  To the extent that the claim that 
firearms gave an advantage to the larger military power is valid, an adaptationist 
would be correct to argue that the unification of Japan during this period was largely 
inevitable.  Lords Nobunaga and Hideyoshi were central figures in this history, and an 
understanding of the specific details of Japanese history requires careful attention to 
their choices.  But the general pattern of Japanese history, if there are large military 
returns to scale of firearms, is indifferent to these individuals’ particular genius and 
ambition, for if they had chosen a less-expansionistic path, another contending warlord 
would have come to dominate.   
In theoretical terms, there existed a large population of competing interactors 
(warlords).  Each interactor was capable of a breadth of variation, thanks to the 
absence of a monopoly on any military technologies, helped in part by the presence of 
foreign powers who were willing to trade.  All variation but the most adaptive, 
however, was futile, doomed to be eliminated by the other proliferating 
configurations.  There was little room over the long run for substantially varied 
interpretations of firearms and military tactics.  Military competition was intense and 
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ubiquitous, such that the larger power tended to emerge victorious and thereby accrue 
still more population and territory.  The inevitable outcome to this idealized system is 
a population of a single large interactor, at which point either the competitive system 
must expand overseas or the competitive process must come to an end.  Interestingly, 
first the former, and then the latter, took place.     
The Japanese Invasions of Korea   
Hideyoshi, after seizing control of Japan, led an invasion of the continent, 
beginning in Korea.  The initial attack was dramatically successful, “due in large part 
to [Japan’s] superior muskets.”
244  Throughout the invasion the usefulness of firearms 
was appreciated to an even greater extent, such that a Kyushu lord writing home 
requested:  
Please arrange to send us guns and ammunition.  There is absolutely no 
use for spears.  It is vital that you arrange somehow to obtain a number of guns.  
Furthermore, you should certainly see to it that those persons departing [for 
Korea] understand this situation.  The arrangements for guns should receive your 
closest attention.
245
The first invasion of Korea eventually ran out of steam due to the resistance of 
the local population, the success of the Korean navy at disrupting Japanese supply 
lines, and the arrival of Chinese reinforcements.  During this respite, the Koreans 
adapted their tactics, fortifications, and armaments to better equip them for battle 
against the musket-based Japanese armies.   
During the second Japanese invasion of Korea the “proportion of musketeers 
rose”
 246 in the Japanese forces, a fact that helped them considerably against the 
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Chinese reinforcements, which outnumbered the Japanese by 2 to 4 times.
247 At one 
point a Japanese commander wrote home further requesting that:  
When troops come [to Korea] from the province of Kai, have them bring 
as many guns as possible, for no other equipment is needed.  Give strict orders 
that all men, even the samurai, carry guns.
248
During the invasions of Korea, because of the extensive integration of firearms 
technology and tactics into their armies, the Japanese had demonstrated superiority at 
battles in the open with the Koreans and Chinese.
249  The second invasion of Korea, 
nonetheless, did not have enduring success for the Japanese, owing to the numerical 
advantage, naval advantages, other tactical and technological advantages, and the 
adaptability of the defenders.  This period provides “yet another reminder, like the 
Chinese experience in Vietnam, that advanced weaponry does not guarantee 
victory,”
250  or in other words, that military competition does not select for simple, 
unidimensional configurations.  Military selection, like most selectionist processes, are 
complex, context dependent, relative to the configurations of other interactors, and 
non-linear.   
This does not mean, however, that we are unable to say anything about that 
which is adaptive.  Rather, it means that we have to appreciate that the adaptive 
topology is complex, and that many variables need to be specified.  In our case, the 
evidence suggests that the effective use of firearms provided a significant advantage to 
military conflicts in the open.  Since military conflict in Japan was largely 
characterized by conflict in open areas, the most adaptive military interactors were, as 
in Europe, those that employed firearms in substantial numbers and in a well ordered 
manner, protected at close range by pikemen and swordsmen.  Since the distinctive 
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inputs for this kind of military configuration are access to firearms, ammunition, and a 
large population, and inferring from the evidence that there were increasing returns to 
the expected success of a military confrontation from the scale of the army, a 
sociotechnical adaptationist would concur with the “generally accepted [view] that 
firearms contributed greatly to the unification of Japan.”
251
Firearms thus proliferated because: 
Everyone recognized their superiority as long-range killing devices, and 
all the feudal lords ordered them in large numbers.  At least in absolute numbers, 
guns were probably more common in Japan in the late sixteenth century than in 
any other country in the world.
252
The fifty years following the introduction of guns to Japan, therefore, provides 
an ideal illustration of a sociotechnical adaptationist’s expectation of the proliferation 
of an adaptive technology: being advantageous, firearms diffused broadly and rapidly 
and continued to be improved within the competitive warlord system.  A few military 
actors acquired and learned how to use firearms in some contexts; the success of those 
actors who embraced firearms led to the proliferation of the use of firearms, through 
both the proliferation of the actors who used them (by acquiring more territory and 
people) and through imitation by others.   
After the second failed excursion into Korea and the death of the leader 
Hideyoshi, the Japanese state, soon to be called the Tokugawa bakufu, went into a 250 
period withdrawal during which there were no battles in Japan
253 and little contact 
with the outside world.  A sociotechnical adaptationist would be at a loss to explain 
what had transpired.  Matchlocks became increasingly rare, and the industry to 
manufacture them dwindled.  The dramatic “reversion to the sword,” to quote Perrin’s 
subtitle, stymies a simplistic adaptationist explanation, and instead offers a plausibly 
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compelling case against a technologically deterministic analysis and in favor of a more 
socially constructivist perspective. 
 
Japan’s Reversion to the Sword: late 1500s-1853 
Firearms did not vanish from Japan overnight.  Through a series of 
governmental policies, which covered the now-unified Japan, possession of guns 
(along with other weapons) was first limited and then forbidden to commoners.  
Manufacture of guns was centralized, controlled and scaled down.  By 1668 the 
government had placed its last order of guns from Sakai, the only remaining region of 
Japan where guns were produced.
254   Gradually Japanese samurai gave up their 
practice of fighting with firearms: 
The samurai went back to taking fencing lessons, the monks resumed 
making black-feathered arrows, and all over Japan skilled smiths poured out a 
never-ending stream of top quality armor and swords.
255  
An adaptationist would explain technological change by appealing to the 
superiority of the more recent technology.  Japan’s matchlocks were not replaced by 
the flintlock firearms as occurred elsewhere in the world, though, but by their 
antecedent (though likely improved) weapons: swords, arrows, and spears.  A 
constructivist analysis, on the other hand, could offer a plausible explanation for why 
Japanese weapons developed as they did, beginning with a simplified enumeration of 
the relevant social groups, in this case: 1) the samurai, 2) the peasants, and 3) the 
Shogunate (government of the Shogun).   
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The Samurai 
The samurai, like feudal lords throughout Europe, were probably impressed by 
the military power of firearms but resentful of their social consequences.  The samurai 
made their living and justified their elite caste status by serving as professional 
swordsmen for their feudal lords.  Firearms undercut this claim by changing the 
tactical topology of military conflict, and undermining the military utility of the 
samurai.  A peasant could, “be taught within a few days to shoot an arquebus with all 
the accuracy of which the weapon was capable.”
256  Thus, not only was any peasant 
capable of firing a weapon that could penetrate the armor of the highest samurai, but 
increasingly a disciplined use of muskets proved to be a superior battlefield tactic to 
archery, the cavalry charge, and the legendary sword duels.  By undermining the 
military usefulness of traditional samurai skills, firearms threatened: 1) the samurai’s 
elite social position; 2) the heroism, glory and norms of traditional combat; and 3) the 
potent meaning of the sword as a symbol. 
Addressing the second point, battles changed dramatically under the influence 
of firearms.  Whereas previously the combatants would ceremoniously introduce 
themselves and “exchange ritual compliments before the slaughter began,”
257 the great 
tactical advantages of firing from a distance eventually came to dominate the 
battlefield rituals.  Furthermore, courageous legends and tales of heroism did not 
emerge naturally from the effective use of firearms.  Bravery and individualism were 
no longer militarily beneficial, but rather patience, discipline, and effective logistical 
supply.   
The sword was also a potent cultural artifact.  A famous Japanese quote calls it 
‘the soul of the Samurai,’ and as such it embodied the heroism and honor of the 
                                                 
256 Turnbull. The Samurai: A Military History, 131. 
257 Perrin. Giving Up the Gun - Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879, 22. 
148  
bearer.  Instead of wearing epaulets or military decorations, the Japanese warrior’s 
heroism was represented in the craft and beauty of his sword.  Bearing a sword 
indicated the right to have a family name.  Samurai were distinguished by their 
exclusive right to carry two swords.  The most ironic expression of the value of 
swords occurs in 1605 when the shogunate wished to reward four outstanding 
gunsmiths; he gave each of them a sword!
258   
The Samurai class, as a relevant social group, clearly had a distinct 
interpretation of the meaning of the sword.  Firearms represented a threat to their lives 
(since a samurai in full armor could be felled by an anonymous peasant hiding in the 
bushes), to their economic and social status, and to their precious, even spiritual, 
cultural artifact: the sword.  Representing an elite 7-10% of the population,
259 the 
samurai were not only a social group with a coherently negative interpretation of 
firearms, but a group with a lot of social influence.   
Additionally, it should be pointed out that ‘the samurai,’ as a class, was itself 
changed by the social negotiation of firearms.  In fact, ‘the samurai’ became a much 
more coherent and closed class following the banning of firearms and related general 
restriction on peasant possession of weapons.   
The Peasants 
The second social group is difficult to define: vast in that it comprised the 
majority of the population, but also underrepresented in the historical record.  The 
peasants are usually assigned passive roles in history’s retelling, except for the 
occasional revolution, and so forth in this story.  In 1588 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the 
successor to Oba Nobunaga and predecessor to Shogun Ieyasu Tokugawa, proposed to 
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build a Great Buddha – out of the “swords, short swords, bows, spears, firearms or 
other types of arms”
260 that could be found in the possession of the peasantry.  This 
edict, passed ostensibly for spiritual reasons—while also facilitating taxation and 
reducing the risk of uprisings—had the predictable effect of increasing the ease with 
which the peasantry remained subjugated. 
   Hidéyoshi had deprived the peasants of their weapons. Iéyasu 
Tokugawa [the next ruler] began to deprive them of their self respect.  If a 
peasant offended a samurai he might be cut down on the spot by the samurai's 
sword… The two swords thrust through the samurai’s belt remained the 
symbol of his authority which the lower orders had no choice but to 
recognize.261
 
In this respect, firearms were not only a weapon that could be used to resist 
taxation or foment uprisings, but were a weapon ideally suited to these tasks since they 
required little training and could threaten the most skilled samurai.  Firearms have 
often been called the ‘great equalizer.’  It is probably not a stretch to speculate that 
some of the peasants interpreted the firearm in a similar manner.     
The Shogunate 
The third relevant social group was the Shogunate, or central authority.  I will 
avoid exploring in detail, for want of space, the Shogunate’s nuanced and changing 
interpretation of the meaning of firearms.  Suffice it to enumerate the principal actions 
of the Shogunate pertaining to guns and situate this in context of the class and political 
conflicts already mentioned.     
As mentioned, Toyotomi Hideyoshi reduced demand for firearms in 1588 by 
the straightforward tactic of restricting ownership rights.  Beginning in 1607, though, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu began squeezing the supply side of the gun economy.  Ieyasu 
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promoted the four leading gunsmiths of Nagahama to samurai, symbolically giving 
them their swords in the first stroke against the product of their craft.  He then ordered 
that all gunsmiths relocate to Nagahama and produce guns only for orders that were 
approved by the Shogunate.  Each was authorized to earn an annual salary, to make up 
for the minimal orders allowed by the government.  Over time the gunsmithing 
community dwindled and the government’s monopoly on firearms became more 
complete.  By 1700 the last bastion of relatively autonomous gun production, in Sakai, 
effectively came to an end.  Nonetheless, throughout the Tokugawa period the 
Shogunate required each lord to have a number of soldiers trained and armed to fight 
in the event of a war, with about 10% of them equipped with firearms.
262   
The extent to which the Shogunate shared or was influenced by the Samurai’s 
distaste for guns is hard to discern.   Irrespective of this influence, though, the 
Shogunate was in the same business as most monarchical rulers: consolidating the 
class and political structure by reducing the peasants’ access to weapons.   King Henry 
VIII, for example, had declared edicts that greatly restricted ownership of guns.  These 
laws, however, were repeatedly revoked when war with France broke out (in 1543 and 
again in 1557), and the imperative to defend the nation overwhelmed the desire to 
consolidate power.  Fortunately for the Shogunate, no belligerent neighbors threatened 
Japan’s gun control policies.  Ieyasu Tokugawa may or may not have shared the 
samurai’s interpretation of the matchlock, but he most likely did see it as another 
weapon that the peasantry could do without, and the samurai had no need, nor desire, 
for.   
Based on this sketch, the constructivist scholar would look to Japan’s reversion 
to the sword as a classic example in which different social groups had very different 
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interpretations of the meaning, use, and desirability of a technology.  Because the 
government and the ruling class both shared an interpretation of firearms that favored 
their eradication from common use and saw no reason to devote extensive resources to 
further innovation, it is not a surprise that firearms fell into disuse.   
But why did Japan’s social construction of firearms diverge so much from the 
experience of every other country with an advanced firearms industry?  Was Japan’s 
uncommonly large samurai population, which as a proportion of the population was 
approximately ten times greater than feudal Europe’s warrior class, a sufficient 
explanation for Japan’s divergent historical outcome? Or did endogenous tendencies 
to perpetuate the “feudal system,” which surely existed in other European nations, find 
fuller expression in Japan because of their isolation from hostile neighbors?  Had 
Henry VIII not repeatedly found himself at war with France, might guns have been 
more rare in England?  The last period of this story offers an answer, by introducing 
the set of actors frequently neglected by micro-constructivist analysis: the rival actors 
in the larger competitive system.  In other words, sociotechnical adaptationism is less 
appropriate during this middle period because of the absence of its defining context: 
military competition.  
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Japan’s Ambivalent Modernization: 1853-present  
Two hundred and fifty years of Japanese isolationism ended on July 8, 1853.  
On what was otherwise a calm afternoon, four "black ships of evil"
263 (korofune) 
spewing black smoke and incomprehensibly moving without sails steamed into Edo 
(now Tokyo) harbor.  Swarms of little Japanese guardboats surrounded the steamers 
and attempted to board.  But Commodore Perry had no intention of being pushed 
around.  He repelled these invaders with ease.   
Commodore Perry, with his ‘evil’ ships, stayed in harbor for ten days, 
implicitly threatening bombardment and blockade, awaiting such a time that he could 
deliver his diplomatically worded ultimatum to an imperial official.  At this time Japan 
had no navy, and only meager coastal defenses; Edo in particular was critically 
dependent on naval trade from Ōsaka for food.  In fact, during Perry’s brief stay rice 
shipments stopped from fear, despite the absence of a blockade.
264
Commodore Perry informed the Japanese officials that he would return next 
spring to receive their response.  “With all four vessels?” the interpreter asked.  
“Probably more,” Perry replied.
265  And the rest, as they say, is history.  Perry 
returned, the Shogunate capitulated – but only so long as the Japanese had to.  Rapid 
adoption of Western technologies and institutions, helped along by a civil war, and the 
overthrow of the now obsolete samurai class, all contributed to Japan regaining its 
sovereignty and superiority.  Fifty years later Japan had industrialized and 
Westernized its military to such an extent that it had the honor of being the first non-
Western power to decisively defeat a Western power (Russia) in a large military 
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conflict during the modern period.  After another forty years, Japan, allied with 
Germany and other axis powers, posed a serious challenge to British, French, Russian, 
and American interests.  Sixty years following its unconditional surrender in WWII, 
Japan stands as the world’s second most powerful economy.  
 
The moment of Perry’s visit, I argue, was a critical juncture in Japan’s 
evolution which neither a constructivist nor an adaptationist approach can fully 
explain.   
To constructivist scholarship, the unanswerable question is: Why did 
Commodore Perry’s visit result in such a dramatic ‘reinterpretation’ of the meaning of 
Western technologies?  Why were Perry’s rhetorical strategies effective, when earlier 
(less belligerent) visits were ignored?   And as will be shown, what use is it describing 
the various social groups when, once they achieve power, all embrace the same, 
modernist and realist interpretation of technology?  How did ‘Perry’ have such 
rhetorical power to radically alter the deeply rooted Japanese interpretations of their 
technologies?   
To adaptationists, the principal challenge is not to explain why Japan finally 
embraced firearms (and industrial technologies and Western institutions), but how.  
Firearms (and other Western technologies) did not diffuse through Japanese culture as 
a result of individualist rational actors maximizing their military power or economic 
productivity.  Rather, a very complex process of social upheaval and cultural re-
imagination was required.  To properly understand the rate and pattern of ‘diffusion’ 
and development, one must consider how different social groups perceived the 
technology, what power and options those groups had, and how the social 
renegotiation transpired.  
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Foreigners on the Horizon 1750-1853 
By the late 1700s an increasing amount of foreign attention was directed 
towards Japanese shores.  The Dutch had long had relations with Japan, albeit 
confined to an artificial island in Nagasaki harbor (the only port accorded to foreign 
visitors seeking an audience).  Russians, in particular, increasingly demanded 
attention.  In 1804 an ambassador for the Tsar, Vasilii Rezanov, sailed into Nagasaki 
harbor aboard a warship.  There he was politely delayed for five months, only to be 
told thereafter to leave.  The Russian government accepted this and subsequent 
rebuffs, but Rezanov did not.  Rezanov organized some raids in the name of Russia 
(though without Russia’s knowledge) to revenge his wounded pride.  The Japanese 
government (or Bakufu) responded to these incursions by strengthening defenses and 
preparing for a possible military confrontation with Russia.  A later visit by a Russian 
cruiser resulted in the kidnapping of the unsuspecting Russian captain.
266  Finally, in 
1808 the HMS Phaeton, “a major British warship then cruising Asian waters in search 
of Napoleonic prey, entered Nagasaki harbor,”
267 and demanded provisions.  This 
demand, unmet, escalated into violence, and coupled with the incursions of a Russian 
raider in the north, “established a new sense among the observant that Tokugawa 
Japan was exposed as never before to foreign danger.”
268
Foreign ships continued to visit Japanese ports, despite the seclusion policy, 
leading to the 1825 “no second thought” expulsion decree, which stated simply that all 
foreign vessels were to be attacked, irrespective of their situation.  This policy 
continued until 1842, when Japanese leaders learned of the disastrous results of the 
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Opium War for the Chinese.  This moment forced many Japanese leaders to reflect on 
their own vulnerability, since if European powers could defeat the much larger China, 
surely they posed a threat to Japan’s sovereignty.  The seclusion policy was then 
tempered so as to allow foreign ships to be provided supplies, lest a hostile act incur 
the wrath of a foreign power.   Furthermore, coastal defenses were once more 
strengthened, and “two companies of infantry and artillery were equipped and trained 
in Western fashion.”
269  These military preparations reflected,  
a policy consensus:. . . in principle bakufu leaders wished to restore the 
[no second thought] policy of 1825, but doing so must await the construction of 
sufficient coastal defenses. . . . Despite much noisy resolve, little actual defense 
strengthening occurred.
270 
Thus, Japan was already moving, albeit at a slow rate, to prepare itself for 
confrontation with the West, when Commodore Perry so rudely steamed in.  It was 
Perry’s visit, however, which posed the problem in its full unavoidable seriousness: 
foreigners were through with playing diplomatic waiting games and living on artificial 
islands, and they had the military capabilities to resolve these frustrations.  It is for 
good reason that at least two serious Japanese histories, “Japan Before Perry”
271 and 
“Japan Since Perry”
272, use Perry’s name as a historical referent in the title.  Japan’s 
foreign policy options following the Commodore’s visit were basically reduced to a 
stark binary: capitulate or suffer the consequences. 
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A Nation in Flux: 1853-1868 
Following Perry’s departure the Shogunate’s chief councilor, Abe Masahiro, 
invited the daimyo (provincial) leaders to present their perspectives on Perry’s 
demands.  The debate ranged between, 
. . . those who advocated the continuation of the traditional policy of 
seclusion and those who argued that Japan had no choice but to accept Perry’s 
demand for the opening of the country.  Both sides held up the example of China 
as a warning.
273  
In the end the compromise solution was to cede to Perry’s demands, but to 
continue strengthening the nation with the intent of someday reasserting trade 
sovereignty and seclusion.  Orders went out to encourage the daimyos to invest in 
modern weaponry, through importation and attempts at indigenous manufacture.  
Foreign military advisors were invited.   
But for every step towards the West, the Shogun was criticized for his 
acquiescence, especially by those daimyos exposed to the West and with large samurai 
populations, such as Chōshū and Satsuma.  Intermittent conflict with foreigners 
increased, resulting in the British bombardment of the capital of Satsuma in 1863 as 
retaliation for the death of some British soldiers.  A few weeks later, forts in 
neighboring Chōshū fired at Western ships, an action that, in the incessant attack-
retaliate negotiations of military conflict, resulted in a large Western fleet returning a 
year later to destroy those belligerent forts.  The western daimyos henceforth avoided 
direct conflict with foreigners, and instead sought ways of overthrowing the 
Shogunate and recapturing Japanese foreign policy.
274  
In 1864 some samurai from Chōshū unsuccessfully staged a coup against an 
increasingly weak, divided government, one that was seen as being too compliant with 
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foreigners.  In consequence senior officials ordered a military expedition to Chōshū to 
support the local leaders in punishing those samurai responsible for the attempted 
coup.  Only a few months after the retaliatory expedition had left, though, Chōshū’s 
provincial government was overthrown by the broadly based anti-foreigner, anti-
Bakufu forces in Chōshū.  This new government was able to move beyond naïve 
notions of winning a civil war solely with samurai tactics.  They reorganized their 
daimyo along more effective lines, importing western rifles and ships, and, of 
particular note, they radically broke from 250 years of tradition by enlisting non-
samurai into their military forces.
275     
The Bakufu, in order to respond to the overt hostility of one of Japan’s 
principal daimyos, looked to France for military assistance and advice.  In 1866 the 
Bakufu launched another attack on Chōshū which failed on account of a secret 
Chōshū-Satsuma (Sat-Cho) alliance, and Chōshū’s impressive military modernization.  
Both the Sat-Cho alliance and the Bakufu now, ironically, prioritized military 
modernization in anticipation of a conflict nominally about (anti)foreign policy:  
Bakufu leaders pursued radical internal reforms to modernize their armed 
forces and reorganize their political structure along the lines of a centralized, 
European-style regime.  Meanwhile Sat-Cho leaders busily purchased weapons, 
trained troops, and deepened their ties to British merchants and diplomats while 
adhering to the rhetoric [to “Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian”] because it 
elicited [samurai] support and embarrassed Bakufu leaders.
 276
Several charged months passed, culminating in the advance of Sat-Cho forces 
in 1868.  After a major battle near Kyoto, the shogun surrendered, and the Sat-Cho 
alliance began gradually subduing various pockets of resistance.  The young Emperor 
Meiji served as a puppet for the new leadership, and an essential rhetorical device for 
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convincing and unifying a proud and traditional people to accept the radical changes 
ahead.  And so began the “Meiji Restoration” 
 
Meiji Restoration - Rich Country, Strong Army: 1868-
277
Many drastic changes occurred during the Meiji Restoration, but the change 
most pertinent to our question concern’s the role of the samurai.  Initially many 
leaders from Chōshū were advocates of continuing their highly effective “mixed 
farmer-samurai militias.”  However, a political assassination and the vested interests 
of various leaders from Satsuma (from where one quarter of the population was 
samurai) weighed decisively against conscription and modernization of the military.  
Nonetheless, Yamagata Aritomo, a samurai of Chōshū and influential reformer of the 
army, had traveled to Europe where he became convinced of the necessity to adopt a 
modern conscript-based army.  By 1873, despite the political intrigues of a few years 
prior, the arguments favoring conscription and modernization overwhelmed the 
opposition.  Thus, the Chōshū and Satsuma samurai who had helped win the civil war 
would fail to return Japan to a class-based feudal order.  These Samurai failed, or were 
betrayed, such that  
. . . by 1876, less than a decade after the restoration coup, the economic 
privileges of the samurai were wiped out entirely.  The coup leaders expropriated 
an entire social class, the semi-aristocratic elite from which they came… The new 
rulers had other uses in mind for [the samurai’s allowances.]  The samurai gave 
back relatively little value for their high costs.  Their ranks included many 
talented people sitting idle.  Their time-honored military skills, focused on swords 
and archery, were useless.  Thus the samurai’s stipends were basically welfare for 
the well-born. . .  . [The samurai’s] annual incomes fell by anywhere from 10 to 
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75 percent.  They further lost pride and prestige: The right to wear swords was 
denied to all but soldiers and policemen.
278  
This ‘betrayal’ by the leaders of the coup that the samurai had supported led, 
unsurprisingly, to a rebellion.  In 1877, outraged by the law forbidding samurai to 
wear their two swords and the related socio-economic changes, 40 000 samurai rose 
up in the ‘Satsuma Rebellion.’  They marched north toward the government’s 
conscript army of 65 000.  They were armed, writes an American teacher living in 
Japan in 1877, with,  
. . . ‘keen double-handed swords of feudal times, and with daggers and 
spears.  It seemed to be their opinion that patrician samurai could rush into close 
quarter with the heimin [peasant soldiers] and easily rout them,’ even though the 
heimin were equipped with rebuilt matchlocks and modern French rifles.
279  
 The two armies faced each other in a manner that was reminiscent of 
Nagashino, and comparably devastating.  For, “a full-scale battle of guns against 
swords can have only one outcome… even as the swords flashed, the air was thick 
with the 322 000 rounds of ammunition and the 1 000 artillery shells the government 
averaged each day.”
280   
The simplistic contrast between the modern governmental conscript army and 
the sword-wielding samurai rebellion is, of course, partly a romantic cliché.  The 
rebels were not so tactically ideological as to not include firearms in their logistics 
planning.  Saigo Takamori, the leader of the Satsuma Rebellion, was also, in fact, the 
former commander of the Meiji army.  Nonetheless, the cliché is deserving because, 
for want of a sufficient ammunition supply and guns that were inoperative in rain, the 
rebellion was fought principally with samurai steel.
281      
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The defeat of the Satsuma Rebellion brought closure to the great debate started 
24 years before.  Driven by the need to defend itself against foreign encroachment, 
Japan had, in fits and starts, finally embraced modernization.  The last serious 
opposition to the import of Western techniques and technologies had been silenced, to 
no small extent because of those very techniques and technologies.  The Meiji 
government, emboldened and empowered by their victory, could pursue the social 
transformations needed to strengthen the country.  A radical program of,  
. . . political consolidation, mass mobilization, military strengthening, 
economic development, and resource exploitation [was initiated] that began 
transforming Japan into an industrial society of the sort that western Europe and 
North America were also becoming.
282  
 
Convergent Interpretations of Technology 
A sociotechnical evolutionist agrees with the constructivists that humans are 
capable of imposing a range of interpretations on a specific artifact, such as firearms.  
During the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese exhibited this breadth: some perceived 
Western technologies to be repugnant manifestations of the inferior barbarians, some 
perceived them to be repugnant but effective under the circumstances, and a small 
group of Japanese admired Western technologies.   A sociotechnical evolutionist, 
however, also agrees with the adaptationists that under circumstances of intense 
competition the interpretations will be constrained by selection processes (and 
vicarious selection).  These interpretations will converge by two processes: 1) 
vicarious selection, in which actors internalize (learn about) the larger competitive 
pressures and alter their perceptions so as to better proliferate; and 2) adverse selection  
by the larger competitive pressures, that is, the loss of power or death.    
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Vicarious and Direct Selection.  Historian Andrew Gordon tells the famous 
story of Sakamoto Ryoma’s conversion to embracing Western technologies.  In it we 
can see an allegory for how those Japanese most hostile to Western intrusions changed 
their interpretations of Western technology.  
Sakamoto charged into the residence of a bakufu official…  With sword 
drawn, he stood intent on killing this man, who was modernizing the Tokugawa 
navy along Western lines.  His target, Katsu Kaishu, convinced the would-be 
assassin to first hear him out.  In the course of an afternoon Katsu saved his own 
life and persuaded Sakamoto that modernizing reforms were inevitable. Over 
time, people like Sakamoto developed a profound understanding of Western 
ideas, institutions, and technologies that would become deeply rooted in Japan.
283
Sakamoto Ryoma later helped create the secret alliance between Satsuma and 
Chōshū, and helped supply guns and warships to the revolutionaries.   
Sakamoto Ryoma’s conversion resonates with a process occurring throughout 
Japan.  Although many Japanese who were hostile to Western peoples and 
technologies, 
. . . set off on their political path with crude and hopeless notions of 
standing up to foreign gunboats with razor-sharp swords and expelling the 
barbarians immediately, many [of them] quickly tempered their extremism with 
practical experience.
284   
What does historian Andrew Gordon mean when he says that Sakamoto 
Ryoma, and presumably the many other anti-Western Japanese, were persuaded “that 
modernizing reforms were inevitable”?  We have in this historical moment a situation 
that cannot be fully understood by either a constructivist or an adaptationist theory of 
technology, alone.  An adaptationist could explain why Western technologies were 
accepted (because they were superior), but not why they took so long to be accepted, 
nor could an adaptationist describe the cultural changes prior to this acceptance.  A 
constructivist, on the other hand, could explain why different actors had different 
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perceptions of Western technology, but not why Katsu Kaishu and the other reformers 
were so rhetorically effective in their appeal to the inevitability of some 
Westernization.  A unified sociotechnical evolutionist perspective, however, can bring 
these two theoretical approaches together.  Different actors had the perceptions that 
they had for the reasons that the constructivists describe, but because non-Western 
technologies were mal-adaptive under military competition against foreign powers, 
these actors were capable of learning (internalizing) the likely consequences (vicarious 
selection) of continued adoption of non-Western military technologies, and decided 
against the fate that increasingly loomed over China and other Asian powers.  This 
decision set, though, was constrained by military selection to only three real long term 
possibilities: modernize, lose sovereignty or die.   
Social groups rarely stubbornly stick with their interpretation of technology 
until economic or military competitors defeat them.  Rather, most humans build an 
internal representation of higher level selection pressures (as Gordon’s quote suggests, 
they gained “practical experience”), and alter their behavior accordingly.  When Katsu 
Kaishu tells Sakamoto Ryoma, his would-be assassin, that “modernizing reforms are 
inevitable,” he is actually saying that the selection pressures are so strong against all 
other politico-economic trajectories that those who follow them will be eliminated 
(through bankruptcy, lost sovereignty, or death).  Sakamoto, wisely, learns from this 
encounter, recognizing Katsu Kaishu’s description of the higher level selection 
pressures to be accurate, and modifies his own behavior and strategy accordingly.   
163  
Military Selection.  In this case study there are few moments when rivalrous 
interpretations of technology compete directly, and military-economic selection 
“decides” which interpretation should proliferate.  In most cases the actors involved 
were smart
285 enough to recognize when they were defeated, and adapted accordingly.  
The Shogunate’s response to Perry is one such example in which vicarious selection 
preempted direct selection, as is the Sat-Cho revolutionary leaders ‘betrayal’ of the 
samurai, and Sakamoto’s aborted assassination attempt.  The Satsuma rebellion, if we 
endorse the romantic interpretation in which samurai made one last attempt to reassert 
the traditional Japanese way of life, is one of the few cases of direct military-economic 
selection.   
Throughout the civil wars that characterized the Meiji Restoration there were a 
number of battles in which one side employed obsolete tactics and technologies.   One 
feared group of swordsmen who defended the Shogunate, the Shinsengumi, suffered a 
major loss against a modern-equipped Satsuma army during a battle in Fushimi.  
During this battle the vice commander, Hijikata, ordered “a charge with drawn swords 
because ‘the outcome of battle cannot be decided by gunfire.’  The Satsuma gunners 
belied Hijikata’s outmoded ideas about war.”
 286
After the Shinsengumi retreated, a visiting ally enquired into the battle at 
Fushimi, to which Hijikata “is said to have replied with a grim smile, ‘Swords and 
spears will no longer be of any use in battle.  They are simply no match for guns.’”
 287  
Soon thereafter Hijikata purchased modern breech-loading rifles for his men.   
This case illustrates direct selection against a mal-adaptive military 
confrontation.  Had the Shinsengumi not retreated, we can expect that their order 
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would have completely perished.  As this case unfolded, like most, the Shinsengumi 
learned from this experience, and adapted.  Thus, though most change and adaptation 
may be caused by vicarious selection (that is, people making informed decisions), this 
change cannot be understood without an appreciation for the direct selection that 
motivates it.   
Sociotechnical Evolution 
Artifacts do not evolve in isolated testing rooms, but embroiled in a messy 
world of competing interactors, be they clans, nations, or trade companies.  
Furthermore, these social groups are not simply an agglomeration of individuals, but 
are highly structured networks of humans, ideas and technologies.  Sociotechnical 
evolution is messy.  So is biological evolution.  Just because animals survive or die 
based on a million contingent events doesn’t mean that, over long enough time and 
space scales, the slight advantages conveyed by mildly adaptive traits won’t 
proliferate.  Likewise in sociotechnical evolution.  Rarely in history is such a stark 
technological inequality encountered as when Commodore Perry first visited Japan—
basically, this situation only occurs when one sociotechnical system interacts with 
another for the first time or after prolonged separation.  These inequalities resolve 
themselves painfully quickly, through either rapid adaptation (as occurred in Japan) or 
invasion (as with the west-ward expansion of the American colonies).   
Did firearms, then, convey such an irresistible military-economic advantage 
sociotechnical systems that they were inevitable?  Probably.  But not necessarily so.  
We can speculate on how Japan could have modernized its navy while leaving land 
warfare to the samurai.  But how possible is this? Very often certain technologies 
require other changes in society, polity, or economy in order to be effectively used.  A 
modern Japanese navy would require an industrial economy.  An industrial economy, 
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however, does not operate very efficiently with feudal social relations and a large, 
unproductive, warrior class.  This massive inefficiency, what technology historian 
Thomas Hughes would call a ‘reverse salient,’
288 is tempting to change.  And at some 
point, either the willingness and power of the reformers will prevail (vicarious 
selection) or the traditionalist system will be dominated and reconfigured by more 
powerful external powers, as took place in other Asian powers.  In the case of Japan, 
the cost-benefit calculation of most actors changed at the point when four “black ships 
of evil mien” steamed in, threatened to starve the Shogun’s capital, and made 
humiliatingly clear the new military-economic selection environment facing the 
Japanese.   
 
Firearms did not ‘beat’ swords.  Swords were a component of a vast 
sociotechnical interactor which included expensive samurai and feudal systems of 
production and governance.  This complex was seriously maladaptive in the context of 
competitive industrializing nation-states.  However, it may be that swords are so 
closely tied to feudal systems and firearms with modern industrialized systems that 
this simplification is symbolically accurate.  Selection was probably favoring 
industrialization, increased social mobility, empowerment of some classes (capitalist 
classes in particular), larger polities (to achieve economies of scale in fiscal and 
defense matters), strong nationalist ideologies, and so forth.  Each of these may have 
been as important as the presence of firearms, and perhaps some more.  Alas, 
selectionism is less easy to observe, and hence less compelling, when operating on 
political systems as compared to military systems.  A cavalry charge into well 
disciplined infantry illustrates immediately the selection pressures.  A corrupt political 
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system slowly sucking the efficiency from a sociotechnical interactor is not as 
compelling of a selectionist story.  But probably just as important.  
In this way we could speculate about how constrained, or how inevitable, is 
sociotechnical evolution.   In some cases, where selection pressures are weak or there 
are many adaptive possibilities, evolution may be highly contingent and variable.  At 
other times, when the converse is true, there may be effectively only one evolutionary 
path.  In the case of Japan, it might have been possible to maintain the ban of firearms.  
But it doesn’t seem possible that the samurai could have maintained their way of life, 
because that would entail maintaining Japan’s feudal social system.  In this way, Katsu 
and Sakamoto may have been right to believe that modernizing reforms were 
inevitable.   
 
Noel Perrin, in his conclusion, draws some broader lessons concerning the 
relationship of people to technology: 
The clock that had been turned backward turned forward again with almost 
incredible speed.  … Viewed from the nuclear present, [Japan’s] two hundred 
and fifty years of technological retrogression may seem to have no great 
significance, except as a historical curiosity, and perhaps as proof that a 
deliberate turning back is in fact possible in a civilized society. … The 
Japanese experience …proves[s]… that a no-growth economy is perfectly 
compatible with prosperous and civilized life…[and] that human beings are 
less passive victims of their own knowledge and skills than most men in the 
West suppose.  …[Many] talk as if progress – however one defines that elusive 
concept – were something semidivine, an inexorable force outside human 
control.  And, of course, it isn’t.  It is something we can guide, and direct, and 
even stop.
289      
 
But the lesson from the Japanese experience is more nuanced than simply that 
a society can guide its technological course; Perrin, in his rush to reassure humanity 
that we can still shape our destiny, like many constructivists, generalizes from a 
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limited case study and analytical frame.  Perrin emphasizes the turning “back of the 
clock.”  But what made the clock suddenly wind forward, making up for two-hundred 
and fifty years of technological stagnation in fifty?   
No one can dispute that humans can interpret, challenge, ‘hack,’ and reimagine 
their technologies in the short run, but in the long run, if larger selection pressures are 
present, then all this interpretive flexibility is just so much variation to be selected 
from.  An analyst cannot understand an evolutionary system without having a good 
understanding of both the variation possible (or scope of interpretive flexibility) AND 
the strength and character of the selection pressures.  The full lesson from the Japanese 
experience is that: a deliberate turning back is in fact possible in a civilized society 
only if external selection pressures are weak or non-existent.  ‘Progress’ is something 
we can guide, and direct, and even stop, if, like island Japan, we can insulate 
ourselves from other military-economic competitors.   
In a review of Noel Perrin’s book, the esteemed historian of Japan, Conrad 
Totman, expresses this same point, though without reference to the theoretical 
implications for the study of technology.  Totman writes that: 
Guns went out of style because war ended.  Had it continued, the use of 
guns would have continued. . . . By treating the disuse of firearms as an act of will 
rather than a byproduct of other developments, Perrin draws questionable 
conclusions about the lesson for our day.  He wants us to learn that just as 
Tokugawa Japan guided, directed, and stopped ‘progress,’ so we today can 
‘choose to forget,’ and by such a resolute act of will undo the whole process of 
thermonuclear weapons proliferation.  What the Tokougawa experience really 
teaches us, however, is a more sobering lesson—namely, that the elimination of 
firearms use required the prior elimination of the sociopolitical conditions 
promoting it.
290   
 
                                                 
290 Totman, Conrad. 1980. Review of Giving Up the Gun. The Journal of Asian Studies 39 (3):599-601.  
Italics mine.   
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Conclusion 
Who—if anyone—controls technological change?   
The answer, of course, is that it depends.  From the point of view of 
sociotechnical evolutionism, the degree of agency depends on the character and 
intensity of selection, and the character of variation.  Neither extreme theoretical 
position, that of the radical social constructivists or the naïve technological 
determinists, provides a satisfactory answer.  There are contexts, usually found on 
smaller scales of analysis, in which the claims of the social constructivists are valid: in 
the absence of path-dependent variation, and of economic and military competition, 
humans have tremendous interpretive flexibility and choice.  There are also contexts, 
usually found on larger scales of analysis, in which the claims of the technological 
determinists are accurate: when a large and varied population of interactors is 
competing economically and/or militarily, humans have little substantive power over 
their collective destiny.   
A frequent justification for constructivist scholarship is that it shows how 
“there is no one inevitable logic of development.  There is choice.”
291  A common 
critique of deterministic scholarship is that it “leaves little room for individual 
agency.”
292  Of course, there is always some choice.  But criticizing and validating 
social theories based on apriori criteria of acceptable allowances of agency is 
misguided.  We should not conflate our theoretical priors with our empirical 
inferences.   Rather than judging social theories by the minimum degree of human 
agency that they allow, I believe that we should evaluate theories based on how well 
they explain their subject of study.  Assuming that individuals “have choice” and 
                                                 
291 Pinch. The Social Construction of Technology: A review, 34. 
292 Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2005. Democracy and Redistribution (review). Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 35 (4):625. 
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assuming that humans have none are equally futile; we should be exploring the hard 
question of how much and what kinds of agency humans have in different 
circumstances and why.   
Yes, there is always some choice.  But in reiterating the constructivist message 
uncritically, we risk making technological control seem too easy, and we fail to come 
to terms with the powerful competitive forces shaping history.  Our divided world 
order is aggravating a number of dangerous processes, including the rapid 
consumption of fossil fuels, disappearing rainforest and biodiversity, global warming, 
the failure to enfranchise and secure billions of people, increasing inequality, insecure 
nuclear stockpiles, astoundingly wasteful expenditures on the military, and rapid 
profit-driven development of unpredictable technologies.  The possibility of a global 
man-made catastrophe is not small.   
Technological determinists often commit the mirror intellectual fault to 
assuming agency: they assume none.  For too long economists theorized their markets 
to be independent of political institutions and social norms.  Likewise, political 
“realists” underestimate the importance of trans-national actors and norms, and too 
easily dismiss the dream of a global order that could rein in dangerous military 
rivalries.  Our world is poised in a historically unprecedented position, both for its 
danger and its promise.  Through improving communication and transportation 
technologies, and a growing global social web, we are increasingly capable of global 
collective action.  If particular economic externalities are identified as the source of a 
global problem, it is conceivable that our world could legislate the problem away.  If 
military competition is deemed as wasteful and dangerous, it is conceivable that our 
world could establish a system of collective security, such as the European Union is 
presently constructing.  These choices are not ruled out to us, but nor are they easily 
within grasp.   One important step towards controlling our future is to develop an 
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understanding of the processes that shape the future, including a full appreciation for 
the breadth of possible human choice and for the competitive processes that constrain 
it.  As a species we can either react to the forces that push us into arms races and 
ecological collapse, or we can proactively change those forces.    
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Appendix A.  Theories of Technology Table 
     
School’s of 
Thought in the 
Study of 
Technology 
Scale of 
Analysis; 
Degree of 
Agency 
Micro-
Mechanisms 
Motives 
of Actors 
Explanatory 
Strengths 
Weaknesses Exemplary 
Scholars 
Strawman, 
“Nomothetic”, 
“Hard”,  
or Naïve  
Technological 
Determinism 
Macro; 
None 
Abstract “laws” 
of history or 
agency of 
“technology”.   
Irrelevant N/A  N/A  No  one. 
Technological 
Determinism 
with 
underspecified 
micro-
mechanism.   
Macro; 
Little 
Underspecified: 
unintended 
consequences; 
“rationalization” 
of all life. 
Underspe
cified 
Observes long-
term patterns in 
history; 
resonates w/ 
intuition; 
highlights 
limits of human 
agency and 
danger of 
technology.   
Lacking 
micro-
mechanism; 
may deter 
political 
action;  
Winner, 
Mumford, 
Jacques Ellul, 
Heilbroner, Karl 
Marx, Lynn 
White, 
Pelto, 
Neil Postman 
Techno-
Utopianism 
with 
underspecified 
micro-
mechanism. 
Macro; 
Unspecified
, possibly 
forfeited 
entirely. 
Underspecified: 
scientific and 
technological 
progress; 
capitalism. 
Mixed: 
knowledg
e, 
wealth… 
Resonant with 
economic 
trends; 
sells products 
and avoids 
revolutions.   
Lacking 
micro-
mechanism; 
may be a 
product of “a 
magnificent 
[capitalist] 
bribe” 
Ray Kurzweil, 
Nick Bostrom,   
Macro; 
Only if 
powerful, 
and there is 
little 
competition
.  
Competition for 
Military Power 
amongst plastic 
sociotechnical 
systems. 
Survival 
(requires 
power) 
Jared Diamond, 
John A. Lynn, 
Kenneth Chase, 
Robert Carneiro 
(less explicitly 
Mumford and 
William 
McNeill) 
Sociotechnical 
Adaptationism 
(Sociotechnical 
Evolution by 
Economic and 
Military 
Selection) 
Macro; 
Only if 
powerful, 
and there is 
little 
competition
.  
Competition for 
Profit amongst 
plastic 
sociotechnical 
systems. 
Survival 
(requires 
profit) 
Provides micro-
mechanism for 
deterministic 
trends.  
Identifies 
constraints on 
agency.  
“Adaptationist 
story 
telling”/circul
ar reasoning: 
explains 
outcome by 
imputing 
adaptiveness.    
Joel Mokyr, 
Frank Geels, 
Geoffrey 
Hodgson 
(less explicitly 
Winner, 
Mumford, 
McNeill, and 
Robert 
Heilbroner) 
Technical Power, 
Technological 
Politics 
Meso; If 
actor is 
powerful. 
Inscription of 
Politics into 
Artifacts 
Contextua
l 
Sensitive to 
power (in tech 
construction 
and use). 
Fails to 
explain 
historical 
dynamism: 
why do the 
powerful ever 
lose power?  
Langdon Winner, 
David Noble, 
Bruno Latour, 
Richard Sclove 
172  
Neo-classical and 
Evolutionary 
Economics, and 
Diffusion Studies 
Meso; Only 
if powerful, 
and there is 
little 
competition
.  
Consumption and 
Production, 
Market Behavior 
Profit and 
Utility 
Merits of 
market; 
innovation and 
its diffusion. 
Often assumes 
rationality, 
and perfect 
information. 
Joel Mokyr, 
Everett Rogers, 
David Mowery, 
Nathan 
Rosenberg, 
Geoffrey 
Hodgson, Joseph 
Schumpeter 
Technological 
Momentum 
Micro-
Meso; 
Constrained 
by past 
structures.  
Social Interaction 
with path-
dependent 
cognitive, social, 
and economic 
investments.  
Contextua
l 
Explains 
historical 
constraints on 
actors (ie. some 
“structure”) 
Still fails to 
explain 
“autonomous 
tech”, trends, 
and historical 
dynamism.   
Thomas Hughes, 
Wiebe Bijker 
(“technological 
frame”) 
Mild Social 
Construction of 
Technology, or 
Historical 
Contextualism 
Micro; 
Constrained
, not clear 
how. 
Social Interaction  Contextua
l 
Realistic; 
compelling 
historical 
narratives; 
detailed. 
Atheoretical: 
“one damn 
thing after 
another”; may 
dangerously 
underestimate 
obduracy of 
crisis.   
Most historians 
and sociologists 
of technology: 
Merrit Roe 
Smith, Leo 
Marx, Kline, 
Bijker 
Thomas Misa, 
Ruth Cowan, 
Bijker 
Radical Social 
Construction of 
Technology 
Micro; 
Unlimited. 
Radical 
Interpretive 
Flexibility, 
Social Interaction 
Anything Emphasizes 
interpretive 
flexibility and 
agency.   
Ignores 
properties of 
technologies 
(and thus 
power, cost, 
efficiency, 
etc…) 
Trevor Pinch, 
Steve Woolgar 
(Mild 
Constructivists 
with occasional 
radical rhetoric: 
Ronald Kline) 
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